PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XV. No. 58. APRIL 1940

CONSCIENCE AND CONSCIENTIOUS ACTION

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AT the present time Tribunals, appointed under an Act of Parliament, are engaged all over England in dealing with claims to exemption from military service based on the ground of "conscientious objection" to taking part directly or indirectly in warlike activities. Now it is no part of the professional business of moral philosophers to tell people what they ought or ought not to do or to exhort them to do their duty. Moral philosophers, as such, have no special information, not available to the general public, about what is right and what is wrong; nor have they any call to undertake those hortatory functions which are so adequately performed by clergymen, politicians, leader-writers, and wireless loudspeakers. But it *is* the function of a moral philosopher to reflect on the moral concepts and beliefs which he or others have; to try to analyse them and draw distinctions and clear up confusions in connection with them; and to see how they are inter-related and whether they can be arranged in a coherent system. Now there can be no doubt that the popular notions of "conscience" and "conscientious action" are extremely vague and confused. So I think that, by devoting this paper to an attempt to elucidate them, I may succeed in being topical without being impertinent.

I shall begin by trying to describe what I understand by "conscience," in the widest sense of the word. I have no doubt that it is often used in certain narrower senses, which I shall indicate in due course. I think that failure to recognize this ambiguity often leads to misunderstandings and disputes which are mainly verbal.

All civilized languages which I know or have heard of contain adjectives like "right" and "wrong," "good" and "evil," or their

equivalents. This shows that human beings from the earliest times have had certain experiences which they took to be cognitions of acts, intentions, motives, etc., as having certain characteristics, viz. *moral* ones, which can take opposed forms. Again, retrospection assures most of us that we too have had such experiences when we have contemplated certain actions, dispositions, or characters, whether our own, or those of other real people, or those of fictitious persons in novels or plays. I am not at present concerned with the question whether there really are moral characteristics and whether we really do cognize them. I am concerned only with the plain psychological and historical fact that most of us, and most of our human predecessors back into prehistoric times, have had experiences which they took to be cognitions of such characteristics in acts, dispositions, characters, etc. I shall call these experiences "ostensibly moral cognitions."

It is an equally plain psychological fact that, when a human being contemplates an action or disposition or character in which these moral characteristics seem to him to be present, he is liable to feel certain kinds of emotion which he would not otherwise feel. All languages have words like "remorse," "feeling of guilt," "feeling of obligation," "moral indignation," and so on; and most of us know what such words indicate from our own experiences of such emotions. I propose to call these "morally directed emotions."

Here I must interpolate some remarks in order to ward off possible misunderstandings. We must notice that nothing ever has or could have *only* moral characteristics, any more than a word could have *only* meaning without any particular sound or visible form. Anything that has moral characteristics will also have certain non-moral ones; and, what is more, its moral characteristics will always depend upon certain of its non-moral ones. If I am told that a certain act was wrong, it is always sensible for me to ask: "Why? What *made* it wrong?" And the answer that I expect would be an indication of some characteristic which can be fully described and understood without the use of any moral term, e.g. that it was a refusal to return a borrowed article, that it was an intentionally misleading answer to a question, that it was an intentional infliction of unnecessary pain, and so on. I propose to call those non-moral characteristics on which moral characteristics depend "right-making," "good-making," and so on.

Now emotions may be and often are felt towards acts, experiences, etc., in respect of their non-moral characteristics. Suppose, e.g. that a friend grants me a favour unfairly at the expense of another person because he likes me and does not like him. I shall tend to view this act with a non-morally directed emotion of complaisance in respect of its non-moral characteristic of being an act of special

love and favour towards myself. But I shall tend also to view it with a morally-directed emotion of disapproval in so far as it is an act of unfairness towards my rival. It is, I think, quite possible to feel a non-morally directed dislike for an act in respect of those very right-making characteristics which give it a rightness which calls forth one's moral approval. Our attitude towards certain acts of stern justice towards their sons by typical Roman fathers is of this mixed kind.

It follows from all this that we may often think that we are feeling an *unmixed* morally directed emotion, when what we are really feeling is a mixture of morally and non-morally directed emotion. And we may sometimes mistake a purely non-moral emotion, such as fear of discovery and punishment or malice, for a morally directed emotion, such as remorse or righteous indignation. But the possibility and even the frequency of such mistakes has no tendency to show that there are not specifically moral emotions. The very fact that we recognize that we are liable to make these mistakes, strongly suggests that there are specifically moral emotions.

Lastly, it is an equally plain psychological fact that the belief that a certain course of action would be right does exercise a certain attraction or compulsion on most people and thus provides them with a motive-component for doing it. Still more obvious is it that the belief that a certain course of action would be wrong exercises a certain repulsion or inhibition on most people and thus provides them with a motive-component against doing it. Sometimes every other feature in alternative A is such as would make one prefer it to B. To do A might benefit me and other people, and to do B might injure me and other people. But to do A would involve breaking a promise which I gave, after due consideration, to a person who is now dead and therefore cannot release me. If I believe that it is wrong to break a promise given under those conditions, this one feature in A may make me reject it and choose B. I am not at present considering such cases from an ethical point of view; all that I am concerned with here is the psychological fact that they happen and are perfectly familiar. All civilized languages have words like "ought," "duty," "obligation," etc. All these words refer to the fact that the supposed rightness of an action gives rise to a motive-component for doing it, and that the supposed wrongness of an action gives rise to a motive-component against doing it, and that these specifically *moral* motive-components may conflict with others which arise from one's belief about the non-moral characteristics of the action. I shall refer to these psychological facts as "moral motivation."

Here again we must notice that non-moral motive-components, based on the attractiveness or repulsiveness which an action derives

from the non-moral characteristics which we believe it to have, will generally co-exist and co-operate with components of moral attraction and moral repulsion. In consequence of this a person may often think that he is being moved by purely moral motives when really his total motive for choosing or rejecting an alternative contains both moral and non-moral motive-components. And we may sometimes mistake a purely non-moral motive, such as desire for comfort or safety, for the moral motive of desire to do what is right as such. But the possibility and even frequency of such mistakes has no tendency to show that there is not moral motivation.

We may sum up these facts by saying that the vast majority of sane adult human beings are capable of ostensibly moral cognition, of morally directed emotion, and of moral motivation. Now every such person is also capable of *reflexive* cognition, i.e. of contemplating himself, his experiences, dispositions, intentions, motives, and actions, from various points of view. To say that a person "has a Conscience," when this phrase is used in its widest sense, is equivalent to asserting the following three closely connected propositions about him. (1) That he has and exercises the cognitive power of reflecting on his own past and future actions, and considering whether they are right or wrong; of reflecting on his own motives, intentions, emotions, dispositions, and character, and considering whether they are morally good or bad; and of reflecting on the relative moral value of various alternative ideals of character and conduct. (2) That he has and exercises the emotional disposition to feel certain peculiar emotions, such as remorse, feeling of guilt, moral approval, etc., towards himself and his own actions, dispositions, etc., in respect of the moral characteristics which he believes these to have. (3) That he has and exercises the conative disposition to seek what he believes to be good and to shun what he believes to be bad, as such, and to do what he believes to be right and avoid what he believes to be wrong, as such.

I propose to describe this as "the phenomenological sense" of the phrase "having a conscience." I think that the most sceptical of speculators about morals would hardly deny that most people nowadays and throughout the course of history have "had a conscience," in this phenomenological sense. Let us consider where ethical scepticism would be relevant to this question. The most radical form of scepticism would deny that adjectives like "right," "morally good," "obligatory," etc., really stand for characteristics. Its advocates would allege that sentences in which such words occur as grammatical predicates are really interjections or commands masquerading as statements about certain peculiar characteristics of actions, dispositions, persons, etc. If so, those experiences which seem to most people to be cognitions of moral characteristics cannot

really be so; for there will be no such characteristics to be cognized. But it can hardly be denied that there are experiences which *seem* to be cognitions of moral characteristics. If there were not, it is impossible to see why moral sentences in all languages should have been couched in the indicative form with a moral adjective as grammatical predicate. So I do not think that such an ethical sceptic, if he knew his business, would attempt to deny that there are *ostensibly* moral cognitions, and this is all that is involved in the cognitive part of the definition of "having a conscience," in the phenomenological sense of that phrase.

If there are no ethical characteristics, it cannot be their presence in the actions, etc., which we contemplate, that moves our emotions. But that would not affect our definition. Granted that a person believes that there are moral characteristics, and believe that such and such of them are present in certain objects which he contemplates, there is no reason why this belief (however false or baseless it may be) should not evoke in him specifically moral emotions towards those objects. The ethical sceptic will, indeed, have to regard those emotions rather as a disbeliever in ghosts might regard the fear which a superstitious person would feel in a room which he believes to be haunted. But any reasonable person would admit that, even if ghosts do not exist, a specific kind of fear is felt by persons who believe in ghosts when they are in places which they believe to be haunted. What is more, a disbeliever in ghosts might himself feel such a fear in such circumstances, though he would judge it to be unreasonable. Similarly an ethical sceptic might himself continue to feel morally directed emotions, though he would have to regard them as unreasonable. And he should have no difficulty in admitting that most human beings do so. Therefore this kind of ethical sceptic need not deny that the emotional condition for having a conscience, in the phenomenological sense of that phrase, is fulfilled by most people.

Precisely similar remarks apply to the question of moral motivation. We are moved by our *beliefs* about the characteristics of things, regardless of whether those beliefs be true or false, well or ill founded. Since it can hardly be denied that most people believe themselves to be aware of moral characteristics in the actions, dispositions, etc., which they contemplate, the doctrine that all such beliefs are in principle mistaken is quite consistent with the contention that most people are susceptible to moral motivation.

An independent attack could, no doubt, be made on the applicability of the second and third clauses in our definition of "having a conscience." It might be contended that, whether we cognize moral characteristics or not, our beliefs in the presence of such characteristics never evoke any specific emotion and never influence our

actions. Our emotions, it might be said, are evoked and our actions are influenced *only* by what we believe about the *non-moral* characteristics of what we are contemplating. But we proceed either to deceive ourselves or to try to deceive others about the direction of our emotions and the nature of our motives.

I think that this kind of scepticism is usually based on some general theory of human action, such as psychological hedonism, which would rule out the possibility of specifically moral emotion and motivation. I need only say that all such general theories rest on certain rather subtle verbal confusions, and may safely be rejected. A more empirical basis for such scepticism is the admitted mixture of non-moral emotions and motives with moral ones, and the admitted possibility of mistaking one of the former for one of the latter in any particular case. As I have already said, it does not seem to me that the facts about mixture and about mistakes and sophistications are adequate to support the sweeping negative conclusions which have been based on them, in face of the strong *prima facie* evidence for moral motivation and moral emotion.

I see no reason, then, to qualify my assertion that, in the phenomenological sense of the phrase, practically every sane adult human being "has a conscience," whatever may have been the case with himself as an infant or with his prehistoric ancestors. Of course an individual may happen to live in an environment in which his conscientious dispositions are hardly ever excited or are constantly suppressed. They may then atrophy or become warped, as any other set of dispositions would be likely to do under similar circumstances.

We must now notice some important negative facts about having a conscience, in the sense defined. (i) To say that a person has a conscience, in this sense, neither entails nor excludes that this person holds any particular theory about the nature of goodness or rightness or moral obligation. It neither entails nor excludes that he holds any particular theory about what makes good things good or right acts right. And it neither entails nor excludes that he holds any particular theory about the nature and sources of our moral knowledge and belief. A plain man, with no theories on any of these subjects, can have a conscience and act conscientiously. So too can persons who hold the most varied theories on these points; a man can be a conscientious Utilitarian, a conscientious Intuitionist, a conscientious Hegelian, or what not. All that is necessary is that he shall believe that, in some way or other, he can form a reasonable opinion about the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of various courses open to him, and that his opinions on such matters shall be capable of evoking his emotions and influencing his decisions.

(ii) The fact that most people have consciences, in the sense

defined, does not, so far as I can see, establish or refute any particular ethical theory. This is, of course, quite a different point from the one which we have just been discussing. It is one thing to say, e.g. that a person could equally well have a conscience whether he accepted or rejected Utilitarianism. It is quite another thing to say that a person could equally well have a conscience whether Utilitarianism be true or false. I assert that, on my definition of "having a conscience," both these statements are true, and that they would be equally true if any other ethical theory were substituted for Utilitarianism.

Now there is no doubt that the phrase "to have a conscience" has often been used in a narrower sense than this. I propose now to consider the more important of the narrower senses in which it has been used. In order to do this I must begin with a very brief account of the moral situation in which we appear *prima facie* to find ourselves. It is roughly as follows.

We seem to be under an obligation to do what we can to maintain and increase the amount of good and to diminish the amount of evil, of every kind, in the lives of other persons whom we can affect appreciably by our actions. Let us call this a "teleological obligation." *Prima facie* it seems that we have other obligations, not derivable from it, which limit it and may conflict with it; e.g. the mere fact that a person has made a promise seems to be enough to impose on him an obligation to keep it unless the promisee should release him. This obligation appears to be independent of any good that may be produced or evil that may be averted or diminished in others by keeping the promise. We seem to be under an obligation to keep it even when we have strong reason to believe that the consequences would be better for all concerned if we were to break it. Again, there seem to be non-teleological obligations which bear upon the direction and range of our teleological obligations. Granted that one has a duty to do good to others, it seems obvious to most people that a man has a more urgent duty to do good to his parents or his benefactors than to complete strangers.

Now there seem to be a number of non-teleological obligations, e.g. to answer questions truly, to keep one's promises, and so on. And they are liable to conflict, not only with our teleological obligation, but also with each other. E.g. a person may have made a certain promise and he may afterwards be asked a certain question. And it may be impossible to keep the promise and answer truly. In order to keep the promise he must tell a lie, and in order to answer truly he must break the promise. The only remaining alternative is to refuse to answer the question; but in many cases refusal to answer would, for all practical purposes, be equivalent to answering in a certain way and betraying a confidence which one had promised to keep.

Now there is an important epistemological difference between teleological and non-teleological obligations. Suppose I am in a situation where several alternative actions are open to me, and that I am trying to fulfil the teleological obligation to produce as much good or as little evil as I can in others. In order to discover my duty I shall have to consider elaborately the probable remote consequences of the various alternative courses of action. Now this involves a great deal of wholly *non-moral* reflexion on the properties of things, the dispositions of persons, the laws of nature, and so on. The conclusions of such reflections will generally be highly uncertain, and one's capacity to conduct them successfully will depend on the extent of one's knowledge about non-moral facts and the degree of one's capacity for reasoning about physical, psychological, social, economic, and political matters. The *moral* insight that is needed will be concerned only with estimating and comparing the goodness and badness of the consequences which one thinks it likely that the various alternative courses of action would produce. Suppose, on the other hand, I am in a situation where non-teleological obligations are predominant, such as truth-telling and promise-keeping. Then in most cases the ascertainment of the relevant non-moral facts is perfectly simple and straightforward and can be performed without any expert knowledge or technical skill and instruction. If one has made a promise and is asked a question, there is generally not the least difficulty in being certain as to what answers would be lies and what answers would be breaches of promise. Here, then, almost the whole of the cognition involved is specifically *moral*; it is concerned with seeing that making a promise, as such, imposes an obligation to keep it; that answering a question, as such, imposes an obligation to answer it truthfully; and with estimating the relative urgency of these two obligations in cases where they conflict.

It is not surprising, therefore, that many people should be inclined to use the word "conscience" in such a way that conscience, on its cognitive side, is confined to the task of intuiting non-teleological obligations and estimating their relative urgency.

Suppose we take "conscience" in this narrower sense. Then it will follow that, if Utilitarianism be true, no one has a conscience. For the essence of Utilitarianism is that there are no non-teleological obligations. And, if there are none, no one can intuit them and estimate their relative urgency; though non-Utilitarians may mistakenly think that they do so. According to the Utilitarian, what makes it obligatory to keep a promise is not the mere fact that the promise has been made. What makes it obligatory, when it is so, is that we are under the obligation to produce as much good and as little evil as possible by our actions, and that experience has shown that promise-keeping on the whole leads to better

consequences than promise-breaking. And similar remarks apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to all the alleged non-teleological obligations.

I am not at present concerned to discuss the truth or falsity of Utilitarianism, so I will confine myself to the following three remarks.

(i) In deciding what he ought to do in any situation, a Utilitarian would have to consider carefully, not only what the consequences of various alternative actions would probably be, but also what kinds and amounts of good and evil would attach to each of these consequences if it were realized. It seems inconvenient to use the word "conscience" in such a way that intuition and comparison of *goods and evils* would not be a function of conscience, whilst intuition and comparison of *non-teleological obligations* would be so.

(ii) Suppose that Utilitarianism is false, and that there are non-teleological obligations. It can hardly be denied that there is *also* the teleological obligation to produce as much good and as little evil as one can. The mistake of Utilitarianism would be to hold that this is the *only* obligation, and to fail to see that there are others, equally fundamental, which limit it and may conflict with it. Truth-speaking and promise-keeping will be duties not reducible to beneficence, but beneficence will still be one duty among others. Therefore, in deciding what one ought to do in a given situation, it will often be necessary to consider the relative urgency of the teleological obligation of beneficence and certain non-teleological obligations, such as truth-telling and promise-keeping. In order to estimate the urgency of the obligation of beneficence it will be necessary to enter into precisely the same kind of calculations as Utilitarians consider to be necessary in every case, since this urgency will plainly depend on the nature and amount of good to be produced or evil to be averted by one's actions. It seems to me that it would be highly inconvenient to use the word "conscience" in such a way that it was part of the function of conscience to compare the urgency of various non-teleological obligations, but was no part of its functions to compare the urgency of non-teleological obligations with that of teleological ones or to compare that of two or more teleological ones with each other.

(iii) Nevertheless, the considerations which have now been brought to our notice do suggest that the following explanatory sentences should be added to our definition of "having a conscience." We must distinguish between the *purely factual* and the *purely ethical* considerations which are involved in any attempt to decide what we ought to do in a given situation. Both factors enter in all cases. The purely factual elements are generally (though by no means always) obvious, even to quite ignorant and simple people, when only non-teleological obligations are in question; but, when teleo-

logical obligations have to be seriously considered, they may be highly complex and uncertain and may demand technical knowledge and skill of an advanced kind. Now conscience, as such, is concerned directly only with the purely ethical factors. The operation of forecasting the consequences of various alternative actions, as distinct from estimating the goodness or badness of these consequences, could be performed as well or better by a person who had no conscience. But, although this intellectual process cannot itself be assigned to conscience, it is an essential condition without which conscience cannot do its own proper work in situations of any complexity. A person who is trying to find out what he ought to do is not using his conscience properly if he fails to inform himself as fully and accurately as possible of all the relevant facts, or if he omits to apply his utmost care and skill to the task of forecasting the remote and the indirect consequences of the alternatives under consideration.

When the word "conscience" is used in such a way that conscience, in its cognitive aspect, is confined to intuiting and balancing non-teleological obligations, I shall say that it is used "in the intuitional sense." I have now tried to show that this is an inconveniently narrow sense. But the word is often used in senses which are even narrower than this, and I will now consider some of them.

It is held by some people that certain kinds of non-teleological obligation are so urgent that a person ought not under any conceivable circumstances to do an action which would infringe any of them. This claim has been made, e.g. for the obligation to answer a question truthfully if at all. Now it seems to me that the word "conscience," and phrases which contain it, are often used in such a way as to imply that a person cannot have a conscience unless he holds this opinion, and that his conscience is in operation only on occasions when his action or his refusal to act is based on his belief that one of these unconditional obligations is involved. I should consider it most undesirable that the word should be used in this narrow way. For the opinion in question is almost certainly mistaken; and, even if it were true, it has been rejected by many people who, in any ordinary use of language, has been scrupulously conscientious, such as John Stuart Mill. It would plainly be unfortunate to use the word "conscience" in such a way that no one could be said to have a conscience unless he were mistaken on an important point of moral theory, and that no one could be said to be following his conscience except when he was under the influence of this delusion. The utmost that can be granted to the intuitionist is that we can see directly that certain relationships, as such, impose certain component obligations on us, and that some of them are so urgent that any act which would conflict with any

of these has a very strong tendency to be wrong. In certain cases this is true, not only of all the *actions* open to one, but also of the only remaining alternative, viz. *refusal to act.* If we care to say that, in such cases all the alternatives are wrong, we can do so; but we shall then have to admit that we ought to choose that alternative (be it one of the actions or refusal to act) which is the *least wrong.* And in complex cases there is not the faintest reason to believe that we have intuitive knowledge as to which one this is.

It remains to notice one further narrowing of the word "conscience." Sometimes it is used in such a way that a person would be said to be following his conscience only in so far as he bases his decision about what he ought to do on some alleged divine revelation. In many cases, I think, this amounts to little more than the previous usage decorated with theological frillings. The pronouncements of conscience about what is unconditionally wrong are regarded as, in some sense, the voice of God speaking in and to the individual; and so the agent can take them to be infallible without arrogating too much for himself. In other cases, however, the situation is quite different. Certain actions are regarded by the individual as unconditionally right or unconditionally wrong, not because he sees this for himself by direct inspection, but because he believes that God has given a ruling on the matter either in inspired writings or in the traditions of a divinely founded and directed church.

I will now leave the notion of conscience, and pass to that of a conscientious action. Conscience, as I have defined it, is a system of cognitive, emotional, and conative *dispositions,* and it is only when these dispositions are in operation that we have conscientious action.

The question whether an action is conscientious or not is mainly a question about the agent's motives in doing it. We must clear up the notion of motive a little before we can give a satisfactory definition of "conscientious action." Suppose that an agent is contemplating a certain possible course of action in a given situation. He will have various beliefs and expectations about its qualities, its relations, and its consequences, e.g. he may believe that it would be unpleasant to himself, that it would please his mother, and that it would be a breach of a promise made to his father, and so on. Some of these beliefs and expectations will attract him towards doing the action, some will repel him from doing it, and others may leave him unmoved. I call any belief about an action which attracts one towards doing it a "motive-component *for* the action," and any belief about it which repels one from doing it a "motive-component *against* the action." Suppose that a certain action is in fact chosen and performed. Then I say that the agent's "total

motive *in* doing the action" was the resultant of all the motive-components for doing it and all the motive components against doing it. And I say that he did it "*because of*" the former, and "*in spite of*" the latter.

Now suppose that there were several components for doing a certain action, and several against doing it, and that it was in fact done because of the former and in spite of the latter. Let us call the former *a*, *b*, and *c*, and the latter *u*, *v*, and *w*. Now consider, e.g. the component *a*. We can ask ourselves the following question about it. Would *a* have been sufficient, in the absence of *b* and *c*, to induce the agent to do this action in spite of the components *u*, *v*, and *w* against doing it? Or did the component *a* need to be supplemented by *b* or by *c* or by both in order to overcome the influence of *u*, *v*, and *w*? If and only if the first alternative is true, we can say that *a* was "a *sufficient* motive-component for doing the action." Next we can raise the following question. Would *bc* have been sufficient, in the absence of *a*, to induce the agent to do the action in spite of the components *u*, *v*, and *w* against doing it? Or did *bc* need to be supplemented by *a* in order to overcome the influence of *u*, *v*, and *w*? If, and only if, the second alternative is true, we can say that *a* was "a *necessary* motive-component for doing the action." Lastly, suppose that *a* had been the only component for doing the action. Then we could say that "the action was done *purely* from the motive *a*."

We can now apply these general considerations to the particular case of conscientious action. An action is conscientious if the following conditions are fulfilled. (i) The agent has reflected on the situation, the action, and the alternatives to it, in order to discover what is the right course. In this reflection he has tried his utmost to learn the relevant facts and to give each its due weight, he has exercised his judgment on them to the best of his ability, and he has striven to allow for all sources of bias. (ii) He has decided that, on the factual and ethical information available to him, the action in question is probably the most right or the least wrong of all those which are open to him. (iii) His belief that the action has this moral characteristic, together with his desire to do what is right as such, was either (*a*) the *only* motive-component for doing it, or (*b*) a *sufficient and necessary* motive-component for doing it. If the first alternative is fulfilled, we can say that his action was "*purely* conscientious." If the second is fulfilled, we can say that it was "*predominantly* conscientious." The following would be an example of a predominantly conscientious action. Suppose that a person, after reflection, decides that the right action for him is to undertake military service. Suppose that the two motive-components which induce him to undertake this action, in spite of fear, love of

comfort, etc., are his belief that it is right, together with his desire to do what is right as such, and his dislike of being thought cowardly by his friends. Then the action is predominantly conscientious if (*a*) his desire to do what is right, as such, *would* have sufficed to overcome his fear and his love of comfort even in the absence of his dislike of being thought cowardly, whilst (*b*) his dislike of being thought cowardly *would not* have sufficed to overcome those motive-components in the absence of his desire to do what is right, as such. In such a case we can say that the non-conscientious component for doing the action which the agent believes to be right is indeed present but is superfluous and insufficient. It would be absurd to refuse to call the action "conscientious" merely because a superfluous and insufficient non-conscientious motive-component for doing it happened to co-exist with the sufficient and necessary conscientious motive-component for doing it.

We come now to a much more difficult and doubtful case. Suppose that the agent's belief that the action is right, together with his desire to do what is right as such, is sufficient, but not necessary, to induce him to do it, in spite of the components against doing it. This would be illustrated by our old example if we varied it in the following way. We must now suppose that the agent's dislike of being thought cowardly *would* have sufficed to overcome his fear and his love of comfort and *would* have induced him to choose the course of action which he believes to be right, even if his belief that it is right and his desire to do what is right, as such, had been absent. The situation may be described as follows. The non-conscientious motive-component for doing the action is still superfluous; but now we must say that the conscientious component for doing it is equally superfluous. Each is sufficient, and therefore neither individually is necessary; all that is necessary is that one or other of them should be present. If you confine your attention to the *sufficiency* of the conscientious motive-component, you will be inclined to say that the action *is* conscientious; if you attend only to the *superfluity* of this component, you will be inclined to say that it is *not* conscientious.

We pass now to another difficult and doubtful case. Suppose now that the agent's belief that the action is right, together with his desire to do what is right as such, is necessary but not sufficient to induce him to do it in spite of the components against doing it. This would be illustrated by the following modification of our old example. We must now suppose (*a*) that the agent's belief that it is right for him to undertake military service, together with his desire to do what is right as such, would not have sufficed, in the absence of his dislike of being thought cowardly, to overcome his fear and his love of comfort; and (*b*) that the latter motive-

component, in the absence of the former, would also not have sufficed to overcome his fear and his love of comfort. Each of the two motive-components for doing the action is now necessary, and therefore neither of them individually is sufficient. If you confine your attention to the *indispensability* of the conscientious motive-component, you will be inclined to say that the action *is* conscientious; if you attend only to its *insufficiency*, you will be inclined to say that it is *not* conscientious.

I will group together purely and predominantly conscientious actions, in the sense defined above, under the name of "*fully* conscientious actions;" and I will group together the two doubtful cases, which we have just been discussing, under the name of "*semi-conscientious* actions." The two kinds of these can then be distinguished as (i) actions in which the conscientious motive-component is sufficient but superfluous, and (ii) actions in which the conscientious motive-component is indispensable but inadequate.

If a person does an act which he believes to be less right or more wrong than some other act open to him at the time, he does it in spite of his desire to do what is right, as such. Any action of this kind may be called "*contra-conscientious.*"

It is plain that a great many of our deliberate actions are neither fully conscientious, nor semi-conscientious, nor contra-conscientious; for many are done without considering them and the alternatives to them from the standpoint of rightness and wrongness. Such actions may be called "*non-conscientious.*" A non-conscientious action may be such that, if the agent had considered it and the alternatives to it from the standpoint of rightness and wrongness, he would have judged it to be the most right or the least wrong of the alternatives open to him. And it may be that he would then have done it for that reason alone or for that reason combined with others which are superfluous and insufficient. If both these conditions are fulfilled, we may say that this non-conscientious action was "*potentially* conscientious." In a similar way we could define the statement that a certain non-conscientious act was "*potentially* contra-conscientious."

I have now completed the task of analysis and definition, and I will conclude my paper with a few remarks about conscientious action, as defined above. (1) There is a very important sense of "ought" in which it is true to say that a person ought always to do that alternative which he believes, at the time when he has to act, to be the most right or the least wrong of all those that are open to him. (There are, undoubtedly, other senses of "ought" in which this would not be true; but we are not concerned with them here.) For this sense of "ought" to be applicable it does not matter how ignorant or deluded the agent may be about the relevant facts,

how incompetent he may be to make reasonable inferences from them, nor how crazy or perverted his judgments about right and wrong, good and evil, may be. But, the more fully this is admitted, the more obvious does the following complementary fact become. The most right or the least wrong act open to other individuals or to a society, in certain cases, may be to prevent a conscientious individual from doing certain acts which he ought, in this sense, to do, and to try to compel him to do certain acts which he ought, in this sense, to refrain from doing. Moreover, if other individuals or the authorities in a society honestly believe that the most right or the least wrong action open to them is to treat a certain conscientious individual in this way, then they *ought*, in the very same sense, to do so. What is sauce for the conscientious goose is sauce for the conscientious ganders who are his neighbours or his governors. This fact is often obscured because many people inadvertently or dishonestly confine their attention to cases, such as the trial of Socrates or of Christ, in which subsequent generations have held that the individual was, not only conscientious, but also correct in his ethical opinions, whilst the tribunal which condemned him was either not conscientious or was mistaken in its ethical opinions. It may be salutary for such persons to widen their purview by envisaging the case of a high-minded Indian civilian conscientiously securing the capture and execution of a high-minded Thug for conscientiously practising murder.

(2) It is sometimes said that, when an individual sets up his conscience against the general opinion of his society or of mankind, he is claiming "moral infallibility." If he knows his business, he is doing nothing of the kind. In order for it to be his duty, in the present sense, to do a certain alternative, all that is necessary is that he should think it *probable*, after considering the question to the best of his ability, that this alternative is more right or less wrong than any of the others which are open to him. Since he has to enact one of the alternatives, it does not matter in the least whether this probability is high or low. Nor does it matter whether the difference in rightness or wrongness is great or small. In considering the question, it is his duty to give full weight to the fact that most members of his society or most of the human race have formed a certain opinion about it. If he is a wise man, he will attach very great weight to this fact. But if, in spite of having done so, he comes to a contrary opinion, he ought, in the present sense, to act upon it, no matter how far short of complete conviction his opinion may fall.

(3) The last remark that I have to make is this. A *purely* conscientious action, in the sense defined above, must be a very rare event. It is hardly credible, e.g. that either undertaking or refusing military service could be a purely conscientious act, in that sense;

for everyone fears death and wounds and everyone dislikes to be thought cowardly.

Now the definitions of "predominantly conscientious" acts, and of the two kinds of "semi-conscientious" acts, all have the following peculiarity. They all involve the notion of what *would* have happened if certain conditions had been other than they in fact were. This notion of the consequences of unfulfilled conditions always enters whenever the question of sufficiency and dispensability is raised. It follows that an individual can seldom be rationally justified in feeling a very strong conviction that an action of his was conscientious; for, in order to decide this question, he has to form an opinion as to how he would have acted in the *absence* of certain motive-components which were in fact *present*. It seems to me that *a fortiori* it must be almost impossible for anyone to decide rationally as to whether another person's action is conscientious or not.

If I am right in this, the Tribunals have been given a task which is, from the nature of the case, incapable of being satisfactorily performed. This, so far as it goes, is a strong ground against allowing exemption from military service on grounds of conscience and against setting up Tribunals at all. There are, no doubt, other reasons which point in the opposite direction; and Parliament has decided that, in the present state of public opinion in England, the balance of advantage is in favour of allowing exemption on such grounds, and has therefore set up Tribunals to consider claims. It only remains for us to watch with sympathy and interest the efforts of these well-meaning men to deal with questions to which God alone can know the answer.

THE ETHICS OF DIGNITY

Professor JOHN LAIRD

In the pages that are to follow I shall try to discuss the validity and the sufficiency of a celebrated moral principle of Kant's "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, always as an end, never merely as a means." In doing so, I shall say quite a lot about Kant, because his statement of the principle has had great influence, because he gave his genius to its elaboration, because he illustrated and defended it in ways that deserve a close examination. On the other hand, my principal purpose is not to supply a piece of Kantian exegesis interspersed with sundry criticisms. In the main I want to discuss the principle, as people say, "on its merits." In so far as I discuss Kant himself, I am doing so with the object of eliciting these merits.

Kant's ethics was a very original system, and he believed that all other moralists had strayed from the way. Nevertheless, he set out to be an interpreter rather than an innovator, to state and defend what he believed to be the plain man's conviction in ethical matters, to describe that conviction in an accurate philosophical analysis, and to justify it metaphysically in so far as a metaphysics of moral freedom was possible to speculative man. Such innovations as he made were intended, indeed, to distil the wisdom of the past as well as to correct oversights. It is therefore to be presumed that the principle we are now examining was not intended to be a brand new invention in morals. It is the principle of intrinsic human dignity, familiar in some form or other to every Stoic and to every Christian, to say nothing of other moralists. Its inclusion in Kant's system was a desideratum that might have been foreseen, and strengthened the motives, and even the popular motives, to credence in the system.

That is the general situation. It is another question whether Kant borrowed his phrases from anyone in particular. I shall be brief and conjectural about that. It is likely, I think, that Kant was influenced by Pufendorf, an author with whom he was very well acquainted. For in Pufendorf's *De Officio* we read (at I, vii): "Even the word *man* is thought to contain a certain dignity, so that the last and most effective argument in repelling the insolent contempt of others is this: "I am certainly not a dog, but a man as well as you." Every man, therefore, should esteem and treat every other as naturally his equal, that is, as a man even as he is." In a broader

way we may discern the influence of Rousseau as M. Delbos has shown in a catena of passages from which I quote some phrases. "I used," said Kant, "to despise the common people and their ignorance. Rousseau disabused me. My illusory superiority vanished; I learned to honour mankind . . . to own allegiance to the rights of humanity. . . . Newton was the first to discover order and regularity in a grand simplicity of nature. . . . Rousseau was the first to uncover the nature of man in its depths despite the diversity of conventional forms."[1] In short, the philosophy of natural rights was one of the suns in Kant's ethical sky, a rationalist's sun, it is true, and not, like Rousseau's a romantic sun. But still, a very great luminary.

These remarks concerning the possible sources of Kant's formula may help to indicate the perennial place that human dignity has in the theories of systematic moralists. I shall not say more about the point of origin, and I wish that I could be equally brief about the place of Kant's principle within the four walls of his own ethical system. That question, in so far as it is a problem of technique and technology, and of the stresses and strains of Kant's system-building, would seem to be better suited to Kant-philology than to the freer discussion that I contemplate here. Such technical problems, however, are not the only ones that arise in this connection, and they have always much wider aspects. We shall see, I think, that several of them reach the foundations of ethics in respects that are very prominent in contemporary discussion. I must, therefore, pay some heed to some of them even at the risk of choosing a stiffish as well as a rather oblique approach to the principal theme.

The place of the principle of intrinsic human dignity in Kantian ethics is something of an enigma. Indeed, Rashdall used an intentional meiosis when he said that the relation of this Kantian formula to Kant's principal earlier one was "not very precisely determined."[2] In this country, for a very long time (but also nowadays) there has been a very general tendency to say that Kant was, or tried to be, a pure deontologist in ethics, an exponent of duty for duty's sake among mankind, and of the right for the right's sake among all rational beings, even God. According to this interpretation of him, right not good was the basis of all his ethics, deontology and not teleology, law and not end. Kant himself in the *Practical Reason*[3] admitted and tried to defend what he called the paradox of his method, viz. that the concept of the moral law was prior to the concept of good and evil.

Therefore there is certainly a puzzle. The principle of intrinsic

[1] *La Philosophie pratique de Kant*, pp. 116 f. See references to Hartenstein, vol. viii, 624, and others.

[2] *The Theory of Good and Evil*, i, 131.

[3] *Analytic*, chap. ii.

human dignity is said by Kant to be a principle about ends, a teleological principle, yet it seems also to be put forward as an alternative formulation of the supreme law of duty "Act so that the rule of thy conduct is fitted to be law universal." Alternatives should not be prior to one another.

So there is a puzzle; but it does not stand alone in Kant's exposition. He began the *Fundamental Principles*, and introduced his supreme law of duty, by asserting that the good will alone had intrinsic worth, and that duty was the human form of the good will. In other words, he gave priority to a principle about *good*. That, I concede does not diminish the puzzle. It suggests a definite contradiction; but it may diminish our surprise. Since Kant introduced his supreme law of duty by basing it upon a proposition about *good*, it is only to be expected that somewhere he would return to the point, and say, as he does say, that his ethics can be and should be construed teleologically, as an affair of intrinsic worth and dignity, as a supreme end.

For present purposes it may seem to be relatively unimportant whether Kant did or did not contradict himself, but it is not at all unimportant whether the principle of human dignity has a teleological or a non-teleological basis. That is not a point to be left in obscurity, and although the answer seems plain—for the principle *is* teleological as Kant says when he discusses it directly—we shall probably find ourselves repaid if we pay a little further attention to the course of Kant's exposition.

When Kant said that duty was prior to good he was thinking and speaking about a certain sort of good, viz. sensible good or pleasure. There his invariable contention was that *such* good was not morally good unless it was morally deserved. The *summum bonum* for man was an *earned* happiness. All other human happiness was but welfare and good fortune, non-moral, non-moralizable. Kant seems also, and I think invariably, to have held that rationality was good in itself, the unchallengeable possessor of indefeasible intrinsic worth. As I shall argue, it was the dignity of man's reason, of man in so far forth as rational, that was the essence and the substance of Kant's version of the moral principle of intrinsic human dignity.

These explanations may mitigate the puzzle by indicating how the contradiction could be rather easily removed. For the rest, let us recall Kant's exposition in its general outline. The law of duty, he said (that is, the principle of obeying those rules and those rules only which could be universalized without exception) was the plain man's code, was true, and could be used by everyone as an infallible criterion for deciding what was right and what was wrong. Philosophy should not impugn but had to analyse the fact. In its analysis philosophy discovered that the rule of duty was a categorical impera-

tive, that is to say, a law unconditionally commanded. What, then, can command unconditionally? Something, says Kant, that is free from all sensory bonds, or (in other words, as Kant thought) pure reason. But pure reason, so far as we know, is just the rational in mankind, rational personality that exists in man and may not exist in any other being. Rational personality is fitted to be the source and the end of rational (i.e. for Kant moral) conduct. All conduct must have an end, but reason is the only unconditioned end, the only end that is not ensnared by the flesh. To substantiate the unconditional supremacy, or "freedom," of reason in the cosmos would require a metaphysics; and definitive scientific or super-scientific proof may not be attainable. But Kant thought he could prove the *possibility* of such a metaphysics.

We shall have to return to much in this argument. For the moment, however, it may be sufficient to underline two parts of it. The first is that the principle of intrinsic human dignity is, for Kant, an affair of human rationality, an end that every human being ought to salute because of a companionship in reason. The second is that Kant regarded the principle as omni-competent in ethics, the *ratio essendi* as well as an adequate *ratio cognoscendi* for all ethical situations.

Having said these things about Kant I shall now attempt, rather abruptly, to start what one of Sir Henry Head's patients called a "direct think." What would we be inclined to think about Kant's formula about human dignity if we did not know that it was Kant's?

Two points may be noted at the outset, the first that the formula bids each man apply the principle to himself as well as to others, the second that there is a wealth of meaning in the little word "merely." "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in another's always as an end, never *merely* as a means."

The first point has rather important theoretical implications. It enunciates, *inter alia*, a principle of justice. Each man should treat himself as well as others as an equal partner in a moral democracy—equal, that is, in the sense in which every man is "equal" before the law, moral or civil. Each is an independent responsible partner. Hence the sort of self-sacrifice that involves the waiving of one's own human rights is condemned. And that is not all. Certain moralists are of opinion that justice is essentially relational, interpersonal, social, and either a relational good that could not exist unless there were at least two parties to it, or a "right" relation that is not a "good" at all. Kant's formula is not constructed on these lines although its application when there was more than one partner might appear to be substantially the same. He bases the formula upon the intrinsic dignity of each several rational man. Therefore, according to Kant, a man on a desert island, without moral partners

and without hope of moral partners, should still respect his own rational dignity. The principle, for him, has social applications of the greatest moment, but it is not, so to say, constitutionally and merely social. It would apply where there was no society.

The second point, the significance of the little word "merely" needs a longer comment. I shall try to show that without the little word "merely" Kant's formula would be simply absurd, but that, with it, the formula is too thin for sufficiency.

Obviously, if Kant had said that we should *never* treat ourselves or others as means but always and altogether as ends he would have said something that was quite untenable. Anyone who serves his fellow-men, anyone who does himself a service is treating himself as a means, in the first instance for the benefit of others, in the second instance for his own benefit. Similarly, anyone who accepts the services of others (or accepts his own services) is treating them (or himself) as a means. Post a letter and you are using postmen and railwaymen as means just as clearly as you are using ink and paper and the pillar box as means. The whole relation of using and of being used, of helping (including self-helping) and of being helped is a relation of means. There is no conceivable social relation in which we would not have to use ourselves or our fellows as means.

Therefore it is comforting to reflect that Kant said nothing so silly. He said that we should never treat ourselves or our fellows *merely* as means, that we should never enslave or consent to be enslaved in the fullest "ideal" sense of slavery, a sense that may never be actually exemplified but that would be exemplified if any man were ever treated *merely* as a tool or as a piece of property. No doubt there is a sense in which it may be said that even property should not be treated quite irresponsibly. A workman, we may say, should respect his tools, a farmer should respect the soil, the curator of a gallery should respect the paintings in his charge. By almost universal consent, however, such statements are elliptical. To respect the land is to respect the users of future crops. The paintings are tended in peace and removed in war, not for their own sakes, not for the sake of the canvas and the pigments, but for the sake of posterity and its enjoyments. Except in this borrowed way, mere instruments, mere property, receive and deserve no consideration for their own sakes alone, and Kant is saying that no man should treat himself or his fellows in that way.

So far, as I have said, I think we should plainly agree with him. Indeed, I think we should say that Kant has succeeded in formulating a principle, indisputably moral, to which there are no conceivable exceptions. I do not say that we should know what to do if, for example, we found that there was genuine slavery, or something uncommonly like it, at some point in the probable passage of a letter

from London to Timbuktu, or that, knowing this, we should never post such a letter. But we should know, if we posted it, that there was something not quite right about the business, and if we could do anything to help the matter we should certainly have a moral reason, and an urgent one, for making that contribution towards the world's improvement.

To discover a principle that is never non-moral and that applies to all moral situations without any exception is a very considerable achievement. It has still to be asked, however, whether the principle, so satisfactory in appearance as regards its spread, may not be spread very thin.

What is the indispensable minimum in treating another being not merely as a means? The answer is, surely, that you are treating anything—call it *x*—not merely as a means if you pay any regard whatsoever to *x* for its own sake. Let us grant, as has previously been allowed, that we do not, strictly speaking, pay any regard to inanimate objects for their own sakes, but only for the sake of potential users, that is, as means. Let us further make the same admission regarding plants. If it is a crime to destroy wild roses in bloom, the crime, we shall concede, is against humanity and not against the roses. The same may perhaps be true about flies and toads, although there we may be more doubtful. When, however, we come to the higher animals we adopt a different principle, or, at any rate, most of us do. We condemn cruelty and negligence towards the higher animals (and all in a moral way) because we hold that it is an offence to produce needless suffering *in them*. In other words *their* possible suffering is a moral determinant of *our* conduct. To that extent, at least, *we* should be considerate towards them for *their* sakes. And that is to say that we should not treat them as mere means, as living tools to which no heed should be given except to keep the tools efficient.

I am aware that the point is disputed among moralists. Some, including Kant,[1] would say that the question always concerns *our* dignity and not *their* suffering. On this view bull-fights are objectionable, not because the suffering of the bull and of the horses is itself to be condemned but because the spectacle brutalizes the spectators and because the sport brutalizes matadors, picadors, and the rest.

That seems to me to be an untenable piece of moralizing, a fact, I should say, that becomes even plainer if we remember a further consequence of the view I am calling untenable. That consequence would be that the suffering of our fellow men has nothing to do with our moral objections to cruelty towards them. In that case, too, the contention would have to be that we brutalize ourselves when we

[1] E.g. *Werke* (Berlin ed.), vi, 443.

hurt other men negligently or without cause, and that we damage our own characters if we hurt them for fun. Even Kant admitted that the happiness of others was a proper moral purpose, whether or not that happiness was morally deserved on the part of the beneficiaries. Indeed, paradox is much too mild a word for a theory of this order. It is utterly false to hold that the pain of the sufferers has nothing to do with the viciousness of cruelty. Is the argument that the suffering of the victims is relevant only because it lowers the dignity of the sufferers and so is of no account in the case of bulls and bears who (perhaps) have no dignity? That would seem to me to be a weak subterfuge if for no other reason because, as Socrates said, the suffering of blameless victims does not lower their dignity, if dignity they may have.

Accordingly, I submit that we should not be treating any being *merely* as a means if we paid the smallest attention to its pleasure or to its suffering. That may be the only clear moral determinant regarding our treatment of our fellow animals. As regards our fellow men, it seems plain that Kant's principle, in this attenuated form, would not suffice in the moral way. A slave-owner whose humanity led him to see to the comfort of his slaves for other than market reasons, who passed the time of day with them when he met them, who had them baptized, would, in all such acts, be treating them not merely as means. In other words, Kant's principle, as he states it, is too thin for his purpose.

Such a comment, I may be told, is grossly unfair. Kant's principle should be read in its entirety. If that is done, it plainly appears that a being is being treated merely as a means if its *rationality* is not respected (supposing that it *is* rational).

That is just my trouble. I say that the alternatives of paying regard to rationality as such, on the one hand, and of treating any man or any animal merely as a means are nothing like exclusive. Any grain of what we often call "humanity," any tenderness for animal suffering, eludes both the alternatives. And that is not all, or nearly all. Man's dignity is not an affair of his reason and of that only. We should also respect a man's courage, his generosity, his taste, his sympathy, his human-heartedness. None of these is mere reason. All may acquire dignity. The principle of human dignity would not normally be understood in the pure rationalistic form that Kant gave it. I would now suggest that it is untenable in that restricted form.

In regarding "reason" as that which alone had intrinsic worth and genuine dignity, Kant was the heir of a long tradition, and he was very resolute about it since he maintained, in opposition to Hutcheson and Shaftesbury as well as to crasser hedonists that true dignity consisted in moral worth alone, and that moral worth was *pure*

practical reason, a priori and wholly non-sensuous, non-emotional, non-empirical. Kant and the Stoics had considered and rejected all other views, and Kant at least was a man of genius. Despite that chastening reflection, however, I have to confess that I find the view incredible, and I would suggest that many philosophers who have said similar things have meant something rather different, as Kant himself sometimes did, although perhaps inadvertently.

Rationality or "reason," according to many observers, is the *differentia* of mankind when man is compared with other mundane beings. Hence, it may plausibly be held (and I think correctly) that whatever is *peculiar* in human dignity is not below the rational level. Supposing, however, that rationality defines the level at which we ascribe human dignity to man, it does not follow, in any way, that man's dignity is pure or mere reason; and it is the latter view, not the former, that I find incredible.

What, in the concrete, do we mean by "reason"? Is it not the power of reflecting and inferring, and forming a balanced judgment and (perhaps) of possessing insight into the sort of principle that, as we sometimes say, "stands *of itself* to reason"? This capacity, among mankind, distinguishes a man who is in his right mind from a man who is not, distinguishes him, in short, from an idiot or an imbecile. In that sense, I think, there would be very general support for the opinion that moral democracy, the equality of all men before the moral law, does not extend to anything sub-rational in human conduct. We should treat others as responsible moral partners, as beings who have the same fundamental right as we have to independent consideration, not if they are imbeciles but only if they are rational. There may be and I think there is a wider democracy of suffering. In that respect imbeciles and many of the beasts have a moral claim upon humanity, but they do not have the claim of dignity implied in the simple statement: "Thy servant is not a dog."

The moral is plain. Human dignity is not sub-rational, but mere or pure reason (if it ever exists) is not a man's sole claim to human dignity. As we have seen, there is also a human dignity of courage, taste, and the like. In man these are not sub-rational. The dignity of human courage is the dignity of a brave man who has his wits about him and knows what he has to fear. It is not mere animal courage. The breath and finer spirit of human taste is not unreflecting, quite stupid and imbecile. But there is a human dignity of human courage and of human taste; and it is not *mere* reason.

The sequel, I hope, will corroborate these opinions; but now I shall pass to another aspect of Kant's position. He regarded the principle of intrinsic human dignity as something that expressed the entire essence of morality and also as a standard that would discriminate

right from wrong in all cases in which it was intelligently applied. Is it possible to agree with him there?

I have said that I can see no possible valid exceptions to the rule that we should never treat humanity merely as a means. If that be true, Kant's principle is applicable to, and valid for, all moral conduct. It is one of the essentials of moral action. Quite a different question arises, however, if we ask whether the principle by itself is sufficient so distinguish right from wrong in all cases of perplexity.

We may hold (and, I think, rightly) that it is unreasonable to ask for an infallible moral criterion. Plato in his *Republic*[1] pointed out long ago that we need not expect to learn from mere ethics precisely how harp-players and horse-dealers could expect to make a success of their business, although genuine success (he believed) was the end of ethics, and although there was a moral aspect to harp-playing and to horse-dealing, Kant indeed may have expected too much from moral principles *per se*. He expected too much, pretty certainly, from his first formulation of the law of duty, the bare self-consistency of any principle that professed to be a possible universal law. That principle, he said, was sufficient in itself to give infallible guidance to all the perplexed, however inexperienced they might be in the world's affairs, however unprepared for the enigmas of fortune. Clearly it could not. It would not tell us when to tell a lie or how to save a life. Kant, as I have said, appears to have regarded the principle of human dignity as an alternative way of formulating the law of duty, and he tried to show by a series of examples how it could be successfully applied as a test over the widest possible range. In all probability he was asking too much of it. On the other hand, a principle that could not be applied at all would not repay close attention. The application of the principle, therefore, its use as a test, is of great importance. We need not expect it to test quite everything with sufficiency, but if there were *much* that it could test we should think very highly of it.

That is the question I shall try to answer now. I shall ask, not whether the principle of human dignity is an infallible test in morals, or a test that is always sufficient as well as necessary. I shall ask only whether it is useful and relatively simple as a test; and, as Kant himself has facilitated the answer to that question by applying his test to what he intended to be a comprehensive and a searching range of examples, it seems best to follow his lead.

Kant divided his illustrative list into four divisions (*a*) and (*b*) duties of complete obligation towards oneself or towards others, (*c*) and (*d*) meritorious (but less narrowly obligatory) duties towards oneself or towards others. (He used the same principle of division, and indeed cited the same list to check all his different formulations

[1] I, 333.

of the moral principle.) As examples of each in turn he cites the duty (*a*) of renouncing suicide, (*b*) of keeping promises, (*c*) of self-culture, and (*d*) of philanthropic regard for the happiness of others.

(*a*) Regarding suicide, his argument is that anyone who contemplates suicide contemplates a means of escape from personal misery, that in doing so the would-be suicide takes himself to be a mere means or tool for happiness-getting, and so is condemned by the principle of dignity.

Here Kant's argument does not seem to be very strong. It is not true, in fact, that all who think of suicide think of it simply as a way of avoiding personal discomfort or wretchedness. One thinks of Captain Oates in the Scott expedition, or of those who, believing that they would recant or betray under torture, prefer to take their own lives. Even if the question were made to turn on hedonism, it would not follow that a man who treats all his problems of conduct as problems of happiness-getting is treating himself or others *merely* as a means. He is paying regard to his happiness, to himself, for his own sake. Let it be granted that the would-be hedonistic suicide is neglecting the preservation of his own rationality as such. In that case there would be at least one type of instance in which Kant's formula would break down. Suppose a case in which some unfortunate man has the best of reasons for believing that he is going out of his mind. What is then the inference from the principle of rational dignity?

(*b*) Kant's second illustration—of promise-keeping—seems very much stronger. It will not, indeed, deal with the cases in which a promise is annulled by consent, or should be annulled if either or both of the parties were not unreasonably obstinate. As is usual with him, Kant assumes that every promise-breaker is simply cheating, that he is trying to evade his obligations and diddling some trusting dupe. On his own chosen ground, however, Kant seems to be right. It would seem to be the case that the cheat uses his dupe, very nearly, as a simple means. He need not, indeed, treat his dupe just like an inanimate object. He may flatter to deceive and otherwise be in appearance most polite and rather considerate. All fiduciary relations, however, presuppose the independent rights and privileges of the consenting parties, and that basis is cynically flouted when one of the parties is and means to be a cheat. That is just what Kant meant, and what he said.

(*c*) and (*d*) The other pair of illustrations that Kant gives are so obviously opposed to the narrower implications of *rationality* in human dignity as to raise a doubt about the interpretation of Kant's meaning that I have hitherto taken for granted. I am discussing the formula "Treat humanity always as an end" as it is given in the *Fundamental Principles*. There its foundation is explicitly stated to be the *rationality* of human nature, and I have assumed that the

statement is to be regarded as identical in principle with the further argument to which Kant immediately proceeds, viz. that the autonomy of man's reason, the intrinsic dignity of his reason and man's rational freedom show that he is a member of a "kingdom" of rational ends, that in a metaphysical and cosmic sense man is a part of the "reason" that governs and indeed *is* true reality.

That I take to have been Kant's meaning; but Kant's illustrations of meritorious duties towards self and others treat the moral "end" as something so much more elastic than mere rationality, so much more like a rational *level* of existence than *pure* practical reason that some may suppose that Kant began by formulating his principle "always as an end" in a sense of "end" that was much too broad for his later contentions, and afterwards neglected to clear the matter up. If that were so, the incidence of some of the difficulties I have raised would be at another and later part of Kant's exposition, and I am willing to leave it so.

To return. Kant says (*c*) that self-culture is morally meritorious, i.e. that it is a man's moral duty to cultivate his own perfection where "perfection" is taken to include all that *harmonizes* with a man's rational dignity. This, I suppose, might cover all that Kant's critics would be inclined to include in those elements of dignity and nobility in a man that were *not* mere "reason"—courage, and good taste and the rest. Indeed, since a "perfect" man must be supposed to be happy and fairly well fed and not too ugly, it is not plain (despite Kant) why the principle should not be expanded in almost any direction in which almost any moralist has sought to expand it in one way or another.

(*d*) Kant's last illustration is philanthropy, care for the happiness (or pleasure of others). Happiness, he says, is a natural end of each of us. Therefore there would be disharmony with humanity as an end if we did not seek and promote the happiness of others. By the same reasoning there would be disharmony if a man did not attend to his own happiness. He would be neglecting a "natural end" in his own person.

(In other parts of his system Kant asserts that we *cannot* promote our own happiness although we can promote other people's, and that we *cannot* promote the "perfection" of others although we can promote our own. Therefore (he says) these intricacies cannot arise. In fact, however, we can promote the perfection of others. What else is teaching for? And we are not so stupid as to be wholly incapable of promoting our own comfort and welfare. What else are Epsom salts for?)

On the whole, then, Kant's attempt to test his principle by applying it to typical cases does not seem to have been conspicuously encouraging. Only one of his four instances emerges fairly success-

fully from the ordeal, and that seems to be a rather slender measure of success, even granting that complete success, i.e. an infallible rule, should never have been expected.

At an early stage in this discussion, I said that although I meant to say a good deal about Kant because he had given his genius to the resolute explication of the principle of intrinsic human dignity in ethics, I was anxious, in the main, to discuss the question freely and generally. Accordingly, I shall now try to speak more freely, attempting firstly to test the application of the principle in a liberal way, and secondly, with a similar liberality of treatment, to examine its basis. Part of this "liberality" will consist in renouncing any restriction to *mere* reason, a point where, as we have seen, Kant in one part of him was continually overpassing his narrower and (I should say) his more official view.

As I have submitted, a man would not be treating any other being *merely* as a means if he paid the smallest regard to that other being for its own sake, this statement being interpreted quite strictly. A man, however, would be treating another being *predominantly* as a means if although he was concerned, perhaps vividly, with its comfort and happiness (denying himself, it may be, that *it* should not suffer) he nevertheless treated it as an inferior being that, in the main existed for his use or by his sufferance. That, in substance, is the way in which men do regard domestic animals and the wild-fowl that are allowed a "sanctuary" here and there. Such treatment, according to the great majority of responsible moralists is not the treatment that any man should give to any other man. So many have said who were not astute moralists. "Am I a dog," said Goliath to David, "that thou comest to me with staves?"

Granting, however, that there is general agreement about some such principle, we have to allow that there is very little agreement about its applications either in current practice or in theories that profess to be more enlightened than current practice. What clear guidance can the principle give us about the proper treatment of "backward" or primitive races? Should we refrain from intermeddling with them in the name of Commerce or Kultur or the Christian Religion; and if we may or should meddle with them, what are the limits to this praiseworthy meddlesomeness? Is adult franchise and female suffrage a consequence of the principle, negro suffrage as well as Nordic suffrage even in self-styled Nordic communities? If that consequence does not follow from the independent responsibility of every sane human being in every sort of social relationship, what consequences do follow? Grant that there should be no slaves, wage-slaves, marriage-slaves, child-slaves or economic slaves—no "natural" human slaves despite the shadow of a great name, and no unnatural human slaves either. What in detail can we

infer? Consider, for instance, the so-called "dignity of labour." Every genuine contributor to human welfare, it may be said, is treated, in substance, like a piece of machinery, if he is denied a responsible part in the planning of his activities, in the sort of output towards which he contributes, as well as in the handling of a specific allotted task. Is it to be inferred that every workman, in consequence, should be part-manager in his trade, and if so to what extent? Could he be a more effective manager of, let us say, Imperial Chemicals than the average British voter is effectively a minister of the Crown or a supernumerary unpaid Civil Servant? The principle may yield *some* guidance in such matters and may never be wholly negligible. But does it yield much in the way of specific moral guidance even in the relatively simple instances I have chosen for purposes of illustration?

I do not think that these are niggling criticisms even if it be allowed (as I have allowed) that no moral principle need be expected to give wholly determinate guidance in every instance. On the other hand, the principle, as I have also said, seems always to give us *some* moral guidance. I have therefore to defend that statement as well as to explain another rather vague assertion that I have made more than once, viz. that there is a sense in which all men should be said to be "equal" before the moral or the civil law.

In its broadest basis I think the principle states, and states correctly, that every man, simply as man, should be accorded a certain status. That, in a famous phrase, is his "natural right," "natural" in the sense of "just" and a "right" because it is morally right for him to claim and to be accorded that status—I should say in all circumstances. The "equality" in question, similarly, is just the moral fact that no privilege should ever be allowed to override the minimum implication of this status. As I have as good as admitted, there may be much perplexity even about these minimum implications, but even if a high degree of precision is difficult to secure, it is not very difficult, I think, to indicate types of condition that at least approach the minimum.

Consider, for instance, the types of "natural justice" that, in many countries are held to underlie the processes of criminal law and of fair dealing between man and man. Such are: that no one should be condemned unheard, that everyone in a grave matter should have as careful and as elaborate a trial as any other, without benefit of profession or of social position; that everyone has a right to a speedy trial. These "rights" are "ideal" in the sense that they are seldom fully observed in practice anywhere; but it is surely not inaccurate to say that they may be a minimum implication of just human dealing of anyone with anyone. In the same sort of way we might say that even convicts and condemned murderers should be treated as beings who have and cannot utterly forfeit elementary manly

status—that there is justice, and not mere soft-heartedness, in such a principle. Elementary requirements such as these are not small things, and are not shoddy platitudes. They have to be fought for, to-day rather harder than yesterday, although yesterday also had its struggles along these lines. Again take the principle that if any man be rightly allowed to express his thoughts (at most times and with few limitations) every man should be allowed to do so; that if any man should be rightly allowed to worship his God (or his *own* God) in his own way, every man should be able so to worship; that if any child should be specially educated because it has specially useful talents, every child should have that opportunity. It would be easy to multiply such examples, and it has to be conceded that the granting of special privileges *dignitatis causa* raises many difficult questions. The granting of special privileges for proper cause, however, is not opposed to the general principle of a common privilege of status for all humanity, and of the common implications of such a status.

Support for some such principle may also be found in an unexpected quarter, namely among the British utilitarians.

It is often said that utilitarianism has at least one signal weakness, viz. that it cannot supply an adequate basis for justice, however successful it may be in putting beneficence and prudence upon an intelligible footing. This criticism might perhaps be resisted by certain types of utilitarianism in the broadest sense of that theory. For justice might be held to be a relational good, a good of personal inter-relation whose goodness is not exhausted in the private benefits or intrinsic rewards of the various persons who participate in a just relationship. If so, utilitarianism, in the general sense of a moral theory that is justified by good results and by these alone, would not necessarily be incapable of dealing with the ethics of justice. On the other hand, there are very strong reasons for holding that historical utilitarianism (and all hedonistic utilitarianism) has not succeeded in defending justice upon a utilitarian basis, despite the assiduity that Epicurus, Hume and Mill displayed about that very question.

Bentham and his followers naturalized an alien in their ethics. They adopted the principle of the single vote. "Each," they said, "is to count for one and no one for more than one." They relied, in fact, upon a non-utilitarian principle of abstract justice, and incorporated it in their utilitarianism. Plainly the principle of the single vote need not march with the greatest happiness principle. Greater happiness might well result if a privileged minority were supremely contented and the rest were but mildly contented than if none was privileged. In a hedonistic plutocracy there might easily be a greater total wealth of happiness than in a hedonistic com-

munism, despite the more equal distribution, Again, when Bentham said that each was to count for one, and for one only, he seems to have meant "each *man*," although, on his own principles he should have meant each possible enjoyer or sufferer. "Quantity of pleasure being equal," he should have said, "cat's cream is as good as poetry." Instead, he said that pushpin was as good as poetry, that is to say a human amusement rather like the game of spillikins. He rightly extended his hedonism to the animal world, but he did not make the animals equal to men. He might have argued, it is true, that each man's capacity for happiness was immensely greater than any animal's, but even in that case it would not need to be incommensurably greater. And other formidable objections would have beset him. Even if a man's capacity for happiness is immensely greater than any animal's, man's capacity for pain is also greater. It is the balance that counts, and the *balance* need not be very different. Again, since one man's capacity for happiness may be vastly greater than another man's, it would not be true that each should count for but one.

In short, the principle "each to count for one" is different from and may be antagonistic to the greatest happiness principle. It is just an assertion of the dignity of each several man, and of his natural rights, stuck in the middle of an ethical theory that repudiated all natural rights, and substituted the universal fact of the pursuit of happiness.

That, I concede, is an argument *ad hominem*. Speaking generally, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that every ethical system, either tacitly or expressly, does in fact include some principle of personal dignity. Teleological moralists speak about the goods to be achieved, but they think of these goods as personal or interpersonal. The possessors are supposed to have a certain privileged status, and the theory would be incomplete if it had little or nothing to say about the possessors. Deontological moralists talk about the rightness of this or the other action, meaning by an action the responsible choice of a moral agent. As Kant saw, some theory about the agent and his dignity must somewhere come in. I shall not separately consider ethical theories that attempt to evade or to transessentiate both teleology and deontology. They are bound to tackle the same problem unless they abolish ethics altogether.

When I began this discussion I meant to say something upon the cosmic moralism that Kant developed in alliance with his principle of intrinsic human dignity. That is a weighty matter. If an ethics of human dignity could be shown to be at one with the cosmic process itself, few would deny that its status was broadened and strengthened. Kant's cosmic moralism was a metaphysics of this order, and the extreme rationalism of his ethical theory (I think) was affected

by the circumstance. It seemed to him that reason might be the foundation and indeed the entire reality of what we call the cosmos, and so that the moral law, if purely rational, was capable in principle of universal legislation.

Such a rationalism appears to me to raise greater difficulties than it could resolve. Even if minds could exist whose entire mentality was "rational," it is, I think, impossible to see what a being could *be* which was all compact of mere "reason." It would be something like a thing made up of mere validity, and that, I should say, would be an *Unding*. Again, to say the least, it is very difficult to concede the possibility that sensation and emotion and the like are only the false appearances of "reason." The spatial and the temporal, for instance, seem to resist the attempt to logicize them without remainder. Moreover, although moral action may be rational as well as "practical" (i.e. active), there is an immense overstatement in talking as if ethics and the "practical reason" were the same thing. By the practical reason one should mean the effects of reflection and of logical or mathematical thinking upon the course of nature. One would think, in short, of harbours, and irrigation works and sewers as well as of morals. There is a moral side to all such affairs; but navigation and hygiene are not merely departments of ethics.

These questions, however, are much too large for a shortish essay.

STUDIES ON PROTAGORAS

ADOLFO LEVI, PH.D.

THE MAN-MEASURE PRINCIPLE: ITS MEANING AND APPLICATIONS

IN the Platonic dialogue that bears his name Protagoras,[1] in a myth (320*c*–324*d*) and in a *logos* (324*d*–328*b*) positively affirms the absolute character of universal moral values, such as force themselves upon all men; this makes one think that the famous *man-measure* dictum was subservient to the ends that the sophist had in view as a teacher of *areté*. Indeed, his condemnation in that dialogue of the sophists who, like Hippias, included in their teaching mathematical and naturalistic studies (318*d*–*e*), must be connected with the criticism of mathematics reported by an Aristotelian text.[2] These studies, that is to say purely theoretic disciplines, were considered by Protagoras not only useless for the spiritual formation of men and citizens, but also void of any certitude and objectivity whatever.[3] We feel therefore allowed to suggest that also the man-measure principle had to perform an office of the same kind: to show that natural philosophy (which then comprehended all theoretical knowledge) could not yield an objective knowledge of φύσις which formed its object, because such knowledge is denied to man. Mistrust of the general conceptions of the cosmology of *physiologists* was widely spread at that time, and the authors of some medical treatises of the Hippocratean corpus used it to justify the construction of a discipline founded on the study of empirical materials interpreted rationally and not with the general hypotheses void of certainty

[1] For the life and writings of Protagoras see E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I, 2[6] (Leipzig, 1920), pp. 1296–1304 and notes. For bibliography cf. Überweg-Prächter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (= Überweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, I[12] [Berlin, 1926]), pp. 52°–53°, and W. Nestle in the edition of the *Protagoras* (Platon, *Ausgew. Schriften*, IV; *Protagoras* 7, Leipzig und Berlin, 1921), pp. 65–8 (*ibid.*, pp. 14–32, speak also of the works of the sophist).

[2] *Met.*, B, 2, 997*b*, 32–998*a*, 4. In H. Diels-W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[5] (Berlin, 1935. Quoted as Diels-Kranz), 80 (= H. Diels, *Die Fragmente*[4] [Berlin, 1922. Quoted as Diels], 74), B, 7. This text shows that Protagoras had criticized geometricians, maintaining that the tangent does not touch the circumference at one point only.

[3] W. Nestle, in the introduction to his edition of the *Protagoras*, p. 30, sees in the criticism of geometry a rejection of the objectivity of mathematics. This can be applied to theoretical disciplines in general.

that natural philosophers found so satisfactory.[1] Protagoras, however, does not simply deny the possibility of a general knowledge of the natural world; he tries to show with gnosiological and metaphysical considerations that all knowledge of φύσις in the form of cosmogical speculations as well as empirical researches, cannot attain its aim, and that, therefore, also mathematical and naturalistic studies have no claim to be included in the teaching that tends to educate men in social and ethical life. But before studying more closely whether this suggestion is justified and whether the man-measure principle must be held as subordinate to that teaching from another point of view, it is necessary to discuss some important questions which concern its interpretation.[2]

The principle is mentioned by different ancient sources: altogether the text to be preferred is that offered by Plato in the *Theaetetus* and, with very slight differences by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.*, VII, 60): Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι (ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος: Sextus), τῶν μὲν ὄντων. ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ (οὐκ: Sextus) ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.[3] "Man [he said] is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not." We shall speak afterwards of the meaning that must be attached to the word χρήματα: it is enough now to say that in some texts (one of which has already been mentioned by H. Gomperz) it is replaced or explained with πράγματα,[4] a word that properly indicates not individual beings but facts. The examples quoted in the texts that follow the sophist's thought more closely speak, not of concrete things or things in some way defined by qualities, but of the fact that a thing possesses—or does not possess—a certain quality (as,

[1] See *Περὶ ἀρχαίης ἰητρικῆς* in the Hippocratean collection.

[2] In my interpretation of the thought of Protagoras I deliberately ignore, the work of H. Langerbeck, *Δόξις Ἐπιρυσμίη* ("*Neue Philologische Untersuchungen*," 10. H, Berlin, 1935, pp. 14–33), which to arbitrariness in reconstruction joins an incomprehension of the philosophical problem in question not easily to be matched.

[3] Diels-Kranz, 80 (= Diels, 74), B, 1. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hypot.* I, 21[6] (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 14), offers an almost identical text. Other texts, in general less complete: Plato, *Cratylus*, 385*e* (*ibid.*, A, 13); *Theaetetus*, 160*d*, 166*d* (*ibid.*, A, 21*a*), 161*c* (*ibid.*, B, 1); Aristotle, *Met.*, I, 1, 1053*a*, 35–36 [wanting in Diels-Kranz and Diels]; K, 6, 1062*b*, 12–15 (*ibid.*, A, 19); Diogenes Laertius, IX, 51 (*ibid.*, A, 1), identical with *Adv. Math.*, VII, 60]. Hermias, *Irr. gent. philos.*, 9 (*ibid.*, A, 16). According to Plato, *Theaetetus*, 166*d* (*ibid.*, A, 219), the proposition was at the beginning of *Ἀλήθεια*; according to Sextus, E., *Adv. Math.* (*loc. cit.*), at the beginning of *Καταβάλλοντες* (that is, *λόγοι*). It is generally admitted that it is one and the same work; some think that the former title indicated the first part or *λόγος* of a work designated by the latter title.

[4] Plato, *Cratylus*, 385*e*; Sextus, P., *Pyrr. Hypot.*, I, 216 [This text is mentioned by H. Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, Leipzig und Berlin, 1912, p. 202]; Hermias, *Irr. gent. phil.*, 9 (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *loc. cit.*).

of a wind, that it is hot or cold);[1] so we think that the word *χρήματα* designates facts.[2] This shows that in the dictum *ὡς* must mean *that*, because it indicates the existence or non-existence of facts: the word, which may mean both *that* and *as*, has been translated variously by the interpreters, because they generally thought that the sophist was speaking of the existence or of modes of being (qualities) of concrete things.[3] (This does not exclude that, in reference to the things themselves, it may mean *as*.[4] In reality it is, or it is not, a fact that an object has certain qualities.) It follows that Protagoras does not refer to the real existence of things which he does not doubt; concerning that of facts he affirms that man is *μέτρον*, that is to say, as Sextus Empiricus[5] understands this expression, not measure in the proper sense of the word, but *test*. From this follows that the proposition must be interpreted, as it is by H. Gomperz, in the following manner: The test that distinguishes the existing from the non-existing [of facts] lies in a relation to man.[6] This is the meaning of the statements of Sextus Empiricus: Protagoras said that truth is something relative[7] (*τῶν πρός τι εἶναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν*) and introduced relativism (*εἰσάγει τὸ πρός τι*).

Scholars have given two main interpretations of the *ἄνθρωπος* of which Protagoras speaks. Some, and among them H. Gomperz[8] deserves a special mention, have taken it to mean mankind generally; and, according to the more widely spread opinion, have held that for Protagoras the existence of things was relative to the physiological and psychological structure of humanity, not to that of

[1] Plato, *Theaetetus* (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, B, 1).

[2] H. Gomperz (*op. cit.*, p. 203), although he fitly mentions the text of Sextus Empiricus that explains *χρήματα* with *πράγματα*, and although he translates the former with *Tatsachen oder Sachoerhalte*, attaches to it subsequently too wide a meaning because he renders it with *Alles* (all), and affirms that the existence of which Protagoras spoke was *being or existing in general* (*Sein oder existieren schlechthin* [p. 201]). Indeed, *all* includes not only facts, but also concrete things, qualities, etc.

[3] E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, I, 2[6], p. 1355[1], affirms that Protagoras did not distinguish the two meanings of *ὡς*, though he discarded neither of them. According to A. Covotti, *Per la thoria della sofistica greca. Studi sulla filosofia teoretica di Protagora* ("Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa," Filosofia e Filologia, V, xii [xix in the series], Pisa, 1897, p. 70), "Plato takes *ὡς* to mean *that* and applies it sometimes to the truth and falsity of judgments, sometimes to the existence of things [in which also their properties are included], and, finally to the existence of things thus determined, and so of the things themselves."

[4] Thus Plato uses expressions of this kind to explain the principle of Protagoras, *Theaetetus*, 152, *a*: *ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ ψαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί; Cratylus*, 386*a*: *ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ πράγματα, εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί*. . . . (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, B, 1; A, 13).

[5] *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 216 (*ibid.*, A, 14). [6] *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

[7] *Adv. Math.*, VII, 60, and *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 216 (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, B, 1, and A, 14). [8] *Griechische Denker*, 1[4], Berlin-Leipzig, 1922, pp. 377ff.

single individuals. So, though acquiring in a wide sense a subjective aspect, the principle could still retain a character of universal validity. The thought of Protagoras, taken in this sense, would in some way come nearer the thought of Kant. Other interpreters (and, indeed, the more numerous, so that they may be said to represent the prevailing opinion) have instead understood ἄνθρωπος as having an individual sense and meaning a single man. As a consequence, the subjectivism of Protagoras would regard particular men, not the human species. As the sophist's subjectivism has also been a matter for discussion, we shall postpone to another moment the examination of this subject which entails the discussion of other questions. For the present it is enough to say that the ἄνθρωπος of his dictum has been unanimously taken by the ancients to have the individual sense[1] and that, therefore, this interpretation must be preferred to the other.

The relation that connects existence to man doubtless consists

[1] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 152*a*, 161*c* (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, B, 1), 166*d* (*ibid.*, A, 21*a*); *Cratylus*, 386*a* (*ibid.*, A, 13). The *Theaetetus*, rejecting the thesis of Protagoras, Plato uses with fuller development an argument employed also by Democritus and called περιτροπή by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 389 (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 15), if every opinion is true, true is also the opinion holding that not every opinion is true, so that the opinion that every opinion is true becomes false just for him who maintains it. As H. Gomperz (*op. cit.*, pp. 229–231) has remarked, this criticism implied that Democritus and Plato interpreted ἄνθρωπος in an individual sense. The same interpretation is given by Aristotle (*Met.*, *Γ*, 4, 1007*b*, 18–25 [Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 19]; 5, 1009*a*, 5–15; *K*, 6, 1062*b*, 13–19 [Diels-Kranz, *ibid.*], and by Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 216 [*ibid.*, A, 14]; *Adv. Math.*, VII, 60 [*ibid.*, B, 1]. H. Gomperz, who has studied the question with a particular care, says that the ancient testimonies justifying the individual interpretation of *man* are much more numerous than the others; but then, there are some (Aristotle, *Met.*, *θ*, 3, 1046*b*, 29–1047*a*, 8 [*ibid.*, A, 17]; Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 219 [*ibid.*, A, 14]; Hermias, *Irr.*, 9 [*ibid.*, 16]) showing that Protagoras himself understood his principle in a general sense, which, however, is not in contradiction with the individual, but rather presupposes it. This interpretation, which Gomperz calls *distributive*, affirms that "*existence in general* belongs to what is felt or thought even by one man, whereas it does not belong to what is not even once felt or thought by any one man" (*op. cit.*, pp. 223–31, Quot. p. 222).

These statements are correct, but they do not go to the core of the matter because not only does the *distributive* interpretation presuppose the individual interpretation, but it is a consequence of it, so that the contrast remains between the individual interpretation and the general interpretation proper, which relates existence to any man, inasmuch as he is endowed with a nature common to all men.

Finally, we may recollect that W. Nestle has observed that the principle of Protagoras might be interpreted also in a communal sense, taking man to mean group (people, race, state). In his opinion, however, Protagoras is not likely to have made these distinctions, but it cannot be doubted that, with some limitations, his gnoseology was individualistic. (Introduction to the *Protagoras*, p. 14; in Zeller, p. 1359[10]).

in knowledge, but scholars debate whether Protagoras reduced knowledge to its sensible form, advocating sensistic gnoseology, or admitted a non-sensible form of knowledge, that is to say intellectual. The former interpretation is based mainly on the *Theaetetus*.[1] Socrates asks the man, after whom the dialogue is named (the famous mathematician, represented in the dialogue as still young and a disciple of Theodorus of Cyrene) to describe science or scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) (146*c*) and, being answered: "science is nothing but sensation" ("οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις",[2] 151*c*) remarks: "You risk certainly not to have made a speech of little value on science, but the same as Protagoras. In some other way, he has said these things" (*Τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα*: 151*e*–152*a*). And, having quoted the proposition of the sophist, he explains it, saying that the latter affirmed that: "as each thing appears (*φαίνεται*) to me, so it is to me, and as it appears to you, so it is to you. Am I not a man and you too?" (152*a*).

Afterwards he asks: " 'To appear,' is it 'to be felt'?" (*τὸ δέ γε "φαίνεται" αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;*); and having obtained an affirmative answer, he proceeds: "Appearance [the sensible image referring to what appears] and sensation are the same thing" (*φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτόν*: 152*b*); so sensation has always *being* as its object and is not deceptive, inasmuch as it is science. The argument of Socrates can be expressed so: As Science concerns always *being*, the identity, affirmed by Theaetetus of science with sensation, and therefore with appearance, leads to the conception that *being* is the object of sensation and appearance, that is to say, it is what appears: so we arrive at the Protagorean proposition. This interpretation has so clearly the character of a reconstruction, that it is permissible to doubt whether the sophist has really affirmed the identity of *αἴσθησις* with *φαντασία* and has used *φαίνεσθαι* to indicate exclusively sensitive appearance. In order to show that Protagoras distinguished sensible knowledge proper, offered by images, from the non-sensible or intellectual in a wide sense consisting in δόξα or opinion, some scholars have availed themselves of an argument[3]

[1] The evidence of Diogenes Laertius, IX, 51 (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 1): "[Pr.] said that the soul is nothing but sensations, as also Plato says in the *Theaetetus*" is clearly derived from this dialogue. No greater importance is to be attached to the statements of Hermias, *Irr.*, 9, and Eusebius, *Praep. Evang.*, XIV, 19, 8 (*ibid.*, A, 16).

[2] According to custom this word is translated with "sensation"; but "sensible perception" would be a better rendering.

[3] H. Gomperz, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–6, has used this argument. It can be doubted whether Protagoras actually applied his principle to ethical conceptions for which Plato uses the expression *δοκεῖν* (*Theaetetus*, 167*c*; Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 21*a*). But even admitting this, one must not forget that the same dialogue uses *δοκοῦν* (161*c*, *ibid.*, B, 1) after giving instances of sensible perceptions.

derived from the use Plato makes of φαίνεσθαι and δοκεῖν, when he presents and discusses the principles of Protagoras. But this argument is not decisive, because passages of the *Theaetetus* affirm that opinion derives from sensation (εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἑκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὅ ἄν δὶ αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ: 161*d*; αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι: 179*c*). Nor must we attach importance to the fact that Aristotle, speaking of these subjects, while using in one text[1] δοκοῦντα and φαινόμενα together, employs only δοκεῖ in another[2] in which he gives an instance of theoretical judgment; this last, indeed, does not seem to be taken from a writing of the sophist's, but to be given by Aristotle himself in order to make an application of the sophist's principlie. Much more important is instead a passage[3] in which Aristotle, discussing the principle, states: Protagoras says that man is the measure of all things, meaning by man him who knows, by means of science or sensation (τὸν ἐπιστήμονα ἢ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον); thus, it was evidently admitted that Protagoras did not confine knowledge to sensation, but included it in also what, in general, we may call intelligence. An even stronger weapon against the sensism attributed to the sophist is offered by Plato himself who in the *Theaetetus*, criticizing the relativistic principle with the argument later called περιτροπή,[4] designates that proposition with the expressions δόξα, δοξάζειν which evidently in this case refer to non-sensible forms of knowledge. If we duly consider these texts, we are entitled to conclude that Protagoras (to whom, in all probability if not with certainty, we can attribute the use of φαίνεσθαι and δοκεῖν) perhaps did not draw a very fine distinction between sensible and intellectual knowledge, but that far from excluding the latter and considering only the former, he referred to any opinion whatever, that is to say to any kind of judgment (cf. *Theaetetus*, 170*d*) and affirmed that each is true to the one who has it, because it regards what appears to him, so that false opinions do not exist. Plato, identifying the thesis of Protagoras with that of Theaetetus, who reduced science to sensible perception, intended presumably to show on the one hand that sensistic gnoseology implies relativism and (as will be seen) subjectivism, and on the other hand that these are valid, but only in regard to the knowledge offered by sensation.

Immediately after identifying the sensistic thesis with the dictum of Protagoras, Socrates wonders whether the sophist has not been all-wise and has not offered with his proposition a riddle to the

[1] *Met.*, *Γ*, 5, 1009*a*, 7.

[2] *Ibid.*, 4, 1007*b*, 23 (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 19). This text and the other given above are mentioned by H. Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

[3] *Met.*, I, 1, 1053*a*, 35*b*, 1.

[4] 171*a–c*. See p. 9[1]. It can be also said with Covotti (*op. cit.*, pp. 44 ff.) that at 164*d* Socrates distinguishes the thesis of Protagoras from the identification of αἴσθησις and ἐπιστήμη.

vulgar (*καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ* : 152*c*), expounding instead the truth to his disciples in a mystery (*ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ*)—According to this theory expounded in the mystery which, excepting Parmenides, has been maintained by all wise men, as Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and by the greatest poets, as Homer (who spoke of "Ocean, the parent of the Gods and their mother Tethys,"[1] thus affirming that all things are produced by flux and motion), and Epicharmus, nothing is one in itself and by itself, nor is there anything that can be designated or described correctly. If you call something large, it will appear also small, if heavy, light; and the same may be repeated of all things, because no thing is one, nor anything well defined and endowed with qualities. All things, which we wrongly call *being*, are born of motion and mutual mingling; indeed nothing is, but everything is becoming. (Hence the principle of Protagoras which, though in a relative sense, speaks of what is, is addressed only to the vulgar). A proof that motion (*κίνησις*) produces what appears as being and becoming, while resting produces instead non-being and perishing, is offered by the fact that heat and fire, which breed and guard the other things, are produced by motion from place to place and friction, that is to say, by movements. These generate living beings and ensure the preservation of the body, which would perish by repose and idleness. Through study and exercise, which are movements, the soul continues in good condition and improves, whereas, by standing still, lacking exercise and living in ignorance, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned. In short, movement in body and soul is good and its opposite is bad: the different forms of movement cause preservation, those of stillness cause corruption and destruction. If one applies this movement theory to what is apprehended by sense, one justifies the thesis of Protagoras, sensistically interpreted. If, e.g., we consider white, we must not think that it is a definite *quid* existing without or within the eyes; nor that it occupies some place, because then it would exist in some place, it would persist and would not go through the process of continual generation. Let us adhere to what we have said formerly and let us assume nothing as a unit existing in itself and by itself: then, black, white, and any other colour is produced by the meeting of the active movement coming out of the eyes with the external passive movement proper to it. Any colour of which we affirm that it *is*, is neither the former nor the latter of these movements,[2] but a *medium quid* proper to each subject. This theory explains why what appears to the senses varies

[1] *Iliad*, XIV, 201. The *Cratylus* (702*a–c*) mentions Heraclitus, Homer (of whom the same line is quoted), Hesiod, and Orpheus as supporters of the universal motion of things.

[2] In the interpretation of 153*e*–154*a* and especially in explaining *τὸ προσβάλλον* and *τὸ προσβαλλόμενον* as active and passive movement I follow A. E. Taylor, *Plato*[3], London, 1929, p. 327.

with the varying of the two factors, namely of the two movements (internal and external, active and passive) which generate it and on which it depends. To return now to the example given before: a certain colour changes in correlation to external movements, to subjects and to the variable conditions of each of them, namely, to groups of movements in their organisms; therefore, it cannot have one and the same appearance for me and for a dog or any other animal, or for me and another man. Nay, as I never continue the same in myself, so nothing can appear to me the same in itself. If the quality that appears to the sense (size, whiteness, heat) belonged to what we measure things with, namely to the organism (or, in other words, to the movements that constitute it), the quality should not change when the organism, remaining unaltered, changes its relations to what we call the objects, and the same can be said for the objects themselves. Instead, if this quality existed in them, it would not change if changes were to take place outside them, but not in them. As qualities change when there is a change either in the organism alone or in what is incorrectly called the object, and, properly speaking, consists in a fluid of external movements, it is clear that they must vary from one subject to another, and continually change in regard to each of them, in correlation to its conditions and to its relations with the surrounding world, which in turn changes ceaselessly, because it is nothing but movement[1] 152*c*–154*b*).

The thesis of the universality of motion as given above is developed further in the doctrine of the κομψοί ("the refined") whose mysteries we must now expound. Their fundamental principle, on which the things said above are based, is that all is movement and nothing else (156*a*). Movement has two forms, each infinite in the number of its aspects: one has the power of acting, the other of being acted upon: their encounter and friction breed infinite products, each of which consists of a couple of inseparable twins, the sensible and the sensation. Let us consider sight. The encounter of two slow movements, one active (the eye) and one passive (some process commensurable with it), generates two quick movements together, whiteness (the sensible) and the sensation correlative to it. When vision is applied to the eye and whiteness to what we call the object, one is filled with vision and becomes a seeing eye, and its correlative is filled with whiteness and becomes white, as wood or stone or any other thing that can take this colour. The same must be supposed for dryness, heat, and all other qualities; nothing exists in itself and by itself, and everything receives its being and its varying from mutually connected processes of movement because even the capacity

[1] Also in the interpretation of this passage (154*b*) I follow Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

of acting and being acted upon cannot be thought as stable and permanent. Nothing can act unless it is in relation with something acted upon and what in a certain relation acts, in another is acted upon. All this confirms what had been said at the beginning: that nothing is a unit in itself and by itself and that everything is for ever becoming in relation to something else. The word *being* is used in ignorance and should be avoided. One must not use terms that indicate fixedness, as *something, this, that,* but employ those that reflect reality and express becoming, perishing, altering. In the same manner we must speak of the particular qualities or those groupings of them, that are called "man," "an animal," or "stone" (156*a*–157*c*).

If this theory is applied to the sensations of dreamers, madmen, and diseased people, to the delusions of the senses in general, it can help to repel the objections which from these facts can be raised against the thesis that sensation is knowledge and that every opinion is true for the one who has it. One cannot say that it is impossible for one subject (e.g. Socrates) to have two contradictory sensations, in disease and in health, and both of them true; indeed, Socrates in sickness is different from Socrates in health, and therefore the acting factor (external movement) will produce a different result in correlation with the different passive factor (subject) on which it acts. As a consequence, the sensation (as the taste, bitter or sweet, of wine felt by the person in sickness or in health) as well as the sensible (bitterness, sweetness) vary in the different cases. I never can feel in the same manner, because if the agent changes, the sensation is modified and the sentient being is altered; it is likewise impossible for an agent, combining with another sensitive being, to produce the same result, because the result will alter with the change of the sensitive being. In such groups of relations, each term is correlative to the other. The subject, becoming sentient, becomes sentient of something; and this something, namely the agent, becomes sweet, bitter, etc., for someone; the connection between both is necessary, but they are not two realities each with its own existence, because there is nothing in this but their reciprocal connection. Instead of saying that something *is* we should say that it is, or, rather, is becoming, for someone, of something, in respect to something. Therefore, as the agent is such for me and not for another, and as it is I, and not another, that feel it, my sensation seems true to me, because it is the sensation of what I am, so that true is the dictum of Protagoras, that I can judge of the things existing for me that they are, and of those non-existing, that they are not (157*e*–160*c*).

Plato, although he considers as Heraclitean the two theories in his general criticism of them (179*d*–183*b*), distinguishes the first

attributed to Homer, to Epicharmus, and, excepting Parmenides, to all the ancient philosophers, from the other attributed to the κομψοί, which appears as a more penetrating re-elaboration of the other.[1] It must be said besides that the former is more genuinely Heraclitean, as it conceives movement as change in general, so as to present study and exercise as movements within the soul (153*b*), though later Socrates, interpreting it in a more relativistic sense, speaks only of κίνησις in space, and particularly of motion from space to space (φορά) (153*c*–154*b*). Instead, the theory of the κομψότεροι considers exclusively space movements, as friction[2] (τριψις) and motion from space to space,[3] and thus, as Taylor has remarked, it appears as a cinematic re-elaboration of the Heraclitean principle that movement is the only reality.[4]

A text of Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 217–19), which it is better to quote, as some historians consider it fundamental, though it adds nothing substantial to what is said in the *Theaetetus*, connects the two theories without distinguishing them and attributes them to Protagoras. "This man, then, says that matter is fluid (τὴν ὕλην ῥευστὴν εἶναι), and, as it is always flowing, additions are formed which compensate losses, and sensations alter their forms and change according to the ages and other conditions of bodies [that is to say, of organisms]. He, then, says also that the λόγοι [reasons, foundations] of all appearances lie in matter, so that matter, so far as it lies in it (ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῇ), has the power of being all that appears to everyone. But men apprehend now this now that according to their different dispositions (διαθέσεις); indeed, a man who is in normal conditions perceives, of what is in matter, those things that can appear to those who are in normal conditions; instead, one who is in an abnormal state perceives only those things that (can appear) to those who are in abnormal conditions. The same, besides, [can be said] respecting age, sleeping, being awake, and any other kind of dispositions.[5] At many points, the account of Sextus Em-

[1] A more precise distinction of the two theories than is usually offered by the interpreters is that made by A. Diès in the introduction and division into paragraphs of his edition of *Theaetetus* (Platon, *Œuvres complètes*, t. VIII, 2 partie, Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1934, pp. 131–2, 171, 177). In my opinion the texts of the *Theaetetus* show that we have here different theories, and that we cannot follow F. M. Cornford (*Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1935, pp. 48–9) and identify the κομψοί with the philosophers mentioned in 152*e*, that is, with all the wise men excepting Parmenides.

[2] Friction had already been mentioned in the account of the first theory (153*a*).

[3] In the general discussion of the theory of the universality of movement, the latter is said to be either motion from place to place or alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) (181*d*).

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 329.

[5] Diels-Kranz, 80 (= Diels, 79), A, 19.

piricus amalgamates and simplifies the theories presented distinctly by Plato; nay, he seems purposely to omit the analysis of those complicated movement processes that, especially in the conception of the κομψοί, serve to justify the assertion that everything is movement and the thesis that all sensations and opinions are true to the same extent. The expression λόγοι, used to designate the reasons and foundations of sensible appearances, is the translation into the language of Hellenistic philosophy of what in the *Theaetetus* is the slow movement of objects determining the rapid movement of the organism. In the Platonic dialogue we do not find the information that, according to Protagoras, losses in matter are compensated by additions; but we have here a matter-of-course application of Heraclitean doctrines to the sophist, who is considered as a follower of the philosopher of Ephesus. In one important point, instead, Sextus Empiricus differs emphatically from Plato. This is when he reports that in Protagoras's opinion matter, so far as it lies in it, has the power of being all that appears to each one, and that, among the things contained in matter, the different men perceive those that can appear to them in conformity with the various dispositions of their organs. Thus, Sextus attributes to the sophist the thesis that the foundations of all phenomena (not the phenomena themselves) exist in matter and that each subject apprehends only some of them; whereas according to the *Theaetetus* Protagoras taught that the same movement of the object causes different results when it encounters different movements in the subjects, so that each man feels differently from any other the same external action. Now, as the *Theaetetus* speaks of a metaphysical teaching that Protagoras had kept from the vulgar to communicate it in a mystery to his disciples, it is clear that no trace of these things is to be found in his writings;[1] on the other hand, we cannot absolutely admit that Sextus Empiricus knew other texts than those known to Plato; so that we must think that when the former in his account of the subjects in question diverges from the latter, he is merely interpreting with alterations the informations he draws from Plato. In the case in question, Sextus Empiricus may have been driven to do so by his desire to emphasize the differences existing between the precepts of the Sceptics and the dogmatism of Protagoras. Now, it is particularly on the evidence of Sextus Empiricus that H. Gomperz bases his interpretation of the thought of Protagoras along lines entirely different from those established by tradition. For him the sophist, whom tradition represents as the founder of subjectivism, is an objectivist who identifies reality with matter. Through any human condition we know an element of the external world adequate to it; such conditions have all the same value for

[1] Aristotle's silence on this subject is significant.

the acquisition of objective knowledge. Protagoras, if we believe Sextus, taught that in the things themselves always lie the two members of a pair of opposites, but that only one of them can be apprehended by the sensation and opinion of a single man. In honey bitterness and sweetness co-exist, although to a different extent; therefore, if a healthy man feels only the latter taste, his sensation is true because it corresponds to reality. But this truth does not exclude its opposite, because the sick man who in honey feels bitterness, apprehends what corresponds in it to his sensation. For both, then, the sensation and the judgment based on it are true, because the disposition of each enables him to feel and know either bitterness or sweetness only, which, however, exist equally in honey, because matter includes in itself all opposites, and therefore, as Sextus says, it can "be in itself what it appears to all." Existence belongs only to what exists for a subject, in so far as it is an object of his act of knowledge; and this object is never matter in itself, but one of the opposites it includes, e.g. sweetness and bitterness: so that the measure of existence is the individual who in that chaotic mixture perceives, owing to his dispositions, only what agrees with him. Existence is necessarily relative, because knowledge is made possible by the disposition of an individual, determining a choice between the opposites contained in his matter; so, for every individual, there exists only what agrees with his structure and dispositions, while what agrees with no subject has no existence, because it is not known and accordingly does not exist for anyone. But though it is relative, existence is by no means subjective, because the individual does not produce sensation, but in the surrounding reality he feels what agrees with his structure and the dispositions of his body; therefore, through the sensitive act he feels something real. . . . It is for him only to choose that aspect of reality that is felt and known, but what has thus been apprehended is always something real. Protagoras, far from being a subjectivist, is a thorough objectivist, because for him some objective reality always corresponds to all human sensations, even if abnormal, as dreams, hallucinations, delusions of the senses, because they are all based on substratum which varies in the different cases. Protagoras must have applied to thoughts his known theory of sensations. He must have seen as existing in matter not only the *foundations* of sensations but also those of opinions. A subject has such dispositions as to conceive only one of the elements it includes; but if two individuals have opposite opinions, they are both right because each knows something real, which is actually included in matter.

In Gomperz's opinion, the evidence of Sextus Empiricus proves that Protagoras was influenced not only by the Heraclitean thesis of universal becoming, but also and even more by the Anaxagorean

theory of matter by which "all is in all,"[1] "in everything is a part of everything."[2] Indeed, we must see a mere application of the latter theory in the sophist's assertion that in honey sweetness and bitterness are found together, and that in every object generally, besides the quality perceived normally, there is also its opposite. According to Anaxagoras gall is mixed with honey, so that an abnormal subject is the one who perceives this mixture, which otherwise is not felt. Since Anaxagoras affirms that "also now in the universe all is in the same place'[3] (*καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ*), all judgments must be true, because in the external world the objects of every possible affirmation of existence are present. "Protagorism in its totality, seen from this point of view, is merely an integration of Anaxagorism. The philosopher of Clazomenae had shown that all things are present everywhere; the philosopher of Abdera adds: of these things everyone feels what his structure and disposition enable him to feel through sensation; and so man is the measure of all things."[4]

This does not mean that Protagoras attributed the same value to all sensations and all opinions alike: this can be argued from the fact that Sextus Empiricus calls certain sensations normal, and others abnormal. Besides, the Anaxagorean theory of matter affirms that in every body particles of every kind of matter exist, but in different quantities,[5] so that in honey there is more of it than of gall: so Protagoras must have thought that, if sweetness and bitterness exist in that body, the former taste must exceed the latter in amount. Therefore, although two contrary opinions are true because both correspond to something real, it must be supposed that he admitted a certain pre-eminence in one, since the reality on which it is based exceeds the contrary reality on which the other opinion is founded. This is the more likely, if we think that, on this assumption, one might help a man leading him to replace the abnormal sensation by the normal and to apprehend thus the predominant part or more developed aspect of reality. Now, this is just the theory that the *Theaetetus* attributes to the sophist in the apology for his own fundamental thesis.[6]

I have dwelt at length on the analysis of H. Gomperz's bold interpretation, as it is very interesting because it affords a reconstruction of the sophist's thought much more organic than the others; but I do not think it must be accepted, above all, because it forces the texts to say more than they actually contain. Even if we start from Sextus Empiricus we cannot make Protagoras dependent principally on Anaxagoras, because the (Heraclitean) belief that

[1] Diels-Kranz, 59 (= Diels, 46), B, 6. [2] *Ibid.*, B, 12.
[3] *Ibid.*, B, 6. [4] *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, pp. 252–3.
[5] Aristotle, *Phys.*, A, 4, 1876, 2.
[6] *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, pp. 233–7, 251–3, 259–70.

matter is fluid decisively diverges from the theory of Anaxagoras for whom the determinations of reality are fixed and permanent. Besides, while he thinks that we perceive what prevails in the mixture in which all things consist, Protagoras, according to Sextus, thinks that matter includes only the λόγοι, that is to say the conditions or foundations of appearances, namely what is perceived by the several subjects. Therefore not even so can we speak of the objectivism of the sophist, because even in Sextus his doctrine remains markedly subjectivistic: indeed, not only does every individual apprehend exclusively one aspect of reality, but he does so in his own way, because the λόγος of what appears to him is different from appearance itself. Finally, we cannot expect to find in *Protagoras's Apology* an evidence of his belief that some sensations and opinions correspond to elements and aspects of reality exceeding in quantity those on which other sensations and opinions depend. Indeed, if such were the case, instead of speaking (as he does in the *Apology*) of a different value of usefulness belonging to notions equally true, he would have affirmed that, among them, a scale of truthfulness can be established, because some reveal reality more than others. Now, for reasons previously given, the evidence of Sextus Empiricus is worthless when it differs from Plato's.[1] Plato's evidence excludes that we can speak either of Anaxagoras's influence on Protagoras, or of a residue of objectivism consisting in the presence, within reality of λογόι corresponding to the different apprehensions that individuals have of them, because, according to the *Theaetetus*, the same external process of movement determines different sensations when it acts on different subjects.[2]

[1] See pp. 28–9.

[2] An interpretation similar to that of H. Gomperz is the one recently offered by F. M. Cornford (*Plato's Theory of Knowledge*). In his opinion, Protagoras thinks that the same thing possesses contrary qualities, e.g. (152*b*) that the same wind is hot and cold at the same time. This thesis, not contrasting with the naïve realism of common sense for which objects have actually the qualities perceived in them, agrees with the teaching of Anaxagoras and the doctrine of Heraclitus about the inseparable existence of opposites. If we admit this, we cannot think that Protagoras was a subjectivist; even the word relativist applied to him is a misnomer and a cause of error, because for him heat and cold together with all the other properties that we can perceive in the wind do exist independently of any percipient, and constitute wind in itself. The other interpretation of the example of the wind, in force of which *cold and heat* do not exist in it until it encounters a percipient, is a Platonic construction on the basis of the ambiguous statement of the sophist (*op. cit.*, pp. 33–6). Many of the objections raised against Gomperz do not apply to Cornford, because he does not attribute to Protagoras the Heraclitism said to have been taught in secret to his disciples. However, his interpretation is quite controvertible. Ancient sources do not refer to intercourse between Protagoras and Anaxagoras, and Plato who, for theoretical purposes, had to connect the teaching of the sophist with that of Heraclitus, might have

Up to this point we have assumed that the metaphysical teaching expounded in the *Theaetetus* can be attributed to Protagoras: we must now see whether this belief is tenable. Though not few interpreters entertain it, I do not think it justifiable. Plato himself shows clearly that such a doctrine had not been stated by the sophist in any work of his; nor can we imagine that he became acquainted with it through *viva voce* communications from the sophist's disciples: indeed, he speaks of it hesitatingly and plainly, showing that he attributed such thoughts to Protagoras as serve to support the relativistic principle he maintains. This is confirmed by the remark uttered by Socrates after criticizing in general the Heraclitean theory of universal motion and after showing that this theory leads to the destruction of the thesis that identifies sensation and knowledge: "Successful has been the correction (ἐπανόρθωμα) of the answer [of Theaetetus] for us who have tried to show that everything is in motion, in order that the answer might appear correct. It has appeared, it seems, that if everything is in motion, any answer given by one in respect to anything, will be equally right" (183*a*). From the identification of the sensistic thesis with that of Protagoras it follows that the Heraclitean doctrine has been introduced in order to establish also that of Protagoras,[1] and that, therefore, it cannot be attributed to the sophist. The sophist's condemnation in the *Protagoras* of mathematical and naturalistic studies, comes to the same result, because it cannot be reconciled with the acceptance of a systematic philosophy of nature. The connection of the two theories was made easier by the relativism implied by Heraclitus's philosophy, and, for reasons mentioned before, the doctrine of Protagoras could be compared to sensism. These considerations facilitate to some extent the solution of two questions which historians have discussed, namely, whether we are confronted with a Platonic construction, or with a doctrine actually maintained by

mentioned Anaxagoras in the *Cratylos*. A stronger argument against Cornford is offered by the fact that the thesis attributed by him to Protagoras and justified in the *Theaetetus* with Heraclitism in its two forms, finds no justification without such doctrines. In the silence of ancient sources to the purpose, we cannot attribute to the sophist the explanation offered by Anaxagoras, that we apprehend qualities through their contraries, which all exist in us; so we perceive hot through cold and vice versa (Theophrastus, *De sensu*, 28; Diels-Kranz, 59 [= Diels, 46], A, 92).

[1] In 179*c–d*, after subjecting the proposition of Protagoras to different criticisms, Socrates says that it is necessary to sift the matter more accurately, studying the value of the thesis of universal movement. Taylor is, therefore, right in saying that the theory of the κομψοί (we can rather say of Heraclitism in general, as it is presented by the *Theaetetus*) is an ontology professing to supply the foundations for the individualistic gnoseology of the sophist (*op. cit.*, p. 329).

some thinker or school, and, if so, by whom.[1] We have no reason to think of any historically actual fact, if the identification of sensism with the relativism of Protagoras is the result of Plato's inner conviction, and if the connection of the latter doctrine with Heraclitism is an attempt made by Plato to strengthen as far as possible the thought of his adversary before criticizing it. Somewhat different is the question in regard to the κομψοί because it can be easily admitted that Plato re-elaborated their theories, but not that he created them completely; however, his elaboration is so emphatically constructive that even here we cannot fix upon particular names.[2]

Leaving these identification problems aside, one may say that Protagoras did not question the existence of the objects of the external world, but that he thought that all the statements that can be made about them are equally true, because facts (namely, the belonging or non-belonging of certain determinations to things) exist, or do not exist, in relation to each single subject. His conception, therefore, is not only a relativism fixing an indissoluble relation between man and the existence of natural facts, a relation consisting in an act of knowledge (sensible and intellectual), but also a subjectivism that makes such a relation depend on the constitution of the different subjects.

It does not result from the texts examined up to this point that Protagoras applied his principle to social and ethical reality. This should instead be said, if it were possible to attribute to him the so-called apology mentioned above, which includes a utilitaristic (*pragmatistic*, it has been called) interpretation of knowledge and morality. Socrates, after connecting the theories previously examined, mentions some objections that might be made to Protagoras; some of them are presented as popular and trifling, but there is one (coinciding, as we have seen, with a criticism of Democritus) that is more important because it shows that the sophist's thesis defeats itself. If every opinion is true, true is also the one that contradicts such an opinion, so that the proposition of Protagoras can be true neither for those who are of a different opinion, nor, in force of this different opinion, for himself (160*a*–165*e*). However, he remarks, Protagoras might censure him for having imposed upon his youthful interlocutor Theaetetus who, having undertaken to defend him, has made allowances which he would not have ratified (165*e*–166*c*). And he makes the sophist proceed so: "For I affirm that truth is as

[1] Protagoras, Antisthenes, Aristippus (and the school of Cyrene) are the names suggested by those who attribute to a definite thinker the fusion of sensism, relativism, and the Heraclitean doctrine of universal motion. See Diels, *op. cit.*, p. 150[1].

[2] I think that, altogether, Diès is in the right when he says that to append a particular signature to so constructive a theory is to restrict it unduly (Introduction to the *Theaetetus*, *op. cit.*, p. 150).

I have written: each one of us is the measure of things existing and things non-existing, yet we differ immensely from one another, just for this reason, that certain things appear to and exist for one man, and certain others [appear] to and [exist] for another man. And I am far from saying that wisdom and wise men do not exist; but I call that man wise who, if bad things appear to and exist for anyone of us, by transforming them causes them to appear and be good. This discourse you must not follow out literally, but you are to understand even more clearly what I mean to say. Remember what has been said before (159*c–d*), that what a diseased person eats and drinks appears to, and is for, him bitter, and the opposite to, and for, the healthy man. It is not necessary—and indeed not possible—to render either of them wiser, nor is it possible to say that the sick man is ignorant because he opines such things, and the healthy man wise because he opines others; but we must bring him [the former] over to the other [disposition], because the other disposition is better. So, also in education it is necessary to remove [men] from a disposition to a better one; but the physician brings about the changes with medicines, and the sophist with speeches. Indeed, nobody has ever caused any one that had a false opinion to have afterwards a true opinion; because it is not possible either to opine what is not or opine things different from those one experiences, and these are always true. But I think that one who, owing to a pernicious disposition of soul, opined things similar to it, was made by a useful [disposition] to opine other such [useful]: appearances, which some through inexperience call true, whereas I call the latter better than the former, but by no means truer (*ἀλλ' οἶμαι πονηρᾷ ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς χρηστὴ ἐπόιησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν*: 167*b*). And the wise . . . call those for the body physicians and those for plants, agriculturists. Indeed, I say that even the latter produce in plants, when they are ill, useful and healthy . . . sensations and dispositions, instead of harmful sensations, and so good and wise orators cause useful instead of harmful things to appear right to cities (*τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι*: 167*c*). For those things that to each city seem right and fair, are so for it while it enacts them (*ἐπεὶ οἷα γ' ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ* : *ibid.*); but the wise man, instead of those which are injurious to them [cities], causes useful ones to be and appear right and fair. In the same manner also the sophist who can educate his disciples, is wise and deserves to be richly rewarded by those whom he has educated. And so there are persons wiser than others and nobody opines false things, and you, whether you like it or not, must be content to be

a measure; because this discourse [principle] is saved with these things"[1] (166*d*–167*d*).

Protagoras's apology applies to ethical and social conceptions the relativistic principle; what appears right and fair both to individuals and cities is such, as long as it is thought to be so; differences in opinions are determined by the sick or healthy dispositions of the soul, which cause now what is useful and again what is harmful to appear good. It is for the educator and orator to cure diseased souls and to bring them to the point of considering laudable what is useful. Indeed, as all opinions are true in the same degree, so it is with ethical judgments which are all true: the only difference in value to be recognized is that which exists between what is useful and what is harmful.

If we compare what the sophist, called back to life, says in the *Theaetetus* in defence of his theories with the speeches attributed to him in the *Protagoras*, we discover remarkable differences. In the latter dialogue, indeed, when he applies relativism to ethical conceptions in defence of an opinion that is not his own, he does not distinguish between what happens to what is good and to what is useful, because he affirms that both vary according to the different subjects and their conditions (339*a*–*c*).[2] But it is above all necessary to stress the unsurmountable contrast between the ethical relativism of the apology and the emphatic recognition in the *Protagoras* of the absoluteness and universality of some fundamental ethical values. This entitles us to deny that the apology represents the intimate convictions of the sophist; and other reasons can be added that have been given by various historians.[3] It can be remarked also that Protagoras, at the end of his speech, corrects the three theories combined by Socrates (sensism, relativism, Heraclitism), namely, that he accepts as his own two doctrines that cannot be attributed to him. We can admit with Taylor[4] on the one hand that Socrates's interpretation of the thought of Protagoras does not belong to the sophist, because it is presented as a substitute for an official exegesis, and, on the other hand, that it is offered as a fair attempt to explain

[1] Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 21*a*.

[2] Aristotle, *Met.*, *K*, 6, 1062*b*, 13–19 (Diels-Kranz, *ibid.*, A, 19), saying that from the principle of Protagoras it can be inferred that the same thing is good and bad, implies that the sophist had not applied this proposition to moral life.

[3] According to Covotti (*op. cit.*, pp. 48–52) it can be inferred that the utilitaristic theory cannot be attributed to Protagoras from the following passages: "If he, being himself present, granted these things, and if it were not we that allowed them coming to his rescue, it would not be necessary to return to them and stress them; but now someone might find that we have not been warranted to agree to this on his behalf" (169*e*); "If suddenly he [Protagoras] rose up to his neck, and reproached me for speaking a lot of nonsense . . . and you for concurring. . . ." (171*d*).

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 333.

the theory of Protagoras, on the assumption that he, as a clever man, may wish to make it consistent with his educational profession: and, indeed, Theodorus, an ancient admirer of his, appears to approve that defence. We may even suppose that at least some of the hints from which the defence was developed were contained in the writings of Protagoras; but we are not allowed to attribute to him thoughts contrasting with those expressed in the myth and *logos* of the dialogue that bears his name.

Another suggestion, bolder at first sight but far more likely than the one expressed just now, may be offered on a subject of fundamental importance. We know on the one hand that Protagoras recognized absolute ethical values; on the other hand, we know from the most reliable sources that he applied the relativistic principle to the knowledge of nature, that is to say (in conformity with the ideas of the times), to theoretical knowledge generally, concerning which he affirmed that all opinions are equally true. Considering these facts, it is quite credible that he, without formulating his thought explicitly and definitely, was convinced that the attributes "true" and "false" have no room in the sphere of social and ethical life, namely that the judgments concerning right and wrong, fair and foul (in an ethical sense), do not obey the tests that hold good for the knowledge of nature:[1] and so Plato, in the belief he was strengthening the sophist's position, interpreted his thought in the manner suggested by the utilitaristic theory of the apology. If the sophist, as everything tends to show, applied the relativistic principle only to the knowledge of nature, or to theoretical knowledge generally, we must also think that he, a self-appointed teacher of *areté*, besides using the principle to criticize mathematical and naturalistic disciplines which he held valueless for the formation of good men and citizens,[2] must have used it also, and principally, to uproot the immoralistic theories similar to those supported by Callicles in the *Gorgias* and the non-immoral but antisocial doctrines (implicitly or explicitly ending in an anarchic cosmopolitism) represented by Hippias, whom the sophist tacitly hits in the *Protagoras*. Indeed, both these sets of theories were based on a conception of φύσις, that, variously interpreted, produced dangerous consequences for social and ethical life. Protagoras, showing that man cannot know the natural world in its inmost reality, because all the opinions about it have the same truth-value, destroyed at one blow the possibility of building social and ethical doctrines on a conception of φύσις,

[1] A confirmation of this suggestion can be found in the language used by Protagoras in the myth and the *logos*; in fact, he uses the expression τἀληθῆ λέγειν only when he says that it is not admissible that one who is not a madman should not say that he possesses justice and the other virtues (*Prot.*, 323*b*). The words "true" and "false" are not used for ethical judgments.

[2] See p. 1.

and so he got rid of those theories that, raised on these foundations, either endangered the beliefs and ethical rules belonging to the Hellenic tradition or led to the most unlimited and destructive immoralism. In this sense, the relativistic principle, far from entailing dangerous consequences for social and ethical life, was to defend it against the negations of anarchic anti-traditionalism and selfish immoralism.

The thesis of Protagoras, derived from the man-measure principle which admits of no contradiction (*οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν*. Plato, *Euthydemus*, 286, *c*), must always be applied to the opinions concerning the natural world.[1] Indeed, if all opinions are true, inasmuch as each refers to what appears to, and therefore exists for, each subject, and false opinions do not exist, every subject speaks of a being that exists only for him and therefore differs from that of the others: hence no contradiction is possible because contradiction requires that two persons should speak in opposite ways of the same object.

Some have attempted, without any reason, to connect with the man-measure principle what Protagoras wrote about the Gods in the beginning of his work *Περὶ θεῶν*: "As to the Gods I cannot know either that they are or what they are, or [add: 'in the latter case'] how they look; because many things hinder knowledge, the obscurity [of the subject] and the brevity of man's life.[2] Zeller has

[1] Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 19. According to this text, such a proposition had been used by persons living in older times than Protagoras. Diels and others think of Heraclitus, but, as Taylor thinks (*op. cit.*, p. 96[1]), it must be Parmenides who had maintained that one cannot speak of what does not exist; contradiction indeed requires that one at least of the contrary judgments should say what is not. Instead, Aristotle from the Protagorean man-measure thesis, infers that contradictory propositions can be stated about everything; nay, that all things are one. As he appears to each, a man will be, and will not be, a trireme; and the same thing will be a man, a wall, and a trireme (*Met.*, *Γ*, 4, 1007*b*, 18–25). But Protagoras, though admitting the existence of objects external to subjects, thought that *χρήματα* or facts (namely, the belonging to them of certain attributes) varied according to the subjects and their conditions, and therefore denied that two persons could speak of the same thing.

[2] This is the translation of the text as reconstructed by Diels (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, B, 4) friom Eusebius (*Praep. Evang.*, XIV, 3, 7, and Diogenes Laertius, IX, 51. The former has *οὐκ οἶδα*, the latter *οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι*. Only in Eusebius we find the words *οὔθ' ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν*, which are wanting in Diogenes; in Hesychius, *Onomatol. in Schol. Plat. de Rep.*, 600*c* (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 3), and in Plato, *Theaetetus*, 162*d* (*ibid.*, 23), but are given by Sextus Empiricus, *Aedv. Math.*, IX, 55–6 (who quotes also verses from Timon (*ibid.*, A, 12), by Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, I, 12, 29 (*ibid.*, A, 23), and by Philodemus, *De pietate*, c. 22, p. 89[6] (*ibid.*), which means that they were in an Epicurean source common to the last two. The last part of the text ("because many things . . .") is wanting in Eusebius. Other evidence: Philostratus, *Vit. Sophist.*, I, 10, 2 (*ibid.*, A, 2); Cicero, *De Nat. Deorum*, I, 24, 63

indeed maintained that Protagoras, who rejected the possibility of knowledge, was bound *a fortiori* to think that knowledge of the hidden causes of things is impossible.[1] But, if he had applied his principle to this subject he should have said that the Gods are, or are not, according to the opinion entertained of them, and that in the former case they look as each one opines. Or, rather, he should have confined himself to the latter point, without questioning the existence of the Gods, as he did not question the existence of natural beings). His position regarding religious beliefs is an agnosticism wholly different from the subjectivistic relativism of the man-measure principle, and this is a new reason for thinking that he restricted its application to the objects of the natural world. It is not easy to guess the contents of Protagoras's book on the Gods: many suggestions have been advanced, but no one of them is convincing. Nestle[2] does not accept, because undemonstrable, H. Gomperz's suggestion that in structure this book resembled the *Dissoi logoi*, namely that it developed the arguments that in the sophist's opinion could be brought in favour or against the different theories about the subject in question,[3] but with greater reason the same may be said of the numerous and detailed hypotheses that he presents. In his opinion, Protagoras has criticized in that book the usual proofs of the existence of the Gods and of their concern for men. He who, according to the myth, recognized that the worship of the Gods is something specifically and universally human, was bound to consider the belief in their existence as an inference drawn *e consensu gentium*, incapable, in his eyes, of commanding assent. Nestle supposes also that the sophist has contradicted the traditional beliefs on religious contamination and finds it very likely that he attacked the mantic art. As a matter of fact, these suggestions are ingenious and interesting, but even less convincing than H. Gomperz's. In any way the religious agnosticism of Protagoras was certainly bold, but it must not be considered as a revolutionary novelty, because the existence of the Gods, while Protagoras was living, had been denied by Diagoras of Mélos, who was not a sophist but a poet.[4]

(*ibid.*, A, 23). According to ancient evidence, Protagoras, accused of impiety in Athens for the beginning of his work on the Gods, fled from justice and, while going to Sicily, was shipwrecked and died. His books were publicly burnt (Diels-Kranz and Diels, *ibid.*, A, 1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 23).

[1] *Phil. der Griechen*, I, 2[6], p. 1406. [2] Introduction to the *Protagoras*, p. 18.

[3] *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, pp. 131 and 189.

[4] See Überweg-Prächter, *op. cit.*, p. 129. Without reason Nestle (*op. cit.*, p. 32) puts him among the disciples of Protagoras; quite reasonably instead it has been remarked that we cannot consider as a sophist one who, for aught we know, did not justify rationally his negation.

(*Translated in Italy*)

FASCISM AND NAZISM

Professor R. G. COLLINGWOOD

When travellers are overcome by cold, it is said, they lie down quite happily and die. They put up no fight for life. If they struggled, they would keep warm; but they no longer want to struggle. The cold in themselves takes away the will to fight against the cold around them.

This happens now and then to a civilization. The vital warmth at the heart of a civilization is what we call a religion. Religion is the passion which inspires a society to persevere in a certain way of life and to obey the rules which define it. Without a conviction that this way of life is a thing of absolute value, and that its rules must be obeyed at all costs, the rules become dead letters and the way of life a thing of the past. The civilization dies because the people to whom it belonged have lost faith in it. They have lost heart to keep it going. They no longer feel it as a thing of absolute value. They no longer have a religious sense of its rules as things which at all costs must be obeyed. Obedience degenerates into habit and by degrees the habit withers away.

This is how Greco-Roman civilization came to an end. It died because the people who inherited it lost heart to keep it going. It died because the religious passion that provided its driving force had ceased to exist. In the days of Marathon and of Cannae that passion was very much alive. In the days of the earlier Roman Empire it was moribund. In the days of the Lower Empire it was dead. Henceforth the Roman Empire was a corpse, galvanized from time to time into spasmodic activity but without life of its own.

Everybody knew this at the time. The great Emperor Julian not only knew it, he tried to cure it by reviving the "pagan" religions. Others had known it ever since the first symptoms of decay had set in; from the fourth century before Christ in Greece, from the first century in Rome. When Christianity began to conquer the Greco-Roman world, people who knew that world to be moribund and knew that the cause was decay in pagan religion fancied that Christianity was killing Greco-Roman civilization and imagined that the destruction of Christianity would bring it to life again; not realizing that Christianity was conquering the world only because the pagan religions were already dead and had left a void which nothing could fill, except a new religion, as universal in its claims as the Roman Empire itself.

Pagan thinkers, knowing that Greco-Roman civilization was dying or dead because the religious passion that inspired it had failed, could only choose between despairing of the future and trying (necessarily in vain) to redeem it by reviving that same passion. Christian thinkers, knowing the same thing, could despair of Greco-Roman civilization and at the same time hope for a new civilization whose driving force should be Christianity itself. That is the theme of Augustine's *De Civitate Dei.*

Their hope was justified. In the course of time the religious passion of Christianity built a new heaven and a new earth: the earth of modern politics and the heaven of modern physical science. This is not the place to describe their details, or even their principles; or to show how intimately those principles were connected with the doctrines of Christian theology, and how accurately in general outline they corresponded with the prophetic vision of the great Christian thinkers who wrote while Rome was falling.

Modern philosophy and science have admirably succeeded in a kind of distillation, by which the rational contents of the Christian faith have been separated out from the mass of superstitious ideas and magical rituals in which they were embodied. The "spirit" of Christianity, issuing from this alembic of the intellect, has been bottled clear and cold and labelled "principles of politics," "principles of scientific method," and the like. The residue, consisting of superstitious ideas and magical rituals, has been thrown away.

Thus in the last two hundred years Christianity has suffered a curious double fate. Whatever in it is capable of logical formulation as a system of first principles has been analysed and codified and has come to function as the axioms upon which our sciences of nature and history, our practice in liberal economics and free or democratic politics—in short, all the things which make up our civilization, are built. But whatever is not capable of logical formulation, whatever is in the nature of religious emotion, passion, faith, has been progressively exterminated, partly by ridicule and partly by force, under the names of superstition and magic. The two processes have gone hand in hand. The same men who have been most eager to formulate the principles in which Christianity has trained them have been most active in suppressing the "irrational" or emotional elements in Christianity itself.

It was in the eighteenth century, more especially in France and England, that the movement called "Illuminism" grew up and spread like an epidemic among educated men. Its purpose was double: positively, to formulate and develop principles which the historian, when he studies them, finds to be derived from Christian sources; negatively, to wage war on every kind of superstition and magic, and in particular the superstitious and magical elements in Chris-

tianity itself, and on religion as such, identified with these superstitious and magical elements. Under the influence of Illuminism, the French revolutionaries inaugurated a cult of "La Raison," and Auguste Comte a cult of "L'humanité"; Shelley (miscalled a Romantic poet, if Romanticism be defined as a reaction against Illuminism) declaimed against priests, wrote *The Revolt of Islam*, and signed himself "atheist" in visitors' books; and Gibbon, ignoring all the evidence, fabricated the fable that the Roman Empire fell not through its own religious decay but beneath the swords of the barbarians. It is only in our own generation that the long-known truth has been rediscovered. In spite of the Romantics (Blake wrote "Mock on, mock on, Voltaire, Rousseau," but who cared for Blake?) Illuminism became the orthodoxy of the nineteenth century; so that an age that prided itself on its scientific attitude towards everything knowable developed in fact a scientific attitude towards everything except religion. Towards religion its proudly cherished attitude was in the main a purely emotional one: an attitude of unreasoning and unintelligent hostility.

The idea of freedom—free speech and free thought for everyone; free inquiry and free discussion in science, free inquiry and free discussion in politics—had been distilled from the body of Christian practice by a long chain of thinkers, of whom the Illuminists were no small part; and in that condition it was available, bottled and labelled, for nineteenth-century use. The first rule of the life and philosophy which on the Continent are called "liberal" and in England, to avoid confusion with the special programme and principles of one single political party, "democratic," is to apply that idea, devotedly if not always wisely, to every detail of human activity. But to a reader who studies any classical exposition of it, like that of John Stuart Mill, the grounds of this devotion are far from clear. They could not be stated either in terms of the utilitarianism nor in terms of the intuitionism which were the two fashionable moral theories of the nineteenth century. Not in terms of utilitarianism, because liberty is or was an end in itself, an absolute value; and the only values recognized by utilitarianism were derivative values, the values of means. Not in terms of intuitionism, because intuitionism gave no grounds for anything at all: its only reason was the "woman's reason," "It is so because it is so." Kant's statement of it as the categorical imperative in its second form: "treat human nature . . . as an end in itself, never merely as a means," was clear and conclusive, but fell under suspicion because it too evidently betrayed its origin in the pietistic religion of Kant's childish training. He had not sufficiently purged his moral principles of religious emotion.

The real ground for the "liberal" or "democratic" devotion to freedom was religious love of a God who set an absolute value on

every individual human being. Free speech and free inquiry concerning political and scientific questions; free consent in issues arising out of economic activity; free enjoyment of the produce won by a man's own labour—the opposite of all tyranny and oppression, exploitation and robbery—these were ideals based on the infinite dignity or worth of the human individual; and this again was based on the fact that God loved the human individual and Christ had died for him. The doctrines concerning human nature on which liberal or democratic practice was based were not empirically derived from research into anthropological and psychological data; they were a matter of faith; and these Christian doctrines were the source from which they were derived.

Beliefs or habits long inculcated will survive for a time their logical grounds. All over Europe, during the nineteenth century, the grounds of the habits and beliefs called liberal or democratic were being destroyed by the anti-religious propaganda of Illuminism and its heirs. Yet the consequences that had been long ago foreseen by philosopher-statesmen like Berkeley did not appear to be happening; until, late in the century, it was complacently suggested by men in whom the habits inculcated by Christianity had survived Christianity itself that "Christianity as a system of dogma" should be given up and "Christianity as a system of morality" retained.

At the present time the liberal or democratic form of life has been openly, ostentatiously, and (it must be added) triumphantly attacked in at least three major European countries. In Italy, Germany, and Spain a new form of life has established itself, in defiance of the liberal or democratic tradition and in outspoken opposition to it. I say nothing of Russia because in the past Russia has never accepted the liberal or democratic ideals, and although Communism as preached by Marx and Lenin is hostile to those ideals, the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 1936 contains a great deal that is in harmony with them. Moreover, I have no personal acquaintance with Russia, and I prefer to speak of what I know.

The point to which I wish to draw attention is this. Alike in Italy, in Germany, and in Spain, the vast majority of the population is sympathetic to the liberal-democratic ideals and hostile to the Fascist or Nazi minority that has seized power. And persons belonging to that majority know very well why power has been snatched from their hands. It is because their Fascist or Nazi opponents have somehow contrived to tap a source of energy which is closed to themselves. Fascist and Nazi activity exhibits a driving power, a psychological dynamism, which seems to be lacking from the activity of those who try to resist it. The anti-Fascists and anti-Nazis feel as if they were opposed, not to men, but to demons; and those of them who have analysed this feeling say with one accord that

Fascism and Nazism have succeeded in evoking for their own service stores of emotional energy in their devotees which in their opponents are either latent or non-existent. Fascism and Nazism may be silly, but those who believe in them believe in them intensely, care enormously that they should win their fight, and win it because they so greatly care to win it. Liberalism or democracy may be wise, but the people who care for it do not care for it passionately enough to make it survive.

Fascism and Nazism owe their success to the emotional forces which they have at command. Alternative explanations are current, but none of them fits the facts.

Those who believe in the Marxist dogmas explain them as class-movements. They are not class-movements. They affect every class alike, and there is no one class whose special interests they advance or whose special point of view they express.

Those who believe in the omnipotence of big business explain them as a counter-revolution of big business against the "Communist Menace." It is true that by inventing an altogether imaginary "Communist Menace" Fascism and Nazism have at critical moments rallied big business to their support; but the movement which has at times employed big business men as its mercenaries, and at times cast them off again, is one thing, and big business itself is another; no one can identify them without suffering from judicial blindness.

Those who believe in the omnipotence of propaganda explain them as due to the power of advertisement. For Germany, this explanation has been refuted once for all by Mr. Peter Drucker,[1] who has shown that Nazism came into power when all the instruments of propaganda were in the hands of its opponents, that its own propagandist utterances have always shown a complete disregard of consistency, and that its most fervent supporters never believed them. The same is true, to my own knowledge, of Fascism. For Fascists and Nazis alike, propaganda is a useful weapon, but not an indispensable one. It is folly to identify a weapon with the hand that wields it.

Fascism and Nazism, then, are successful because they have the power of arousing emotion in their support. They can annihilate even the most widespread liberal-democratic opposition in their own countries because those who believe in them "think with their blood," as the Nazis say: care intensely about their beliefs, and can therefore overwhelm the liberalism or democracy which, because its votaries have for two hundred years progressively purged it of emotional elements, has become as purely as possible what the

[1] *The End of Economic Man* (London, 1939), especially page 14, bottom, and the pages following. I owe much to this book, but I do not accept everything it contains.

French call *cérébral*, an affair of unemotional thinking. A man who thinks with his blood, even if what he thinks is silly, will always get the better of a man who thinks merely with his brains, even if what he thinks is wise.

What liberals or democrats think, there can be no doubt of it, is wise. To think in that way is to take a long view. It means building up a social order whose scientific organization will always be capable of understanding as much of Nature as man need understand in order to advance his own welfare as one natural being among others; whose political organization will always be capable of resolving as much of the inevitable tensions and antagonisms between the various particular societies (nations, classes, and so forth) into which human society must always divide itself, as must be resolved in order to keep human society a going concern instead of a suicide club. It means renouncing all Utopias and all millenniums: all hope of omnipotence or omniscience, whether in relation to Nature or in relation to man. It means believing that human beings will never have solved all their problems, overcome all their difficulties, or settled all their quarrels; but that they need never lack the wits, the power, or the good will to solve the problems which at any given moment they most urgently need to solve.

What Fascists and Nazis believe, there can be no doubt of it, is silly. It means conjuring up a social order based on the superstitious adoration of individual leaders who, being human, are neither infallible nor immortal. It means not only neglecting inquiry into natural law, but stamping out the spirit of free thought and the practice of free expression upon which that inquiry depends. It means not only failing to resolve the inevitable tensions between one human society and another, but exacerbating them as a matter of principle, in order to intensify the emotional solidarity which they generate in the particular societies concerned. So, with regard to Nature, it means no longer cutting your coat according to your cloth, and providing your own cloth for the coat you need, but plundering the cloth from someone else's stores. With regard to man, it means living in a constant atmosphere of terrorism and terror, quarrels and fear of quarrels: in short, neglect of Hobbes's First Law of Nature and aspiration towards a state in which there is "no place for Industry, . . . and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation . . . ; no commodious Building; no knowledge of the Face of the Earth; . . . No Arts, no Letters, no Society; and which is worst of all, continuous feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."

If, in spite of this, Fascism and Nazism have conquered countries which together contain one-quarter of the entire population of Europe, or one-third of the population of Europe if the U.S.S.R. is

left out, the reason can only be that in their original homes, Italy and Germany, special causes have led to the abandonment of liberal or democratic principles. These principles, as we have seen, are derived from Christianity; and the emotional force, the "drive" or "punch," that once made them victorious was due to Christianity itself as a system of religious practice rich in the superstitious or magical elements which, in Christianity as in every other religion, generate the emotion that gives men the power to obey a set of rules and thus bring into existence a specific form of life. We have seen that Illuminism and other anti-religious movements have long ago exhausted liberalism or democracy of this emotional force and reduced it to a mere matter of habit. A mere habit has no "punch." It holds together with a success directly proportional to its own tenacity, which depends chiefly on the completeness with which it has been established, and inversely proportional to the strength of the destructive forces operating upon it.

All over the world liberal or democratic principles, having lost their "punch" and having become mere matters of habit, have lost their initiative and have been thrown on the defensive. All over the world destructive forces are operating upon them. But in Italy and Germany they have only been established in a somewhat experimental spirit at a somewhat recent date, among peoples whose history had for many centuries been conducted without them. In England and France they are hard-won achievements, the fruit of continuous political experience and political education extending over many hundreds of years. In the United States they presided at the birth of a nation, and are part and parcel of its heritage. Such habits are hard to break; yet in all three countries they have shown signs of weakening, and it is a serious question how long their defence will hold out against the attack of forces which I will not here attempt to analyse.

The destructive forces operating against liberalism or democracy in Italy and Germany are often identified with the after-effects of the war of 1914–18. Germany had to undergo the humiliation imposed on her by the Treaty of Versailles; Italy smarted under the disappointment of hopes which that same treaty did not fulfil. I do not deny this; but I suggest that it does not suffice to explain the facts. The spark in a fuse is not the sole cause of an explosion.

Liberal or democratic principles, I have argued, are a function of Christianity. Consider the religious situation of Italy and Germany. The Christianity of Italy is very ancient and very deeply rooted; but it is a highly syncretistic Christianity. When first it became the official faith of the country it was a Caesaro-Papism which combined the principles of Christianity with the principles of a three-centuries-old Emperor-worship, the worship of a "Leader" invested with

divine attributes and venerated in a magical ritual. And even Augustus did not invent this worship of a human leader; it was deeply rooted long before his time in the practice of Mediterranean peoples. Fascism harks back consciously to the Roman Empire, and the various "Fascist Decalogues" that have found their way into print, however they may differ in other points, agree in reasserting the formula of Emperor-worship, "The Duce is always right." And the vitality of pre-Christian religion among the Italian people is abundantly proved by the numbers of pagan cults which have always been, and still are, fervently practised by them, not (like the pagan survivals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in this country) under the Church's ban, but countenanced and consecrated by the Church itself and presided over by the Church's own priests.

Fascism as a system of political principles is a function, not of Italian Christianity, but of the pre-Christian paganism which has survived under the toleration and protection of Italian Christianity; and this is what has made possible an understanding between Fascism and the Vatican. The "punch" of Fascism is derived from the pagan emotions which the Vatican has always tolerated. It surrenders nothing, therefore, in tolerating Fascism.

Protestantism from the first has persecuted these pagan survivals and has refused to incorporate them in its own conception of Christianity. But even in England, which has been officially a Christian country for seventeen centuries, they still exist, as everyone knows who is at all intimately acquainted with the life of an English village. Germany was the last European country to adopt Christianity; and in Germany the pagan survivals have always been extremely vigorous. Officially, instead of being tolerated as in Italy, they have been disowned; but unofficially they have been very much alive. It is no wonder, then, that they should now have come to the surface; that Nazism should actively promote them; and that leaders of German Christianity should become opponents of Nazism and should find themselves in concentration camps.

Thus in Germany, as in Italy, though with very different consequences for the representatives of Christianity, the new political movement contains ideas drawn from the survivals of an unextinguished pre-Christian religion, and derives its "punch" from the emotional appeal of that religion. The same pre-Christian religions, or similar ones, survive in all European countries, and even, unless I am misinformed, in the United States of America. In all these countries, therefore, the explosives exist which in Germany and Italy have shattered the inert façade of the principles derived from Christianity. Elsewhere these explosives may not exist in such large quantities; and the spark which has exploded them may, possibly, not be forthcoming. But it would be folly to forget their existence;

and it would be criminal in those who know the facts to conceal their knowledge.

The time has long gone by when anyone who claims the title of philosopher can think of religion as a superfluity for the educated and an "opiate for the masses." It is the only known explosive in the economy of that delicate internal-combustion engine, the human mind. Peoples rich in religious energy can overcome all obstacles and attain any height in the scale of civilization. Peoples that have reached the top of a hill by the wise use of religious energy may then decide to do without it; they can still move, but they can only move downhill, and when they come to the bottom of the hill they stop.[1]

[1] This article was written immediately after reading Mr. Joad's *Appeal to Philosophers*. Mr. Joad asks for a truce of philosophical sects, a pause in logic-chopping, and an attempt to make fresh contact with the classical tradition in philosophy. The philosophers of the classical tradition, as I understand it, were men who used their trained faculties of thinking in order to think about facts, and primarily about facts of practical importance in relation to the lives of their fellow-men. No facts, in my opinion, are of greater practical importance at the present time than Fascism and Nazism. Our own country is fighting Nazi Germany. My friend, Mr. Hooper, asks me for an article on "some urgent important theme." The most urgent theme I can think of is the necessity for taking Fascism and Nazism seriously; to stop flattering ourselves with the belief that they are baseless follies indulged by unaccountable foreigners, or the alternative belief that they are good examples which we should be wise to follow. What our soldiers and sailors and airmen have to fight, our philosophers have to understand. If I have understood them badly, I hope someone who understands them better will correct me.

IS THERE A SOCIAL CONTRACT?—II

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In an earlier article I urged that the State presupposes an agreement to be governed on the part of its members. One common objection to this view was discussed at some length. It remains to deal with three further objections.

(2) It will perhaps be urged that a particular individual, or a small minority, would not be able to withdraw from the State if they wished to do so. If anyone decided that he did not wish to have anything to do with the State, whether it be the State in general, or some particular State, he could not give effect to his decision. Compulsion, as exercised against such persons, cannot be said to rest in any sense on their own consent. To put the same point in another way, "The claim that government rests on consent would never be listened to by a magistrate."[1]

This is an argument that is very likely to impress the ordinary man when it is first presented to him. He will say, "I had nothing to do with the question whether or not I should live under a government. I find myself actually forced to conform to the laws. If I try to set the State at naught, I shall soon be deprived of my property and my liberty. I have no real alternative but to submit."

The barrenness of the alternative which confronts a person who wishes to repudiate the State has been strikingly expressed by Hume. The following passage refers strictly to the man who wishes to leave his country, which is not necessarily the case with the man who is opposed to the State. But ultimately the two problems are identical, and the passage lends itself well to our purpose:

> Can we seriously say that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manner, and lives, from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires. We may as well assert that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean and perish the moment he leaves her."[2]

Much in the same way, it is urged, our obedience to the State involves only the semblance of freedom.

It is not difficult to find an answer to this objection. My argument, throughout, is based on the fact which was stressed at the outset, namely, that conduct is essentially selective. In particular, a compromise is seen to be unavoidable with regard to the advan-

[1] B. M. Laing puts Hume's argument into these words in *David Hume*, p. 204.

[2] *Works*, vol. iii, p. 505.

tages of social co-operation. We cannot have everything our own way, and this forces a further choice upon the individual, namely, that between the State and anarchy. It is thus absurd to complain that our property and freedom are taken from us if we disregard the State, since, without the State, we should not have any property or freedom. The State is not an institution to which a man attaches himself in the same way as, being already a member of a church, he decides also to join a debating society. The State is a condition of all the other conditions of the good life. Thus, in a sense, we have little choice but to accept the State. But this choice is not forced upon us by the State. It is due to the nature of man and society. As regards the State itself, it exists because normal human beings consent to have a government over them in preference to anarchy. That the attitude of the ordinary subject is properly represented here is not always clear because the inconveniences imposed by the State thrust themselves more to the forefront of our thought, and are more clearly associated with the State, than the benefits which the State bestows. Nevertheless, while complaining of restrictions imposed upon them, men rely unthinkingly upon the protection of the State.

I think it was this point that Locke had in mind when he declared

"every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is so far forth obliged to obedience of the laws of that government during this enjoyment, as anyone under it, whether this possession be of land to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging for only a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the territories of that government."[1]

As it stands this statement is clearly untenable. Commenting on the passage J. M. Plamenatz declares: "That the being inside the territories of a government does not imply a willingness to obey its laws becomes evident as soon as we consider the nature of crimes and conspiracies."[2] This criticism cannot be gainsaid. Yet I feel that Locke is much nearer the truth than his critic seems to realize. It is true that the criminal does not consent to obey the laws which he breaks. But it does not follow that he does not consent to the framing and enforcing of laws generally by the government whose officers will punish him if detected. He may even be particularly anxious that the law which he himself violates should be enforced generally. Few thieves would wish to see the abrogation of property laws. And thus, although the use of material things does not *imply* the acceptance of any government, such use can normally be taken as indicating the acceptance of government as the condition whereby the sustained enjoyment of material things is rendered possible

[1] Second Treatise on Civil Government, sect. 119.

[2] J. P. Plamenatz, *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation*, p. 7.

among civilized peoples. It seems to me that this is what Locke is struggling to express, and it is unfortunate that he did not develop this side of his thought more fully and relate it to his theory of rights. It is significant that the above quotation appears in the chapters where Locke's difficulties drive him to his closest approximation to the arguments of Hobbes.

The distinction between obedience to a particular law and co-operation in the maintenance of government generally, is closely related to the distinctions made in an earlier article between the enforcement of a particular law against an offender and the enforcement of a system of laws against the people as a whole. Neglect of these distinctions has both confused the advocates of the contract theory and misled its critics. The consent which government presupposes is consent to the operation of a law-enforcing system, not to this or that specific enactment considered by itself.

The case of the conspirator, as distinct from the mere law-breaker raises difficulties. Such persons, indeed, are rare in a healthy State, and even they normally desire some kind of State. Nevertheless, the fact that the State has to deal with conspirators as well as its subjects who recognize its authority, throws into prominence the need to supplement the idea of consent in our complete explanation of the State. This brings us to a new stage of our discussion.

I have argued that the powers which it is distinctively human to desire cannot be secured without the enforcement of a social organization, and that the awareness of this truth induces in the majority of persons an acceptance of government and co-operation in its maintenance. But this does not imply that the enactments of a particular State are in all respects justifiable. Nor is it the case that the person who resists a State has no claim upon its members. Indeed, the rebel (whom we should be careful not to confuse with the mere lawbreaker) will have even legal rights in most States, if only on account of the difficulty of defining rebellion legally.[1] Without doubt he will have moral claims. But that raises the question of the relation of the State, as understood in this discussion, to morality; and this brings me to a further objection.

(3) It will be urged that the view of the State which I have been commending seems to preclude any limits to the authority of the State. That there are such limits, however, is implied in the admissions with which the preceding passage concluded.

To deal with this objection I must explain my view of the relation

[1] That Hobbes was well aware of this difficulty will be clear to anyone who reads chap. 30 of the *Leviathan*. Note especially the words: "For a Civill Law, that shall forbid Rebellion (and such is all resistance to the essential Rights of Sovereignty), is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation, but only by virtue of the Law of Nature that forbiddeth the violation of Faith.

between the State and morality. But, in a brief compass, the most that can be done is to indicate the way in which my argument requires this problem to be treated. Those readers who disagree with my moral theory may, without necessarily dissenting in other respects, substitute their own beliefs about moral claims and distinctions.

I have said little hitherto about moral matters. The authority constituted by our consent to be governed is amoral. It may also be true that men's motives for so consenting, in many instances, are purely selfish; i.e. many may simply want things which cannot be ensured without the State. But it is also morally our duty to co-operate in the maintenance of the State since this is a means to the fulfilment of our moral obligations. The latter, by contrast with any authority which is made by consent are ultimate and underived, although they vary with the nature of particular situations, including the moral beliefs of the persons involved. Consent is not, therefore, one of many ways in which the State has direct moral authority over its subjects. Our consent to the promotion of certain ends does not directly affect their morality. It is thus misleading to suppose that there is a special moral basis of political obligation constituted by our consent to the specific actions of the government, and existing side by side with another basis which covers the remaining enactments of the State. This supposition was made by many writers. A recent instance is found in a book to which I have already referred, namely, *Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation*, by J. P. Plamenatz. With many of the positions that are defended so skilfully in this book I am in entire agreement. But the issue seems to be seriously distorted at many points by the fact that the author conceives of the problem of consent, in political philosophy, as that of examining instances where the consent of the subject to specific enactments provides a direct *moral* justification of them. If I am right, however, there are no such instances. At the same time, the consent to be governed, to have our differences resolved by some law-enforcing system, creates an amoral authority whose functioning is indispensable to the fulfilment of ends which we *ought* to fulfil independently of any consent on our part or that of others. Plamenatz arrives at the following conclusion: "Under the very best possible conditions, so far as consent is concerned, it may be true that the rights of the governors depend upon the consent of a majority of the governed, but never upon the consent of all persons who can rightly be said to be obliged to obey the law. It follows from this that consent cannot be taken to be the only basis of political obligation."[1] I think, however, that it is truer to say that, if we are speaking *morally*, consent is *never*

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 23.

directly the basis of political obligation, but that, on the other hand, consent is *invariably* the condition of an amoral authority which the State has in the first instance, but which we are *morally* obliged to maintain as the means to the completest fulfilment of moral ends. The attitude of Plamenatz is, I think, due largely to the failure to make the distinctions stressed on p. 179. It is significant that he begins his discussion by identifying government by consent with popular government. On my view, a dictator, to the extent that he can be said to *govern* at all, governs as much by the consent of his subjects as any representative assembly.

It is the recognition of morality and the emphasis on its unique and ultimate character that distinguishes my view from that of Hobbes. As regards the account of the essential nature of the State itself, it would be hard to improve upon the *Leviathan*. And there, writing of the person who refuses to conform to the social contract, Hobbes declares "And whether he be of the congregation or not, he must either submit to their decrees or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever."[1] I would not agree with Hobbes that there is no justice or injustice outside the State, nor that a rebel has no claim to consideration. But it is clearly inconsistent for those who dissociate themselves from the State to insist on those moral rights whose exercise depends on the enforcement of a social organization. And it is thus no immoral intrusion upon the freedom or liberty of an individual to take upon ourselves, as organized into a State, to deal with him in a certain way if he is unwilling that there should be a State. There can be no question of ignoring him, since, as has been already insisted, our lives are closely inter-connected. If a person refuses to avail himself of a scheme whereby his fellows organize their relationships, he cannot complain if they sacrifice his interest to that of their organization. Such procedure will not itself be based on consent. It will not be, strictly speaking, political, since it will not take place within the relationship of ruler and subject. It will be justified as part of the duty to promote a moral end (which I would equate with the general welfare). But it is the exception for the State to be dealing with individuals on this basis alone. The general welfare requires that the co-operation of subjects in the maintenance of the State should modify its treatment of them. The treatment meted out by the law to anarchists, moreover, would not be inappropriately described in the current and somewhat ironic term, "protective custody," in so far as it is probably much kinder than it would be to leave them to the full implications of outlawry.

It is distinctive of the individualism typified by Locke that it

[1] *Leviathan*, Everyman ed., p. 92.

ignored these considerations. While Locke, it is true, regarded the maintenance of a "standing law to live by" and a "common judge" as the peculiar function of the State, he failed to appreciate the full implications of law and its contribution to the life of a civilized community. Thus it was thought that individuals, already in enjoyment of specific and determinate rights, such as property, undertook to belong to a political society whose authority over them was extremely limited in consequence of excluding interference with these original rights. Naturally, this doctrine proved very obstructive of much desirable action by the State, and it is particularly inadequate to a society whose increasing complexity deepens the need for an all-pervasive organization or "planning." It is the persistence of this particular view of the inviolability of the individual that hinders the solution of many urgent problems to-day. But in actual fact, the exercise of such rights as that of property is inconceivable except as determined and regulated by society. My property is the control of material things which it has been arranged to reserve for me. As such, it may be morally unjust. But this means that the arrangement should be modified. The fallibility of the State does not render it less indispensable as the creator of those legal rights without which moral rights could not be respected in practice. There are rights outside the State in the sense (*a*) that the treatment we owe one another is not always enforceable, and (*b*) that the enactments of the State *ought* to be of a certain kind and not another. But there are no rights outside the State in the sense of claims to continued exercise, in independence of the State, of the basic conditions of the good life. Most, if not indeed all, our rights, in the last analysis, presuppose that organization of our inter-relationships which the State enforces.

The disrepute into which the theory of the social contract has fallen is due largely to its association with the individualism deplored in the foregoing passage. It is regarded as expressing the view that a person who wished to free himself from all contact with the State could do so without drastic repercussions upon his own life and privileges. The inconsistencies of individualist thinkers themselves confirm the absurdity of such a supposition if confirmation were needed.[1]

The opposite error to that of individualism was made by idealists in the supposition that, since there can be no exercise of rights independently of society and the State, rights are derived from

[1] Locke, for example, has no means of reconciling his inalienable right of property with the right of a youth, on coming of age, to place himself under any government he pleases. On Locke's view, if the youth places himself under the government of France, the British Government would have no jurisdiction over the property he has inherited in England.

society, and that, as was sometimes supposed further, the State, as an indispensable means of embodying these rights, is infallible. This is a particularly vicious distortion of the truth, and I shall return to it again.

It will be seen, however, that the argument of this paper involves an absolutist theory of sovereignty. The necessity for government lies in the inter-connection of men's interests and the conflict of their wills, arising in some cases from malice, in others from misunderstanding, in others from differences in moral conviction. The condition of co-operation is submission to a final authority. We cannot prescribe the limits of that authority, because our reason for agreeing to maintain it is our inability to agree on other matters. The essence of the social contract is the acceptance of an authority whose decision is final. Because the affairs of men cannot be completely departmentalized, nothing can be excluded from the jurisdiction of that authority. Hence, in great measure, the fallacy of individualism.

It is the supreme merit of Hobbes that his account of the social contract is *at the same time* a statement of an absolutist theory of government. It is only in the light of such a theory that the need for a contract, and its place in a complete political philosophy, can be understood.

By absolutism, however, we do not mean despotism. It is true that Hobbes favoured a dictator. But the essence of his argument, and the principle represented by the term "absolutism" is as compatible with democracy and the practice of *laissez-faire* as it is with dictatorship. All that is implied is submission to a unified authority. It is irrelevant how that authority is constituted and what duties it allocates to itself. Absolutism is simply the means of effecting that compromise without which no society can subsist. Its particular modes do not concern us here.

The authority created by the contract is, however, absolute in a legal, but not in a moral sense. The contract itself does not create a moral authority. Morality is not the creation of men. It is ultimate and unique. But this does not make the principle of legal absolutism unimportant. There are, it is true, certain enactments which the State ought to make rather than others. The State has a special province. And the misconduct of government in some regard may, moreover, reach the point at which the subject is justified in disobeying, or even in breaking into active resistance. Normally, an unjust law should be obeyed in the interests of conformity to law and order. But there can be no question of denying the right to resist under extreme provocation. It is also the fact that men will resist, whether rightly or wrongly, on occasion. Government is thus subject to political as well as moral limits. But it is

important that we should understand what happens in cases of resistance. The authority of the State is repudiated in its entirety rather than limited. We can dispense with a particular State as an instrument for the promotion of our ends, with a view ultimately to the creation of a better State. That is what the moral and political limitations imply. But to the extent that we accept any State as our instrument for the promotion of social purposes, we must grant to it uncircumscribed authority. This follows from its nature. Government cannot function successfully unless it is the highest human authority. If it is wise, a government will set very definite limits to itself. But its limits cannot be imposed from outside. We could not set such limits without being already united and having some person or persons to make final decisions on our behalf, i.e. without being already a State.

The authority of the State involves thus, in the first instance, the acceptance of a final human authority to which, in consequence of its finality, a fixed scope cannot be ascribed. We must trust this authority to function effectively. If it disappoints us beyond endurance, our only remedy is to create another in its stead. This artificial authority, whose sole basis is consent, becomes also a moral authority in so far as the fulfilment of moral ends requires that we should so consent.

These truths have considerable practical importance, since they emphasize the need for compromise and the acceptance of an absolute authority, as the *sine qua non* of effective co-operation. In particular, it would be well for those who are responsible for the conduct of international affairs to steep themselves in the teaching of the *Leviathan*. The League of Nations has failed, and will inevitably fail so long as it remains a *League*. To render it effective, Nation States must surrender their sovereignty and accept the decisions of the League itself as to what is and what is not within its province. Otherwise we remain in the state of nature, as the tragic history of recent events testifies.

I pass now to the last objection.

(4) The eclipse of the notion of contract in political philosophy is primarily due to the rise of utilitarianism, reinforced later by idealism and its conception of a moral end. It was urged by Hume, Bentham, and Austin, among many others, that the grounds of political obligation lie in the purpose which the State serves. This seemed to render the idea of contract superfluous, if not positively mischievous.

Thus Hume declares:

"It is evident that, if government were totally useless, it never could have place and that the SOLE foundation of the duty of ALLEGIANCE is the *advantage* which it procures to society, by preserving peace and order among mankind."[1]

[1] *Works*, vol. iv, p. 268; see also vol. iii, p. 510.

Accordingly, it is on "utility" rather than "fidelity" that government is based.

It has already been pointed out, however, that the principle of utility, as applied to politics, implies the free acceptance of government. This was admitted by Austin, although not without some ambiguity. His use of the word "preference" in the above quotation adds emphasis to this point.

I have shown that few, if any, of the advocates of the contract theories rely entirely upon the idea of contract. The purpose served by the State is normally regarded as the ultimate consideration. The relation of the contract to that purpose was not always clearly conceived. And Hobbes is almost unique in his acceptance of the contract as binding solely in respect of its being a means to the fulfilment of a certain end, in his case the selfish purposes of the subjects. But no political thinker of importance has been entirely oblivious of the end served by the State. It would be particularly perverse, at this date, to deny that the explanation of political obligation must be made, in the final analysis, in terms of such an end. Our conceptions of the end vary. For some it will be pleasure or the satisfaction of desires; for others, national greatness; for others, the fulfilment of duties intuitively apprehended; for others, the realization of the greatest good. But the supremacy of the end cannot be challenged. Nevertheless, it is of first importance to realize that the State, as an instrument for the attainment of an ultimate purpose, presupposes the agreement to be governed. Some of the advantages of this procedure have already been noted.[1] I can only mention one further consideration, the most important as it seems to me.

When we understand how the agreement to be governed enters into the constitution of the State, we shall appreciate better the distinction between law and mere fact, on the one hand, and morality on the other; and form a sounder conception of the relation between them. As I have argued earlier, the law secures to members of a community certain powers through their consent to be governed. It is this condition that distinguishes legal rights from other kinds of facts, and make it meaningful to speak of them as "rights." These artificial rights, however, need to be carefully distinguished from moral rights which do not depend on consent and which are not, in any sense, facts. The observance of these distinctions simplifies the task of jurisprudence and ethics as well as political philosophy.

For those concerned with this problem from the side of jurisprudence, the study of *Corporate Personality* by Frederick Hallis will be of much interest. The author of this book displays the highest ingenuity in the heroic but futile attempt so to conceive of rights

[1] See my first article, p. 78, Jan. 1940 and above, p. 179.

that the conditions of their legality also ensure that they are both moral and embodiments of facts. To the Austinian view of law as the command of a sovereign authority, he objects: "But what guarantee have we that the concessions of the State will be justly granted or denied?"[1] "We have put the cause of justice into the hands of a sovereign, be it a parliament or a despotic prince, and let its definition be found in the expression of that sovereign's will."[2] "This theory fails to do justice to that demand which jurisprudence makes in its character as a normative science. . . . The aim of the law is also the service of an ideal, the introduction of justice into the life of society. It must therefore be charged with a sound conception of that ideal which must ever be present in its rules."[3] This ideal is in turn identified with the "normative character of social facts."[4] The lawyer and the student of jurisprudence must therefore take account of the content as well as the form of law. That content has to be appraised in terms of an "ideal purpose" whose "validity is rooted in historical fact." It seems that "on the one hand the sanctions of law are extra-legal or social, and that, on the other hand, every legal judgment has a moral judgment as its background." As applied to the problem of corporate personality, this involves the repudiation of the Fiction Theory. It is not contended that a group has personality in a metaphysical sense, but before it can be treated as a person for the purpose of law its structure must exhibit certain factual social features, which are, at the same time, moral. Legal personality is not, therefore, a concession or creation of the State. And in pursuance of this theme, the author examines a number of representative theories, ranging from the Neo-Kantian writers on jurisprudence to the pragmatists and jurists, ascribing their success and failure to the measure of their conformity to the principle he stresses. The conduct of the argument is skilful and balanced, and it is with reluctance that I treat of it in a brief compass. But it seems to me that no position is more likely to introduce confusion into the tasks of the lawyer and legislator than that represented by Hallis. The law, as such, knows nothing of either morality or social fact, except in so far as it elects to comprehend them within its enactments. No doubt, a legal system which falls foul of morality or social realities will not be enduring. But that is another story. The law must be brought to terms with facts and ideals without identifying it with either. Otherwise legal pronouncements will be arbitrary and chaotic in the extreme. Bluntschli had declared that "in no case can an official be bound to render obedience which would violate the higher principles of religion and morality."[5] But, as D. G. Ritchie pertinently replies, "What does

[1] *Corporate Personality*, p. 12. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 20. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 21.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 126. [5] *Theory of the State*, English translation, p. 508.

he mean by bound? An official cannot be *legally* bound to break the "law of the land"; but he cannot *legally* claim to disobey a command, which, though not contrary to the law of the land, he considers contrary to *his* morality and *his* religion, and yet to remain an official."[1] The lawyer's "good law" must be distinguished from "a good law" in the moralist's sense. We are thus not surprised to find Hallis making the significant complaint that the Fiction Theory is "still the theory used in the legal practice of most countries. If the jurist has laid its ghost, the lawyer still knows it in the flesh."[2] That seems inevitable where the lawyer knows his business. As regards the charge made by the author that the Austinian view betrays the evolutionary character of social life and the struggle for right,[3] the guilt lies more at his own door. With the fusion of legal and moral right, the legal shortcomings of a claim may seriously obstruct its fulfilment. We shall have no ground on which to press the claim if its morality is impugned by its legal deficiencies. The law must be criticized and amended in terms of a standard in all respects external to itself. Both this task and the effective application of the law requires an uncompromising distinction between mere fact, law which is a special kind of fact, and morality. Hence the importance of the view that the State involves a social contract, for that view adds emphasis and clarity to those distinctions. The State itself (and in consequence its specific enactments) is seen to be, in the last analysis, man-made, an instrument fashioned to deal with social facts, and, as such, moreover, distinct from the end for which it is designed. This is the reverse of the view which Hallis, in complete consistency with his own tenets, favours. Referring to Korkunov and Ihering, he declares:

> "They proceed upon the basis of the same distinction between purpose and instrument, end and means, as we draw in the sphere of mechanics. In the latter we can separate the two and construct the instrument or means to suit the purpose or end. This we cannot do where the problem is one of organizing living society. We cannot study the ends of social life apart from the instrument through which they are to be realized. We cannot, that is, separate the teleological problem from the scientific problem."[4]

As I understand it, however, the sphere of mechanics has no monopoly of the usefulness of the distinction between means and ends, although it is harder to adjust the latter in the treatment of social problems.

In the sphere of ethics itself, our case seems even stronger. The distinction between law and mere fact is often imported into that sphere, in violation of the uniqueness of moral conceptions. This manifests itself in the neglect of those rights which do not admit of being enforced, the procedure of Green in Lecture A of *Principles*

[1] *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 250.
[2] *Corporate Personality*, p. 27.
[3] See p. 176 in particular.
[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 187.

of Political Obligation. But the supreme instance is the idealist theory of the general will.

As is well known, this theory originated with Rousseau. And Rousseau's mature thought rests upon a profound sense of the distinction between fact and right. In the first five chapters of the *Contrat Social* we have one of the most classical expressions of this position, the substance of which is put uncompromisingly into the declaration: "If force creates right, the effect changes with the cause." Thus, "the word 'right' adds nothing to force" (chap. 3). How then is a right constituted? Here Rousseau's individualism asserts itself. The independence of the individual must be preserved at all costs. He must remain free in the sense that demands are made upon him solely because he has "given himself." In the last resort he must "obey himself alone." If this meant merely that a certain kind of right, a right not strictly moral, is made by the acceptance of authority, it would be true and, as has been urged, important. But it would not require approval of each of the enactments of that authority in itself. Nor would it leave us without any principle to guide our treatment of those who do not so give themselves. Rousseau, however, thought he was describing the essence of *morality*. It is extremely significant that his contract, while it sets up the State, at the same time gives embodiment to a morally infallible general will. Law and morality are fused. And the consequences are twofold. On the one hand, the normal instrument for the fulfilment of moral ends, in the face of conflicting wills, namely, the compromise rendered possible by a legal system distinct from the moral order, is no longer available. Accordingly it is not surprising that Rousseau's treatment of the relation between the legislative and the executive is particularly unsatisfactory and obscure. The rightfulness of the executive's interpretation of the law, a task which exhausts all the vital decisions that confront the community, suffers in the same way. On the other hand, moral rights and duties are confined to the sphere in which men find themselves in agreement. In no sense does justice seem to have any reality outside the State sovereignty of the general will. Furthermore, a truly objective agreement will be rare on Rousseau's view that men are inherently selfish, a feature of his thought which is rarely appreciated. In consequence of the "preference each man gives to himself," "the general will, to be really such, must be general in its object as well as in its essence . . . it loses its natural rectitude when it is directed to some particular and determinate object."[1] And as one means of ensuring the purity of the general will in this regard, the apostle of freedom opposes the rights of association. This exposes to the full the barrenness of Rousseau's principle. Subsequent thinkers have endeavoured to amend the

[1] *Contrat Social*, book ii, chap. 4.

position in terms of common desires more ultimate and abiding than the will for the State and its enactments, the plausibility of the procedure being heightened by postulating extensive disinterestedness. Men, it appears, sincerely desire one another's welfare. But this seems to me a doubtful assumption where substantial sacrifices are required. It is, at least, a flimsy basis for morality. And there will be matters not covered by such mutual regard, in the conduct of which we shall have no moral principles. The further supposition that identity of purpose is found in our real, as contrasted with our actual, wills does not seem to have foundation in fact, or to be unfailingly adequate to our basic moral convictions. This has been urged by me in another paper, where I seek to criticize more fully the various forms of the theory of the general will.[1] Here, therefore, I contend myself with an indication of how the misguided attempt to found ethics on the idea of communal ends, arises from the inability to distinguish the legal rights which are made by agreement from the moral rights which are not—the assimilation of morality to law. In illustration of this latter tendency, in the form criticized in this essay, we may refer to the quotations made earlier from Green and Ritchie.[2] In these and kindred passages, the assent which is affirmed to be essential to sovereignty is equated with the acceptance of a moral end; sometimes, with morality itself. Along such lines neither law nor morality can be properly understood.

In the last analysis, moreover, law is itself a kind of fact. It has often been said of Hobbes that his civil rights, while distinct from the "power of everyman to all he can get" are yet only *powers* of a special kind. And Hobbes's conception of civil rights is preeminently sound. It is thus not surprising that the idealist theories of morality, which find their model in the law, stream back to their source by regarding the actual demands of the State as ultimate and morally infallible, a procedure whose extravagance is only matched by the viciousness of its effects.

The prevalence of this attitude in the modern world, dignified no longer by a high faith and a sincere respect for philosophical truth, enhances the usefulness of considerations which emphasize the ultimate artificiality of the State. It would be hard to find a phase of history to which an understanding of the social contract, both as regards its limitations and the responsibilities which those limitations deepen, the demand for loyalties sustained and forbearing as well as rational and critical, would be of greater service. Utterly inadequate as a complete explanation of political obligation, the idea which we have been discussing is not so superfluous as the utilitarians, obsessed with their own discoveries, happily supposed.

[1] See *Mind*, October 1937 and January 1938.

[2] In a former article; see page 75, Jan. 1940.

DISCUSSION

HEGEL AND PRUSSIANISM

In an article under this title in the January number of *Philosophy* Professor Knox sets out to disprove "(i) that Hegel the man is justly accused of servility to the Prussian Government, and (ii) that there is any warrant in the text of his *Philosophie des Rechts* for the charge that Hegel the philosopher was an exponent of *Prussianism* and *frightfulness*."

In the course of this attempt he draws attention to two passages in which he thinks I misinterpreted Hegel in my *Morals and Politics*. (1) The first of these passages occurs on my p. 107 where I attribute to Hegel the view that 'the proper exercise of philosophy is in the service of the State.' The passage in the *Philosophie des Rechts* (Vorrede), after describing the views of an opponent as Rabulisterei der Willkür reads: "Noch weniger ist sich *zu verwundern*, wenn die Regierungen auf solches Philosophiren endlich die Aufmerksamkeit gerichtet haben, da *ohnehin* bei uns die Philosophie nicht wie etwa bei den Griechen, als eine private Kunst exercirt wird, sondern sie eine öffentliche, das Publikum berührende Existenz, *vornehmlich oder allein* im Staatsdienste, hat." (The italics throughout are mine.) Hegel goes on to say that hitherto the State, either through self-confidence or contempt, has left philosophical heresy free: "Weil sie nicht dazu kommt, die Substanz der Sachen zu berühren, ja nur zu ahnden; sie würde somit zunächst wenigstens politzeilich nichts gegen sich haben." But, since the State "needs a deeper instruction and insight," and demands the satisfaction of this need from philosophy, it will not be influenced by any professional claims to freedom for the discussion of first principles, if these have a bearing upon conduct. (This looks very like the Athenian attitude to Socrates.)

Professor Knox then is concerned to show that these remarks are no evidence either that Hegel was servile to the Prussian Government or that he was an exponent of Prussianism.

In prosecuting the first of these attempts he points out several facts, given by Bosanquet, which I had forgotten. Hegel and the opponent, Fries, whom he abuses, were both, as university professors, civil servants in the pay of the Government, until Fries was dismissed, and were therefore perhaps bound either to refrain from criticizing it or to resign. The Government had recently decided to enforce a censorship upon academic publications. Hegel delayed the issue of his *Philosophie des Rechts*, but finally published it with a *Vorrede* explaining that, though critical of the Government on some points, he "shared its opposition to revolutionary ideas."

All this has nothing to do with me. I did not use the word 'servile,' nor did I ever suggest that Hegel was moved by the mercenary desire to retain a job or to get a better one. I had overlooked that he was in Government pay and I could therefore consider that neither as an excuse nor an aggravation. I was shocked not that he simulated these views for money, but that he actually held them. I did imply that his reflection must have been distorted by party, social, or religious prejudices; just as Professor Knox and I might bring the same charge against one another without offence and almost certainly with some measure of truth. But that in *this* sense he was 'servile' to the Prussian

Government—that he was too ready to congratulate it upon the dismissal of a troublesome, if silly, professor and upon the tightening of an academic censorship—I still think. One can only read the passages.

Professor Knox argues that Hegel must really be deploring the oppression of the Prussian Government, because in the *Encylopædia* he ascribes philosophy to Absolute Mind which transcends Mind Objective where the State is placed. I agree that Hegel's metaphysic does not necessarily imply a repressive (or any other) policy. My contention precisely is that when he came to politics his prejudices led him to think this policy was so implied. Even if he had not made this particular remark, we could have guessed what his attitude would be from such sayings as 'Der Staat ist also die Wirklichkeit des substantiellen Willens . . . das an und für sich Vernunftige. . . . Dieser Endzweck das höchste Recht gegen die Einzelnen hat, deren höchste Pflicht es ist Mitglieder des Staats zu sein' (*P.d.R.*, 258), and from his distinction between *Moralität* and *Natürrecht* in *Philosophie des Geistes*, § 502.

Nor did I use either the term frightfulness or Prussianism; but it might fairly be inferred that I thought Hegel's writings contained the germs which have been developed, with more or less enthusiastic acknowledgment, by totalitarians of both Marxist and Fascist persuasions. I agree with Professor Knox that dismissal of professors and censorship of philosophy hardly come up to modern standards of frightfulness, but they might not unfairly be described as Prussianism or Russianism, though they are also practised in places less subject to the limelight.

(2) A second alleged misinterpretation is a sentence on p. 108 of my *Morals and Politics*: "War is justified by Hegel on the grounds that by it domestic discontent and hankering after liberty are quelled and the inconsiderable nature of individual life and happiness demonstrated by 'hussars with shining sabres' " (*P.d.R.*, § 324).

Professor Knox quotes this passage, beginning: "War is not to be regarded as an absolute evil or as a merely external accident resulting, it may be, from the injustice or the passions of nations or their rulers " (he omits the words *überhaupt in solchem das nicht sein soll*). He then proceeds: "It is true that Hegel goes on to affirm that people stagnate (!) if they remain at peace and that war does result in the composing of domestic feuds," but he insists that Hegel's emphasis is on the denial that war is an *absolute* evil, and finally asks: "In face of these quotations, can it be maintained either that Mr. Carritt's summary is fair or that Hegel is an apostle of frightfulness?" To the first question at least I think the answer of most readers would be: Yes. I do not know that I ever met anything which Hegel would call an 'absolute' evil; such a thing is, I suppose, on his philosophy, impossible; certainly he could not so describe an immoral act. I take war to be an evil of the same kind as slavery or the vendetta, which we ought to try to remove. Hegel's defence of it, as educational, reminds me of those 'edifying sermons' (to quote his own sneer) which condemn attempts to discover cures for cancer or unemployment, on the ground that these are providentially designed as discipline for character. His defence of it as necessary reminds me of the nineteenth-century defence of child-labour. As to his denial that it presupposes any guilt, I agree with the criticism of T. H. Green:

"However widely distributed the agency may be which causes the destruction of life in war, it is still intentional human agency. The destruction is not the work of accident or nature. . . . The language indeed which we hear from the pulpit about war being a punishment for the sins of mankind is perfectly true, but it needs to be accompanied by the reminder that this punishment of the sin is simply a consequence of the sin and itself a further

sin, brought about by the action of the sinner, not an external infliction brought about by agencies to which man is not a party" (*Political Obligation*, §§ 160–161).

When Guernica is bombed I am not edified. Nor could I comfortably tell my sons or pupils that it was not an absolute evil if by killing or being killed they should be strikingly reminded of mortality. Nor am I consoled by the romance of the 'shining sabres.' But Hegel's view that States have no duties to one another and that it is the highest duty of a State to promote its own power, against which other States have no right (*P.d.R.*, §§ 336, 337, 342–4), renders a justification of war inevitable, as personal 'honour' justified duelling.

There remain three other instances of alleged misinterpretation, founded not on single passages, but rather on general impressions, and therefore to be discussed in a rather different way.

(i) "That by adopting Schiller's epigram, *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht*, Hegel frankly identifies might with right" (*Morals and Politics*, p. 114).

(ii) That Hegel "defends the suppression of freedom of conscience" (i.e. I suppose of freedom of speech and of association).

(iii) That Hegel holds that "the individual is a mere means to the State's ends" (*Proc. of Arist. Soc.*, 1935–36, p. 236).

It is only the first and third of these misinterpretations of which I am accused, but I should like to say something shortly about all three. It is to be noticed that Professor Knox is prepared to maintain not only that these interpretations are unfair upon the whole, but that there are no 'detailed passages' in Hegel to support them, though he agrees that they have often been given.

Against all these interpretations Professor Knox cites passages, with some of which I will try to deal before citing my own. But I should begin by disclaiming the belief that Hegel, any more than any other philosopher, was always consistent or that he was such a bad philosopher that *all* his inconsistencies were wrong. I cannot agree that "there is no warrant in the text of the *Philosophie des Rechts* for a charge that Hegel was an exponent of Prussianism and frightfulness," though I never made the charge. I am not sure if the wording here is meant to allow that such warrant *can* be found in the *Philosophie der Geschichte* and elsewhere. We are certainly entitled to interpret the former work by the latter, as Professor Knox relies upon the *Encyclopädie* for his interpretation of the censorship passage. And since later we are told that "It is only if *half* its doctrine is ignored that the *Philosophie des Rechts* can be interpreted as an apologia for the most criticized aspects of National-Socialism," we may perhaps infer, without pledging ourselves to exact bisection, that (so far from there being no 'detailed passages' to 'warrant the charge'), it is only if we neglect the other half that we can avoid my interpretation.

(i) Taking then the first count: Did Hegel identify might with right? Professor Knox says: "What triumphs in history, Hegel thinks, is the right or God's purpose, the rightness of which is intrinsic to itself, not dependent on its might." Here I stand corrected. I ought not to have said that Hegel *identifies* might with right (in the sense that he does not distinguish them in thought), but only that he holds them inseparable, so that whatever we see prevailing, we can know, however wrong it appears, to be right. I think I might fairly have said that he identifies right causes with successful causes. Professor Knox cites as 'plain words' which have been neglected: "Because sovereignty is the identity of all particular authorities, it easily gives rise to the common misconception, which mistakes it for sheer force (*Macht*), and identical

with despotism" (*P.d.R.*, § 278). But the question is not whether all sovereigns, because they have power, are despots, but whether the power either of a sovereign or a despot is any evidence that he represents the will of God. And I find at least equally 'plain' the words that "The existence of the State is the process of God upon earth" (*P.d.R.*, § 258), and at least equally emphatic: "Die absolute Regierung . . . ist das unmittelbare Priesterthum des Allerhöchsten, in dessen Heiligthum sie mit ihm Rath pflegt und seine Offenburungen erhält. Alles Menschliche und alle andere Sanction hört hier auf. . . . Jedes machen an ihr käme aus der Freiheit und dem Willen" (*System der Sittlichkeit*, p. 38). Further on he explains his distinction between despotism, resting on mere physical strength (*Macht*), and "*Gewalt*, reine entsetzliche Herrschaft . . . sic ist *nothwendig und gerecht* insofern sie den *Staat als dieses wirksliche Individuum* constituirt und erhält." In the *Philosophie der Geschichte* (Lasson, viii, 2, p. 88) we read that the right of the *Weltgeist* is above everything that can be justified as excellent or noble; and the Weltgeist embodies itself in the State. And again, "What the absolute end of Spirit requires and accomplishes, what Providence does, transcends the moral obligations and responsibilities and the praise or blame of individuals. . . . The litany of private virtues, of moderation, of humility, of humanity, of mercy, must not be raised against supermen (*Welthistorische*) and their deeds. World history may completely disregard the sphere of morality and the popular contrast of morality with politics" (Lasson, viii 2, p. 153).

(ii) These passages on success as the criterion of right have already provided some material for answering the second question: "Does Hegel repudiate freedom of conscience?" And we may also refer to the discussion of the censorship question at the beginning of this paper. Professor Knox on this point quotes the passage (*P.d.R.*, § 270, n. 2) where Hegel defends the Prussian toleration of Jews and Quakers even though the latter refuse military service. But in the same passage Hegel insists that they have thereby forfeited their citizenship and have, in that respect, been not inaptly compared to slaves. Professor Knox next quotes § 137 on conscience as a "sanctuary which it would be sacrilege to violate." But the whole passage reads: "Conscience, *as the union of subjective belief with the absolute* [i.e. the state] is a sanctuary which it would be sacrilege to violate. But whether the conscience of any individual corresponds to this idea is a question . . . so *the state cannot recognize conscience in its individual form* of subjective conscience." A long section (*P.d.R.*, § 140), summarized in a paragraph of subsection (*e*), argues that, since judgments about duty are fallible, "to oppose the authority of my private conviction to law, which has the authority of God, of the state, and of centuries" is "a stupendous presumption." This implies that God's will is revealed to the state but not in conscience, which therefore the state must silence. This is explicit in the *Phil. d. Geschichte*: "The ethic (*Sittlickeit*) of the state is not of the reflective (*moralische*) kind where my conviction rules" (Lasson, p. 94).

(iii) Does Hegel maintain that the individual is a mere means to the State?

(*a*) Professor Knox's first argument is that Hegel allowed more freedom to the individual than Plato did. So modest a testimonial I would not contest, though others do. Indeed, I should take Hegel's self-gratulation here as the sign of a lamentably low standard. It is hard to see how anybody not enslaved would have less freedom than Plato's workers. Nor must we forget that Hegel's own account of the *Bauernstand, der Stand der rohen Sittlichkeit* is as contemptuous as Plato's own (*System der Sittlichkeit*, pp. 30, 61, 65).

(*b*) Professor Knox then cites §§ 260 and 184 of the *P.d.R.* as asserting that "the modern state allows its subjects to develop to self-subsistent indi-

viduality." I would not deny that Hegel, like Burke, idealized the constitution of his own time and country as manifesting an almost perfect mean of liberty, which any reform would upset. But they only managed to do this by putting the golden mean at a very queer place in the scale. Hegel would allow individuals to "develop self-subsistently" so long as their well-being and *that of others* is subordinated to the well-being of the State as the State conceives it: "*Das Wohl eines Staats eine ganz andere Berechtigung hat als das Wohl des Einzeenen*" (*P.d.R.*, § 337). "Allen Wert den der Mensch hat, alle geistige Wirklichkeit, hat er allein durch den Staat . . . So nür ist er in der Sitte." (*Phil. d. G.*, Lasson, viii, p. 90). "Der Staat ist nicht um der Bürger willen da; man könnte sagen er ist der Zweck, und sie sind seine Werkzeuge (Indes ist dies Verhältniss von Zweck und Mittel hier nicht passend).

No doubt Hegel professed (as who does not?) and even persuaded himself (as who cannot?) that he was an admirer of freedom. And he managed this by giving the word a peculiar meaning of his own. Freedom is not the power of doing what you like (*P.d.R.*, § 15) nor what you think right (§ 140). He holds that those and only those are free who desire above all things to serve the success and glory of their State. In desiring this they are desiring that the will of God should be done, since "dass der Staat ist, ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt." So there is no conflict between their subjective goodness or freedom and objective goodness or freedom; what they want to do is what the State enforces and what ought to be done. If an individual believes he ought to do what is not for the success and glory of his State, he must be "forced to be free," though we may contemptuously approve his "blosse Moralität." If he ask how he is to know that the rulers' idea of success and glory, or of the means to them, is correct, that the *de facto* State is also *de jure*, *ἀκρειβεῖ λογῷ κρέιττων*, the answer must surely be that the very fact of their being rulers is the surest sign of God's will that they should be. This must be the answer, since Hegel contends that supermen like Caesar, who in disobeying the State for private ends, were strong enough to succeed, are "justified," however we may condemn them from the point of view of *moralität*. If they fail they are condemned. Right without might is "blosses Sollen." What happens to this freedom when the *Weltgeist* transfers its patronage to some other State, so that ours has no longer the "mission" to be glorious and successful, seems doubtful. Our defeat proves that God has abandoned us. Ought we to fight against him? It is the mission of the dominant State to sink our leaky ship, and logically we ought to rat. We shall then be free because our desires conform to the will of God, which can only be conjectured by what it brings about. Sibree's translation of K. Hegel's edition of the *Philosophie der Geschichte* (to which I have not had access) contains a passage, which I do not find in either Gans or Lasson: "Every Englishman will say: We are the men who navigate the ocean and have the commerce of the world, to whom the East Indies belong and their riches; . . . A nation is moral, virtuous and vigorous so long as it realizes its great aims" (p. 77). This only amplifies *Philosophie des Rechts*, § 347, "The nation to whom such a mission is entrusted by the World-spirit is, for its epoch, supreme. Against this, its absolute right, the spirits of other nations have no rights whatever."

The passages on which I would mainly rely for this general impression of Hegel's political philosophy are (*a*) for internal policy § 258 of the *Philosophie des Rechts*, which I summarized in my *Morals and Politics*, pp. 105–7 (*b*) for external policy, the Introduction to the *Philosophie der Geschichte*. These two works are translated severally by Dyde and Sibree.

Finally, if this, my general interpretation of Hegel's political theory, is

wrong, it has at least the excuse of being shared by many of his most admiring and able exponents.

(*a*) H. von Treitschke is commonly considered as the theoretical protagonist of German State-idolatry and militarism. In his *Politik* (of which selections are translated by H. W. C. Davis in *Political Thought of H. von Treitschke*) he clearly regards himself as a disciple and popularizer of Hegel, his chief criticism being that the master, for instance in questions of religion, was too totalitarian. He regards it as the *reductio ad absurdum* of democracy that it should logically disregard even distinctions of race. "It is materialism that rejects war" (*op. cit.* pp. 182, 153).

(*b*) W. Wallace (*Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, clxxxi–iii) summarizes Hegel thus: "It is foolish to oppose the interest or (as it is expressed by the more morally obnoxious word) the utility of the state to its right; . . . war (which some would fain abolish or moralize) has to decide not which of the rights asserted by either party is the true right (for both parties have a true right) but which right has to give way to the other. . . . All states are founded by the sublime force of great men. . . . The state is the self-certain absolute mind, which recognizes no definite authority but its own; which acknowledges no abstract rules of good and bad, shameful and mean, craft and deception." Wallace comments: "It is evident from these propositions that Hegel takes that view of political supremacy which has been associated with the name of Hobbes. . . . so also Hobbes describes the prerogatives of the sovereign Leviathan. . . . The absolute government is divine, self-sanctioned, and not made. . . . If we ask, where does this public opinion appear? . . . Hegel answers, it is embodied in the Aged and the Priests. . . ."

(*c*) T. H. Green (*Freedom in Morality*, § 6) says: "We cannot significantly speak of freedom except with reference to individual persons; only in them can freedom be realised; therefore the realisation of freedom in the state can only mean the attainment of freedom by individuals through influences which the state supplies. . . . What Hegel says of the state in this respect seems hard to square with facts. . . . Hegel's account of freedom as realised in the state does not seem to correspond to the facts of society as it is, or even as, under the unalterable conditions of human nature, it ever could be."

(*d*) F. H. Bradley (*Ethical Studies, My Station and its Duties*) after referring to Hegel, says, "Virtue is not a troubling oneself about a peculiar and isolated morality of one's own. The striving for a positive morality of one's own is futile and in its very nature impossible of attainment; in respect of morality the saying of the wisest men of antiquity is true, that to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one's country."

(*e*) D. H. Ritchie, who in his *Rationality of History* (*Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, ed. Seth and Haldane) was a whole-Hegelian, says: "In a sense, might is right. If individuals or nations are able permanently to succeed in influencing the world, we must regard their conduct as justified by their success. . . . The permanence of any 'counsel or work' is the test of its divine sanction" (p. 140) (*Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht!*)

(*f*) Bosanquet, who defends Hegel on the same lines as Professor Knox, asserts that "the state *de facto* is also the state *de jure*" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 185) and that "in submitting even to forcible restraint, when imposed by society in the true common interest, I am obeying only myself" (p. 107); though he admits that to call this "freedom" is "more or less a metaphor." A "modern state" is "the typical mind, the very essence of reason" (p. 281). "The general will must be the rational will even though people are not aware of it" (p. 240). "The state is the guardian of the whole moral world, but not a factor within an organized moral world. Moral relations

presuppose an organized life, but such a life is only within the state, not in relations between the state and other communities" (p. 325). "If the act was immoral, can the state as such really have willed it?" (p. 323). To justify all this Bosanquet puts forward the quite Hegelian, but for political theory astonishing view, that the distinction of persons is the same as that of faculties or interests in myself, so that there is no more injustice in developing one man at the expense of others than in sacrificing, say, my athletics to my philosophy. "The true particularisation of the human universal does not necessarily coincide with the distinction between different persons. . . . The stress seems therefore to lie in the attainment of the true particularisation which does justice to the maximum of human capacity, rather than on the mere relations which arise between the members of a *de facto* plurality" (pp. 170–179). This, which would justify slavery, seems so outrageous that I should have thought I must have misunderstood it were it not in complete agreement with Hegel's doctrine of the "inconsiderable" nature of individuality and Bosanquet's own formulation that "the world of claims and counter-claims" is an illusion.

(*g*) In the same spirit Professor Lord (*Principles of Politics*, 1921) writes: "The merely factual difference between individual minds or their acts is in itself quite insignificant and meaningless" (p. 270)—so you can punish me for your crime!

(*h*) Professor Reyburn (*Hegel's Ethical Theory*, 1921) says, "Moral responsibility is an abstraction" (p. 195).

(*i*) Professor Sabine in his admirably fair *History of Political Theory*, 1937 (pp. 635–639), says: "Hegel continually identified right and force, partly because he imputed to nature an ideal constitution that inevitably gives the greatest power to right, and partly because he regarded might as making right. . . . The state is continually represented as standing for the highest possible ethical value. . . . Hegel was at times led to the . . . conclusion that a good citizen need do nothing but conform to the existing state of affairs in his society. It was characteristic of him that he repeatedly equated individual choice with mere caprice, sentimentality and fanaticism. Again and again he branded the right of private judgment as a merely 'superficial' theory."

These few quotations must serve to show that for eighty years Hegel has commonly been interpreted by his most favourable critics in a "totalitarian" sense—in the sense that he thinks might indicates right; that he defends the suppression of free-speech and the subordination of conscience to law and tradition; that he thinks war necessary and the attempt to abolish it silly; that he believes the state to have some other justification than the welfare of its members or the enforcement of justice, but to have no duties to other states. That he ascribed any value to the democratic principles of equality and of representative government, I suppose, Professor Knox would not suggest.

E. F. Carritt.

THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE ALL-INDIA PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

HELD AT HYDERABAD, DECCAN

I

MESSAGE FROM HIS EXALTED HIGHNESS THE NIZAM OF HYDERABAD AND BERAR

I have great pleasure in sending this message to the scholars of Philosophy who have gathered here to exchange their thoughts and ideas and to examine afresh the heritage of ages past about the vital and fundamental problems of existence. I consider it auspicious that the devotees of the Mother of Arts and Science should meet in these premises, almost within a fortnight of the opening ceremony of this building. India has been a cradle of Philosophy, and the Deccan has had the distinction of producing thinkers of the first rank. I hope that the renaissance of learning and the revival of India's best thought will be greatly furthered by such gatherings, and that the interplay of thoughts will clarify important problems and be a source of the enrichment of intellectual life in its various aspects.

December 19, 1939

II

WELCOME ADDRESS

By The Honourable Nawab Mahdi Yar Jung Bahadur, m.a.(oxon.)

Education Member, H.E.H. The Nizam's Government, Vice-Chancellor, Osmania University, Chairman of the Reception Committee

It is my pleasant duty to offer a hearty welcome to the distinguished delegates of the Indian Philosophical Congress. The selection of Hyderabad for this year's session is fortunate for us. Under the enlightened rule of His Exalted Highness the State has made great strides in all directions. The establishment of the Osmania University is an event of historical importance. Centres of learning and wisdom shift and change. Athens, Alexandria, and Baghdad, and in our own country, the ancient university of Nalinda, once bore the torch of learning and have left an imperishable record inscribed in the pages of human history. I fondly believe that Hyderabad is destined to become the seat of a new learning and the embodiment of the common culture of the people who inhabit the State. The happy blending of that culture is exemplified in the architecture of the stately edifice of its Arts College.

The presence of eminent philosophers from different parts of India assumes a higher significance when we see what the world is passing through. When chaos reigns in the realm of thought or action, it is the proud function of the philosopher to bring about order. Philosophy is taken by some to be the mere fantasy of a dreamer, without any practical relation to life or reality. This misconception of the highest intellectual activity of man is as fallacious as it is harmful. When all the world is suffering from confusion, the philosopher

alone aims at discipline—the well-ordered discipline of thought and action. The highest function of a University is not served by the production of degree holders in as great a number as possible. A University should rather be a centre and nucleus of the highest thought and intellectual activity. We may or may not be interested in history, economics, or the natural sciences, but we should be failing in our duty as intelligent beings if we did not look at the world from the standpoint of them as a whole. We are painfully aware of the religious and sectarian strife and conflict by which our country is torn. This turmoil would end if only self-interest were subordinated to the interests of the country as a whole. To my mind philosophy is one of the best antidotes to the narrow-minded communalism of our day.

India has been for centuries the cradle of great metaphysical systems. The mystical attitude has been so commonly associated with the Indian mind that even to-day the Indian way of looking at things is considered by some to be synonymous with the philosophical outlook on life. But with the passing away of the old traditions, India has made way for the materialistic concepts of Western culture. Nevertheless, I refuse to believe that the highest culture of the West is necessarily materialistic in its essential character. Its greatest sons were enthusiastic exponents of spiritual values. But what has taken place is that the development of the natural sciences in Europe has adversely affected the growth of spiritual factors and has relegated thought—the highest function of man—to the background. Happily we now see a transformation going on in those very lands which were the cradle of the mechanical sciences.

Philosophy is not quite the abstract science we are sometimes apt to believe. On the contrary, it is one of the most concrete of all sciences since it takes a pre-eminently synthetic value, bringing as it does great breadth of vision and coherence and unity to the human mind. At the same time, feeling and reason, thought and emotion, have all their proper place in the philosophical system. On the other hand, abstraction or alienation from reality, which is said by some to be a characteristic of every system of philosophy, is in fact only a sign of decadence. For, like a living organism, philosophy also grows and decays. At its best it does not aim at passivity but tries to realize in concrete reality the values of the spirit. A philosopher who loses himself in unfruitful meditation and affects to despise society and nature, is not a full-fledged philosopher. It is in him a sign either of immaturity or of decadence when he devotes himself to the empty fantasy or sterile speculation. The true philosopher, as his name suggests, is a lover of wisdom. It is he above all others who desires and strives to see ideas and values taking concrete shape in the world of fact and experience. Action without thought is simply mechanical, while thought without action is but jejune or barren. Action and thought well co-ordinated are the characteristics of every true philosopher. It is for you, gentlemen, to be faithful to that ideal. Let your actions be guided by your thought, and your thought itself inspired by the Divine Idea. The man in the street acts but does not cogitate, an unpractical dreamer cogitates but does not act; but the true philosopher is he who acts in conformity with his thoughts. His ideals and reality are not as poles asunder. His ideals, so far from being lifeless, are possessed of a vitality which enables them to find a place in the world of facts and experience.

There also exists another popular misconception regarding philosophy. Some people mistakenly believe it to lead to the denial of the Supreme Being. In my opinion the contrary is true, for it is just philosophy which uplifts man from the dust and ashes of the limited, to the conception of the infinite. He nevertheless takes an interest in all that is going on around him. The song of the nightingale does not leave him cold or unmoved, yet all the beauty and

splendour of the world is for him not the last word. Philosophy and Religion meet here; for is it not the essence of every religion to believe that our life is not the alpha and omega of existence and would be incomprehensible or even meaningless without reference to something higher? We live and move and have our being in the Deity. There are different stages of human development. At the lowest stage man is but the slave of his wants and desires. The pleasure of the senses he may call happiness, but a little higher up he ceases to look to his own pleasures but sacrifices himself for the pleasure or profit of his family, clan, or some other greater social whole. Then at last comes a moment when he outgrows the pleasures of the senses completely and finds bliss and contentment in the contemplation and realization of spiritual values. God is now his stronghold. He is for him the last word and the ultimate meaning of existence. The dignity of philosophy and the great mission of the philosopher cannot be sufficiently emphasized. It is for you, gentlemen, to show the way to men to rise to those sublime heights of thought and action. It is for you to show the world the right way of thinking and the right way of doing. The Divine Idea works in one and all of us, but it is in the philosopher that it finds its highest expression. The world to-day is passing through a severe trial. What will emerge from it no one can foretell. We see communal strife at home and the clash of nations abroad. Man, the masterpiece of creation, has degraded himself and is blindly heading towards ruin and disaster. It is the function of the philosopher to transcend the narrow barriers of race and creed, and to guide the world along the right path. He should awaken in man the Divine Idea now lying dormant. At a moment when the dark forces of barbarism and brute strength are threatening civilization on all sides, it is for philosophy to bring solace to the troubled spirit. Man is divided against himself, and it is for philosophy to guard the spiritual values of truth and peace. It does not become a philosopher to retreat into his cell and shut his eyes to the bitter experiences and disappointments of life. The philosopher would lose his *raison d'être* if he remained a passive spectator of events. It is now for philosophers to send forth a message of love and harmony and to make that message heard.

The philosophical way of looking at things is therefore to be cultivated both within and without the precincts of a University. Resignation to the inevitable and in the beneficence of the Creator should inspire our actions as they have inspired all great men. Philosophy is the enemy of one-sidedness; Universality is its character. Moreover, it teaches the wisdom of love and reconciliation. The antitheses and discords of the world are not merely negated and denied but are brought into concord and harmony. For what else is the goal of philosophy if not concord.

The educational value also of philosophy cannot be exaggerated. It shows man in quest of the Absolute, the ultimate foundation of all that exists. It may sometimes err in its reasoning but it may not be insincere. Man is destined to be a denizen of two worlds, the world of space and time, and the world beyond. It is philosophy which brings man into harmony with his own destiny. This is the great goal which lies before you. Man is said to be made in the image of God; woe be to him if he allows this image to be obscured. One of the greatest thinkers of all time, Plato, has said that only philosophers should become kings. He meant that only a true philosopher is capable of realizing the ideals and values in a State.

In conclusion I may be pardoned if I say a few words regarding the philosophical situation to-day. There was a time when metaphysics dominated the field. With the growth of scientific technique and the development of natural sciences, modern man has become highly sceptical to metaphysical truths.

Experience and experiment are the two catch-words of modern science. But the revival of metaphysics is, I think, necessary. A healthy metaphysics takes us to the ultimate ground of all experiences and facts and at the same time is fully conscious of its own limits. Nor should one lose sight of the relation of psychology to this great science. Modern psychological research has no doubt thrown light on the dark nooks and corners of the human mind. It has revealed the mysterious intricacies of the conscious and the sub-conscious states. But psychology without any metaphysical foundation, without soul and consciousness, is only a dream which can never be realized. There is something in man which cannot be caught by the experiment but is a direct emanation from God.

Let me wish you all success in your deliberations.

III

WORDS OF WELCOME

By The Right Honourable Sir Akbar Hydari, P.C.

(*President of the Executive Council*)

Gentlemen,

Allow me to welcome you to this capital city of His Exalted Highness' Dominions and to the Osmania University under whose auspices we meet to-day. I welcome you in the capacity of its Chancellor in the full knowledge that any House of Learning, like a University, can only enrich itself by deliberations like those upon which you are about to enter. I need hardly add that I shall myself follow your proceedings with deep interest.

In the world of to-day, so inclined towards immediate results, the profession of philosophy is apt to be regarded as an occupation tending to unreality. Some accuse it—drawing support from history—of creating ferment and unsettlement of ideas, of demolishing old gods while not replacing them by new ones, by shaking the fabric of human belief on which rest much of the hopes of mankind, without presenting to the mind the comfort it needs amid the spiritual and material concerns of an increasingly complicated existence.

I am not one of those who believe, like Keats, that all charms fly at the touch of cold philosophy. Plato called philosophy the highest music, and there is, in reality, much of true inspiration in those flights into realms of pure thought which distinguish the work of the great philosophers. Above all, the devotional aspect of such thought, manifesting itself in the mysticism of some at least of the great philosophers, brings to us indeed the breath of true poetry and to our minds the comfort of true inspiration.

To me mysticism has always appeared as "vital" philosophy. It has a corner in every heart and an appeal to every mind, for there is none among us who, at one time in his life or the other, has not, in the course of his mental or spiritual adventures, experienced its charms. There is a realm beyond the reach of our five senses, and whether you reach it through the faith of the Soofis or through pure reason, the joy in the attainment is the same. Shakespeare was not joking when he asked, "Hast thou any philosophy in thee, shepherd?" for there exists that imaginative faculty in every human being which, despite Aristotle's appellation of him as a political animal, makes him more suited to be called a philosophical being. To put it at its lowest, so long as imagination remains a human faculty, philosophy in its larger sense will remain of human interest.

To the administrator in India, inheriting as an Indian the traditions of diverse philosophies, Hindu, Muslim, and others, this "vital" philosophy, as I have called it, has immeasurable value. Just as Logic may afford training

to his thought, and Psychology a scientific insight into the working of the human mind, so the appreciation of mysticism and philosophy may bring a greater realization of unity in the midst of what is only an apparent conflict, and of the true basis of such concepts as Equity and Justice. It may lend that poise to his judgment which may otherwise be found wanting.

Your deliberations can therefore be of great utility. Scientific misapplication of doctrines like those of the survival of the fittest, even of a political ideal like nationalism, is leading to the worship of Might, and to the oppression of the weak by the strong. Just as Architecture is harmony in brick and mortar, music in sound, painting in colour, so philosophy is harmony in thought and mysticism harmony in life. I hope your deliberations will contribute to the creation of such harmony in thought and life, particularly in the thoughts and lives of those millions, differing in creed and caste, who alike are sons of our common Motherland.

NEW BOOKS

Language and Reality. By Wilbur Marshall Urban. In the "Library of Philosophy" series. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 755. Price 21s.)

The conclusion of Professor Urban's book is that Metaphysics is not only a possible but an actual body of knowledge and one without which the utterances of scientists, poets, religious teachers, logicians, and plain men would be senseless. And he defends Metaphysics—which he takes in no watered-down sense—not only against the old charge that its conclusions are unprovable, or the Kantian charge that the arguments for any given metaphysical conclusions are counterbalanced by equally cogent arguments for its contradictory, but also and especially against the recent charge that metaphysical assertions are just breaches of good grammar. Metaphysical propositions assert the existence of, and ascribe properties to, "metempirical entities," and they are to be found in that corpus of metaphysical knowledge which constitutes the Great Tradition or *philosophia perennis*, namely, the body of Greek-Christian speculation, minus, apparently, certain relatively subordinate matters which are the points of disagreement between, say, Aristotle and Spinoza, or Aquinas and Hegel.

The volume (which is of veritably Giffordian dimensions) seems to skip no topic and to omit reference to no historic or contemporary theory relevant to the general problems of the rules of significant symbolism and the special one of the criterion of significant symbolism in Metaphysics. This review will perforce make no mention of many of these topics.

Professor Urban acknowledges and emphasizes many of the reasons which have of recent years led philosophers to make problems about language, significance, and nonsense cardinal to all other philosophical questions. But his whole argument is in the direction of drawing from his study of these problems lessons diametrically opposed to the sceptical, agnostic, and positivistic lessons which have been drawn by the chief philosophical inceptors of these inquiries. He admits the demand for criteria between significant and nonsensical assertions, but denies that the criterion of empirical verifiability is, save in a restricted domain, either sufficient or necessary. Construing (somewhat arbitrarily) the verifiability-principle as requiring verification in sense-experience, excluding verification in introspection and memory-experiences, he finds that assertions about other minds and about values remain significant although not sensibly verifiable. He therefore introduces a new significance-criterion which he calls not "verification" but "authentication." A symbol is authentic, apparently, if two conditions are fulfilled: namely, first, if it rings a public bell, that is, if it is the vehicle of some genuinely shared experience; and second, if it expresses an experience possessing an objective reference to an independent reality; expressions of some emotions, for instance, are vehicles of the emotional intuition of independently existing values.

Many things are real which are not among the things and events namable in the vocabularies of physicists, and the symbols for these reals are authentic but not sensibly verifiable. So the utterances of the poet, the prophet, and the metaphysician can and do express direct, but non-sensible, acquaintance-

ship with features or elements of reality. Moreover, the things which poets, prophets, and metaphysicians tell us about are not only more important than the things which the empirical sciences describe, they are cardinal to our understanding of the scientists' reports. These are meaningless save as properly inserted into the map provided by the seer.

However, there remains an important difference between the dictions of the scientist on the one hand and those of the poets, prophets, and philosophers on the other. The utterances, or some of them, of the former class are intended to be understood literally, while those of the latter classes are not to be understood literally. These are in one degree or another "symbolic," or metaphorical, or allegorical. To understand them we have to apprehend an inner meaning which is very different from what we seem to find when we try to construe these utterances literally. Nor must we say that the poet or the prophet cannot say what he means; the point is that he can and does say what he means, only in vehicles removed, because lifted, from their empirical fact-recording functions. In their new function they state metempirical facts or (I suppose) metempirical fictions. The highest class of non-literal utterances is metaphysics. In a certain way, only in talking metaphysically are we talking real sense. We could not say anything significant in science, common sense, ethics, poetry or religion unless presupposed in our assertions were certain propositions to articulate which is to talk metaphysics. In metaphysics we are talking about metempirical entities and metempirical properties of them, such as Selves, Values, God, the Infinite, and so on. These constitute the subjects of metaphysical propositions. But the predicates of these propositions, as well as the grammar of the unions of these subjects with these predicates, are lifted from ordinary literal diction. Yet they are not in this new use to be understood literally. They are meant analogically, and when so understood the propositions are significant and of radical importance. (It is not clear what tells us which of them are true.) The general corpus of these radical metaphysical truths is the Greek-Christian *philosophia perennis*—I suppose an expanded and modernized Thomism. But what specimens may be offered of metaphysical truths is, to put it with seeming cynicism, of relatively slight importance. The important point is whether the argument is valid for the possibility of knowledge of metempirical facts.

For all the book's encyclopaedic range—and length—it is not very easy to trace the central thread of the argument for its main thesis. An enormous number of small points are made or essayed, peripheral rejoinders are sketched, and objections met or discounted; but when the lopping and barking are done, the central timber does not bulk very large.

I think, but without great confidence, that the following points are at the heart of Professor Urban's thesis. All experiences or plenty of experiences, besides cognitive ones, have objective reference, so there must exist special entities for experiences, such as aesthetic, ethical, and religious emotions, to refer to. All words, save nonsense-words (which are not really words) are names, so there must exist entities having these names. The significance of words which do not signify—or are not being used to signify—sensible objects consists in their signifying the objects to which non-sensitive experiences refer. This alone is necessary and sufficient to explain the significance of words in their metaphorical, allegorical, and analogical uses, i.e. when they are not being used literally to signify sensible objects. All propositions assert the possession by substances of attributes, so all significant statements have genuine entities for their subjects, though these hail from different universes of discourse.

Unfortunately all these points are very obscure, and, as I am tempted to

interpret them, all are, I believe, false. It is not true that if I desire or imagine something, there exists something of which it is true that this is what I wanted or fancied. It is not true that all words are significant in the same way, namely, that of being something's name. The "Fido"-Fido relation is a special and not a general one. If all words were names in the same way, either "Fido Mary" would be a sentence or else, "unless to-day is Thursday, I am mistaken" would be an inventory of entities. Most words are not "Fido" words, but their not being names does not render them meaningless.

The fact that many words have metaphorical uses does not entail the existence of extra strata of entities for these words to be the names of. If I call a man "a willing horse," I am indicating certain tissues of similarities between his behaviour, treatment, etc., and that of a willing horse. To indicate analogies between ordinary objects does not entail mentioning an extra object. And, finally, most propositions are not simple singular attributive propositions, so the fact that their expressions are significant does not entail the existence or subsistence of appropriate substances.

There remain, of course, a great number of matters Professor Urban's discussions of which are well worth study. His inquiry into the nature of communication and his accounts of the special nature of value-propositions and of the internal connections of thought, language, and communication are of considerable interest. I know of no comparable treatment of the whole question, which has been unduly neglected, of the non-literal or "symbolic" uses of expressions. The author shows how these occur and have to occur not only in poetical and religious fields but also in the field of science itself; and he is thus led to discuss with a good deal of insight the sorts of thinking that enter into poetry, religion, and the nascency of scientific theories.

Similarly, in his discussion of the nature of metaphysical utterances, though I think it governed by a false equation of signifying and naming, he seems to me to have considerable success in making good his position that such utterances often mean something and something other than what they seem to be saying when taken *au pied de la lettre*. Genuine nonsense is uttered, even by metaphysicians, less commonly than is sometimes (not uneagerly) supposed. Only their utterances often need re-formulation in order to dispel both taunts and enthusiasms.

In conclusion, Professor Urban's book is serious, stimulatingly counter-revolutionary, encyclopaedic, and (in the topics and persons commented on, and in some respects in manner) up to date. It is not epoch-making, but neither is it negligible.

GILBERT RYLE.

On Hegel's Critique of Kant. By JOSEF MAIER. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. x + 108. Price 9s. 6d.)

Books about Hegel these days are rare; good books about Hegel are very rare. Mr. Maier is to be congratulated on writing about him with clarity and with mastery of the Hegelian idiom; at least one feels that Macran and McTaggart—and Hegel (!)—would think so.

Expressed very briefly, the author's aim is to state, specifically with regard to ethics, the defects that Hegel found in Kant, and to show that these defects

reappear in Hegel. The book is more important than its size or its academic theme would suggest: for Hegel, despite his almost complete neglect in philosophic circles, propounded a theory of the State which has been variously supposed to lead to Prussianism (and presumably Nazism) and Marxism, so that any light that can be thrown on what Hegel's ethics and politics actually were may well be valuable.

In describing the relation to Kant, Mr. Maier makes use of some very interesting material which he draws from early papers of Hegel's: one of the chief points thus established is the extraordinary identity between the early Hegel and the Kantian ethics. Because of an inherent dualism in this, Hegel breaks away from it. In describing what Hegel found unsatisfactory in Kant and the concept of morality that he put in its place, it is a pity that Mr. Maier did not take the opportunity of analysing Hegel's views by attempting to answer some of the many difficulties about them that have been raised by Professor Carritt ("Hegel's Sittlichkeit," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S. vol. xxxvi, London, 1936). The present book suggests that the author might well be able to answer at least some of Professor Carritt's very difficult questions.

The most important part of the book is the chapter entitled: "Critical Evaluation of Hegel's Position." The author criticizes Hegel (1) on three general grounds connected with the dialectic, and (2) on particular grounds connected with morality.

(1) Mr. Maier objects that the dialectic in *The Phenomenology of Mind* from sense to universal does not start from sense at all; that the so-called "movement" of the dialectic is in no sense a movement; and that Hegel fails to show any identity between thought and being.

It would seem that the author makes a good point when he claims that the dialectic of sense does not really start from an absolutely sensuous "here"—in other words, that the "here" is conceived as a universal from the beginning or that the dialectic involves a *petitio principii*. But his criticism of the "movement" of the dialectic is not so cogent, because he does not explain what Hegel meant by this. The third criticism follows as a corollary. There is unfortunately no space to discuss these points at all fully.

One lapse about terminology should be noted. Mr. Maier does not mention whether he is using "notion" or "concept" for *Begriff*—on p. 48 he uses the former and on p. 82 he appears to use the latter. In other cases of technical terms he is careful to mention the German original.

(2) Having charged Kant's ethic with being purely *formal*, Hegel is in the dilemma either of making the State into an ideal, unattained so far by any existing State, *i.e.* of making the State something that *ought* to be but *is* not, and thus repeating Kant's formalism, or of raising a contingent State (in fact, the Prussian) to being absolute. Otherwise expressed, Hegel's dialectic must become formal and devoid of content or empirical, and so the dualism that in Hegel's eyes vitiated all philosophy from Descartes to Kant, Fichte, and Schelling breaks out even in the principle that was designed to merge that dualism.

Hegel would probably reply to Mr. Maier that he was not erecting an empirical phase into an absolute, but that the Prussian State conformed to the dialectic in its most concrete form. However, it would be difficult to prove that at one particular place in Europe and at one particular time in history the Ideal State came into being with dialectical necessity. One would have thought that the supposedly abstract and irrational nature of space and time would have precluded the existence in space and time of any ideal stage of the dialectic. The author would seem to be on the track of a major defect in Hegel and it is regrettable that he did not pursue the matter further.

Mr. Maier gives a lucid exposition of Hegel's dialectical attempt "to show that the philosophy of practical reason bears an inner contradiction. The moral law demands, 'Help the poor.' Real aid would consist in the abolition of poverty. But with the abolition of poverty the duty to help the poor would disappear because there would be no poor" (p. 53). Hence if duty is to remain, poverty must remain also and so duty will be unfulfilled. "Thus the maxim 'Help the poor,' which is thought to be a universal law, abolishes itself" (*Ibid.*). It would surely be difficult to find a more plausible example of dialectic; yet the reasoning would seem to be quite *pseudo*. We have only to make the maxim read: "If there are poor, it is a duty to help them," whereupon the falsity of the antecedent no longer renders the maxim incapable of fulfilment. All that would remain of the dialectic would be a practical maxim on the best form of aid to render.

We come now to the Introduction! This, if relevant to the theme of the book, should come at the end, and be expanded at considerable length. It contains hints of some further aim, besides those already described, that the author is striving towards.

The doctrines of all philosophies up to and including Hegel were "all solutions of the fundamental problem of the capitalist world . . ." (p. 4). The bourgeois thinker has similar problems. Like the idealist he, too, can harmonize the bourgeois world only by interpreting the world as a product of thought. The need for this exists because "men have abandoned the attempt to reform social life from its foundations and . . . are seeking the solution of the antagonisms of society in thought rather than in 'being' " (p. 5). Idealists replace the search for a moral re-ordering of life by systems of theoretical morality divorced from practice. Idealism, therefore, leaves the fundamental problems of human existence incomprehensible within its own framework. Mr. Maier hopes to use Hegel's critique of Kant as an illustration of this. He does not explain the application of the illustration, but presumably it is of the following kind. The capitalist system involves a social dualism, which was not recognized directly; it was manifested indirectly through philosophical dualism; the systems from Descartes to Hegel attempted to grasp existence as a whole in order to overcome this dualism; successive failures were followed by better attempts; the best and last attempt due to Hegel shows that even his magnificent attack on the Kantian dualism failed to overcome it; hence his ethics remained dualistic, formal, and out of touch with the realities of human existence. Thus these philosophers tried to solve a social dualism by an *a priori speculation* instead of by *action*. What Mr. Maier actually says in his introduction is not so precise as this; in clarifying it, therefore, I hope that I have not misconstrued his thesis.

If the present title and preface correctly describe the subject-matter of the book, namely, an investigation about Hegel's relation to Kant, then the present introduction is wholly out of place. But if, as the introduction suggests, the author's intention was to insinuate a thesis about social dualism under the cloak of philosophical discussion, then the thesis, which is of considerable interest, would need so much explanation and justification that it would require several chapters devoted solely to it, and it should appear *after* the conclusions about Hegel's formalism have been reached. Mr. Maier has, however, steered clear of combining an exposition on social dualism with his critique of Hegel, with the result that we have a valuable discussion of Hegel's ethics criticized in part from Hegel's own standpoint untrammelled by an additional thesis, which perhaps Mr. Maier will give us an opportunity of studying fully in another volume.

J. O. Wisdom.

The Philosophy of John Dewey. (The Library of Living Philosophers. Vol. I.) Edited by P. A. Schilpp. (Evanston and Chicago, North-Western University. 1939. Pp. xv + 708. Price $4.)

This book is the first of a series which has a rather novel plan. Mr. Schilpp, the editor, who seems to have taken Schiller's *Must Philosophers Disagree?* very much to heart, maintains that he has evolved a workable scheme for preventing confusion (not all of it but much) about the meaning of any considerable philosopher of the present day to whom the gods have granted a longish life. The scheme is in effect that several eminent contemporaries should be asked to say what they think about so-and-so's philosophy, and that so-and-so should reply to them with some fullness. The present elaborate volume follows this plan. Seventeen persons, some of them eminent and all of them men of weight, discuss Dewey's philosophy in essays, for the most part, of twenty to thirty pages. Dewey replies to the bunch in about ninety pages. There is an introductory biography, in this case by Dewey's daughters with some help from J. D. himself, and there is a very full bibliography (of 65 pages).

The biography, I think, is very well done, and tells us much that is interesting and helpful about the foreground and about the background of Dewey's lifework. The only complaint I have to make is that it does not seem to me to say enough, or to suggest enough, about the exceptional personal charm of its subject.

The essays deal with different aspects of Dewey's many-sided activities in philosophy. They discuss his psychology, his epistemology, his metaphysics, his aesthetics, as well as his views about politics, ethics, and religion. The authors are of very different types and training. Some of them, very properly, were Dewey's pupils, or had other special opportunities for assimilating the Dewey atmosphere. Such are Ratner, Geiger, Kilpatrick, Childs, Randall, and Piatt. Others write more from the outside: M. Parodi from Paris, Messrs. Reichenbach and Bertrand Russell from temporary academic addresses in America, Mr. Santayana from Rome, and Dr. Whitehead from his second home in Harvard.

Whitehead's essay is just a two-page eulogy. Mr. Russell's professes to be, and for the most part *is* restricted to Dewey's latest considerable book, the *Logic*. Santayana's is in substance an old review of Dewey's *Experience and Nature* (Dewey's principal book of naturalistic metaphysics), and Dewey complains with some asperity that Santayana has ignored the reply that Dewey published. (But the review was brilliant and deserves resurrection.) Each of the other contributors has made a serious attempt to assemble the most important things that Dewey has said at various times upon the subject of the individual essay. Mr. Reichenbach does not altogether conceal his belief that we do that sort of thing much better now. Mr. Murphy, in his very able critical paper, may not wholly convince us by his denial that he is attempting to rewrite Dewey's philosophy on the lines that it should have taken. On the whole, however, the book reflects very great credit upon all the contributors, and so upon the editor in selecting them. Those who are rather particularly sympathetic towards Dewey (and particularly his pupils) keep well on the hither side of idolatry and give effective and useful expositions that really do expound and clarify. The critics are frank, and mean to be friendly as well as fair. In short, the contributors have entered into the spirit of their enterprise and the result is a valuable book, far more important than most commemorative volumes. (The book commemorates Dewey's eightieth birthday.)

Dewey, as he says himself, had to undertake something very difficult when he agreed to reply. He has elected to be rather brief about those who were expositors rather than critics, but it was very important to tell us, as he does very candidly, which interpretations he on the whole accepts. To his critics, and especially to the bigger among them, he attempts to reply pretty fully. He has pretty sharp things to say about some of them and about what he takes to be misunderstanding on their parts. Consequently he leaves the reader with a very pretty set of problems. Do they really misunderstand him, or he them, or does each misunderstand the other? Have critics such as Russell or Murphy put their fingers upon weak spots in the Dewey philosophy? Does Dewey himself understand what the weakness is supposed to be? Have they discovered blind spots in his philosophical vision or are they the dupes of an illusion that Dewey himself had understood and conjured away? That is just the sort of question that a book like this should evoke. That it does so, and does so very fully, is a tribute to its genuine success in its novel and irenic kind.

JOHN LAIRD.

Charles Peirce's Empiricism. By JUSTUS BUCHLER, Ph.D. With a Foreword by Professor ERNEST NAGEL. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1939. Pp. xvii + 275. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

As Mr. Buchler says, "it is as the profoundest analyst in American philosophy that Peirce should continue to be known." That is high praise, but it is only just, and it is fortunate that the contemporary vogue of analysis in philosophy has encouraged the study of a man of genius who otherwise might not have received much more attention after his death than before it.

In setting himself to make this close study of Peirce's empiricism, Mr. Buchler has been most judicious. Peirce's is now a very famous name, but the many bulky volumes of his *Collected Works* (recently published) are almost as hard to grasp as to ignore. His thought is challenging but dispersed, and it provokes as well as stimulates. Anyone who can make an accurate and coherent story even of a substantial part of Peirce's main contribution to philosophy has put the rest of us under a very deep obligation, and Mr. Buchler, in my judgment, has succeeded to a degree that would be astonishing if it were not obviously so very well earned. From involved and repetitious material he has spun a smooth fabric that in a sober way (and despite his fondness for splitting infinitives) is also elegant. He may perhaps, as he himself incidentally suggests (p. 200), be a little too much concerned with Peirce's anticipations of modernity, but it would be inhuman to rob us of that aspect of Peirce, a big part of a big man.

Mr. Buchler forestalls criticism by insisting that he has confined himself to Peirce's empiricism. "For those, then, who hold," he says, "that Peirce is essentially a metaphysician, what follows will be an abstraction from his writings (and I am content to show that what is abstracted is self-sufficient); for those who hold that Peirce is radically inconsistent it will simply be an exposition ignoring one side of the inconsistency; and for those, finally, who regard Peirce as essentially an empiricist it will perhaps be a stimulus to further study of him." Directly or indirectly, however, a man of Mr. Buchler's thoroughness cannot discuss Peirce's empiricism without also discussing the greater part of his general philosophy, and Professor Nagel in his preface says as much by implication.

The book is divided into three parts—"Critical Common-sensism" (Pierce's

term), "Pragmatism," and "The Formal and the Empirical." These Parts are subdivided into numbered sections but not into chapters. In the three Parts together there are fifty-two sections.

I hope I have indicated with sufficient plainness that I think very highly of the book. It is timely; I believe its exposition to be accurate as well as (obviously) careful; and it deals with matters that are subtle and important as well as fashionable. That having been said, and repeated for emphasis, I reserve for myself the liberty to be querulous rather than complaining. The arrangement that Mr. Buchler has selected may have been the best that his material permitted and he *has* brought order into it. Nevertheless, it is hard on the reader. Some of the sections follow one another in a natural sequence; others (I think) don't. The reader's attention is frequently distracted by the rapid juxtaposition of sections that may be connected but that look pretty thoroughly distinct. And the reader does not have very much warning. Again, the reader seems to me to be tried rather severely by the fact that the first part deals with Common-sensism. Chronology and some other good reasons (I make no doubt) led to, if they did not compel, Mr. Buchler's choice; but the first part is pretty hard going, and it seems to me to be more condensed and rather less consecutive than the other parts, at least in an obvious way. (It contains more than half the sections of the entire book; in other words, its constituent sections are about half the length of the other sections upon an average). In comparison the middle part, on Pragmatism, is very much easire to follow; and some readers may find it more exciting, not less challenging, and more readily assimilable into their philosophical systems. If any reader shares my feeling with regard to Part I, I hope he will on no account omit Part II, and in that case I am confident that he will not stop until he has read the book through. Nor will that be the end of his acquaintance with the book.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Moral Philosophy of Santayana. By MILTON KARL MUNITZ. (New York: Columbia University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 116. Price 11s. 6d.)

Santayana professed that his main interest was in moral philosophy. Yet he thought the belief in obligations absurd, and hardly less absurd the belief that anything is good, except in the sense that it may be a cause of satisfaction to some conscious being. What then is left as the subject of his "moral philosophy"? He would reply: "All that is left as the subject of Spinoza's or Aristotle's Ethics." He held that moral philosophy was a guide to happiness:—to the art of harmonizing one's desires and "clarifying one's ideals"; desires and ideals being all naturalistically and in the last resort physically determined. And no doubt Aristotle can be interpreted in a sense not far from this if we leave out of account his teleological conception of nature. Spinoza, again, verbally agreed with Hobbes that "good" means what a man desires. But it is hard to think that this adequately expresses his real belief. And we may think that if he had not committed himself to it, he might have expressed his real beliefs less mysteriously.

In Santayana, too, Dr. Munitz notes a constant see-saw between a naturalistic position and mysticism. His very denial, at one moment, that we can rationally recognize any real duties or goods drives him, at the next, to a dogmatic assertion of the sole value of a mystical or non-rational absorption in the contemplation of pure being, which entails, as regards conduct, quietism. In other words, Santayana was no philosopher but the poet, or rhetorician,

of inconsistent moods, between which he fluctuated because each was irrational.

The book is not clearly written. For instance: "the order of preference is determined by an intellectual clarification of which ideals will stand higher after analysis of their representative scope and inclusiveness" (pp. 84–5), and "if we substitute much of Santayana's account in the later works of the Realm of Essence as it figures for the spiritual life for the "absolute" of the above quotation, and his doctrines of a complete "disintoxication of values" and the "absolute good" of spiritual insight for the mystic's programme of moral abstention, we find that the situation is not at all changed" (p. 95).

E. F. CARRITT.

Last Lectures. By ROGER FRY. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. xxix + 361. Price 21s.).

Baldwin Brown and Roger Fry contributed more than any other English writers of their generation to a theoretical understanding of the visual arts. But the former, being an obscure professor, was unknown save to a handful of scholars, whereas the latter, being primarily an art critic in open revolt against contemporary standards, became a household word among painters and frequenters of art galleries in his own lifetime. These lectures, delivered as Slade Professor at Cambridge, are a prologue to a universal history of art combined with a brief excursion into the generalities of aesthetics. The prologue opens in ancient Egypt and the curtain falls again in ancient Greece. What a feast for the art historian had its author lived to cover the Renaissance, the classical schools that followed it, and the modern period in which he had already sifted with so sure a taste the lasting from the ephemeral! *Sunt lacrimae rerum.* . . .

Fascinating as the plentiful illustrations of the historical chapters are in themselves, and because Fry's comments reveal a host of unsuspected beauties, his theoretical views are necessarily the main attraction for the aesthetician. Without attempting any comprehensive definition of art, or even visual art, he singles out for detailed description the qualities of "sensibility" and "vitality" that appealed to him most strongly in objects as different in other respects as a Chinese portrait, an Egyptian mask, or a Grecian statue.

By "sensibility" he means the organic relationship between shapes and contours and colours that lends the genuine work of art unity amidst variety; "in art there is at once order and uniqueness, which means incessant variation from the precise or mathematical order." And by "vitality," to which he attaches little importance unless combined with formal excellence, he means the vital energy and suggestiveness of the human or animal figure depicted by the artist. This fusion of form and content in the finest products of the visual arts is entirely consistent with the doctrine outlined in his earlier writings; in my history of modern aesthetics, published six years ago, I pointed out that Fry alone among the prominent art critics of his day avoided the pitfall of an exclusive and one-sided formalism. But his lack of psychological knowledge prevented him from analysing the vitalizing mechanism of the mind in the same precise and methodical fashion as he analysed the relations between the shapes and colours of a successful design.

It is a striking paradox that the man who did more than any other to refine and improve the artistic taste of his generation should deny the existence of aesthetic standards. He refuses objective validity to the judgment of taste because, unlike the scientific judgment which rests on the immutable facts of

sensation and experience, it is determined by the private feelings of every individual who reacts aesthetically to art or nature. And our feelings are as fickle as an April day. No one could meet this reverberating challenge to aesthetic orthodoxy within the compass of a brief review. But as I believe that standards of taste are not an arbitrary invention of arrogant highbrows, it is at any rate not inconsistent for me to take exception to certain deviations from the perfect assessment I detected in the historical survey.

There is, it seems to me, a serious overvaluation in the author's estimate of negro art. Now no one probably would deny that even the arrested civilization of tribal life has produced remarkable works of art; yet I doubt whether they would bear comparison with the finest products of a full-blown civilization. And when I read of the "spirit head" reproduced in Plate 96, an object little different from countless other wooden fetishes, that "work like this seems to transport us into the remote regions of the spiritual life, which some of the greatest musicians and a very few of the greatest artists alone have explored," I must confess I gasped.

The under-valuation of Greek art is less serious an aberration because it usefully debunks the stiff, pseudo-Egyptian figures of the archaic period which have received the indiscriminate blessing of many devotees of classical art; and because, though in theory he condemns even the fifth century for its mathematical and conceptual bias, in practice he does not conceal his delight in the harmonious and rhythmic beauty of the tranquil figures from the Parthenon. There is a brilliant introduction by Sir Kenneth Clark which shows the intimate understanding of a personal friend as well as the judgment of a sensitive and balanced critic.

LISTOWEL.

The Nature of Self. By A. C. MUKERJI, M.A., Reader in Philosophy, Allahabad University. (Allahabad: The Indian Press. 1938. Pp. xii+359. Price Rs. 5.)

The purpose of this book is to unroll the problem of the "self" in the light of comparative philosophy in order to demonstrate that of all attempts to solve it, Western and Indian ones, Śankara's solution is the only consistent one. The book covers much the same ground as the author's excellent work *Self, Thought, and Reality* published in 1933 (reviewed in *Philosophy*, vol. xi, p. 103 f.), but Indian philosophy, confined in the latter to the last two chapters, appears from the outset side by side with the Western views.

Of all contributions as yet made to the comparison of Indian and Western philosophy this is very likely the most useful one. It is not, as were former contributions, "either predominantly historical and descriptive or . . . contented . . . with discovering stray similarities between the Western and Indian thought," but a "serious attempt . . . to undertake a comparative study for mutual supplementation of arguments and consequent clarification of issues" (Preface). The reader will be surprised at the multitude of close and sometimes almost verbal parallels between Indian and Western philosophers brought to light here.

For the course of the inquiry we may refer to the titles of the nine chapters, viz.: (i) The Ego-Centric Paradox, (ii) The Psychological Theory, (iii) The Epistemological Theory, (iv) The Relational Theory of Consciousness, (v) Consciousness as a Quality, (vi) Consciousness and Change, (vii) Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, (viii) Absolute Consciousness, (ix) Hegelian Absolutism. The book closes with an Appendix on "The Rôle of Reasoning in Advaita Philosophy," calling attention to the fact (often ignored by

Western authors) that for Śankara a rigorous philosophical discipline is one of the conditions for the attainment of the (irrational) highest experience.

The backbone of the work is the proposition that "the epistemological and the psychological attitudes are as distant from each other as the north pole and the south pole" (p. 59). Both Kant and Śankara were penetrated by it, and they were also at one in explaining the psychological attitude as the fatal confusion (called "transcendental illusion" by the former and *dahyāsa*, false attribution, by the latter) of "the self as the knowing subject with one of the objects which the self knows" (as the mind; p. 24). But Kant stopped at the noumenon as a "negative limiting concept," and post-Kantian philosophy, if not denying the reality of consciousness (relational theory), either yielded to agnosticism by depriving the self of all its meaning or endeavoured in vain "to hold together the theory of a knowable ego with the distinction of the self as subject from the self as a substance" (p. 66). Śankara, on the other hand, found, by a descent, as it were, into the ego, its real nature to be consciousness itself, i.e., the fundamental, contentless consciousness required for explaining the identity-feeling and psychical continuity (p. 226) and proved by dreamless sleep where, as he says, "the appearance of unconsciousness is due to the absence of objects, not to the absence of consciousness" (ibid.).

Our author complains (p. 228) that "the epistemological significance of deep sleep has been sorely misinterpreted or ignored" in the West (cf. in *Philosophy*, vol. xii, p. 337, v. Subrahmaya Iyer's view; also vol. xiv, p. 239) and accuses, as the chief sinner against Śankara's Absolute, the late Professor Paul Deussen. While disagreeing in general with the latter's views we can yet not help thinking, as he does, that an object-less (non-dual) consciousness is for us something quite incomprehensible. We are further not certain at all that the idea of an Absolute that can serve "as an explanatory principle of human knowledge and experience" (p. 306) does not involve a contradiction in terms. And is not the use made by Śankara of the phenomenon of dreamless sleep a relapse into the psychological attitude?

F. Otto Schrader.

Indian Realism. By Jadunath Sinha, M.A., Ph.D., Premchand Roychand Scholar, Professor of Philosophy, Meerut College. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 1938. Pp. xvi+287. Price 10s. 6d.).

Dr. Jadunath Sinha has already earned for himself the reputation of one of the best-informed and ablest exponents of Indian philosophy, viz. by his book *Indian Psychology: Perception* (London, 1934). His present work is in no way inferior to this and will not only appeal to those to whom it is dedicated, viz. "The Contemporary Western Realists who may feel a sense of kinship with the Realists of Ancient and Medieval India," but to everybody interested in comparative philosophy, though it refrains from drawing parallels with the West, excepting the almost irresistible and highly instructive ones with Berkeley, Locke, and Hume. The book opens with a chapter on the Yogācāra Vijñānavāda, i.e. the Buddhistic Subjective Idealism, which it tries to "reconstruct" on the base of the sketch thereof given by Mādhavācārya (14th century) in his compendium of Indian philosophical systems (Sarvadarśana-samgraha) and of the works of two Buddhistic authors and typical exponents of that doctrine, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (8th century). The next two chapters give an account of the most interesting inter-Buddhistic controversy between Subjective Idealism and Representationism, and

then there follows until the end of the work the (exposition and) refutation of Subjective Idealism by its non-Buddhistic opponents, viz., the advocates of the Jaina Realism (chapter iv), Sāṃkhya-Yoga Realism (v), Mīmāṃsaka Realism (vi), Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism (vii), and finally by Śaṅkara and the founders or chief representatives of the other Vedāntic schools. There is a section also, in this last chapter, on Rāmānuja's criticism of the Buddhistic (Sautrāntika) Realism. The one thing we miss is a chapter or appendix on the establishment and criticism of Subjective Idealism within the school of Śaṅkara (*dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda, eka-jīva-vāda*).

F. Otto Schrader.

The Nature of Truth. An Essay. By H. H. Joachim. Second edition. (London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. viii + 182. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

It is now a third of a century since the first edition of this rather famous essay appeared, and there is still a demand for the book, despite the dissemination of two thousand copies. That is as it should be. There are few, if any, expositions of the metaphysics and epistemology of "truth" in our language that are as complete as Joachim's (despite its brevity), and few, if any, that so happily combine wide and faithful scholarship with deep and resolute argument. The author himself thought that no answer had been given to the second chapter of the essay, and that until such an answer was given, "logical analysis" and "logical positivism" had to be adjudged confused and worthless. His readers to-day might have been even more grateful than they are had Joachim, instead of producing this bland and blank negative, made some attempt, even the smallest, to show why he rejected the numerous replies that his book provoked, and (for instance) had explored the question why "external" relations could not relate. More generally, some readers may think that he was and remained too confident a Bradleian, even in his very diffidence regarding what must be yet, if it could be at all, must be greatly dark. But, however that may be, it is beyond dispute that Joachim wrote with a scrupulous care and with a nervous elegance (although not always, I think, with a precision) that gave wide pleasure and deserved universal praise. It is characteristic of him that one of the most beautiful of the many beautiful passages in the book is a footnote (p. 161).

This second edition has been efficiently and unobtrusively edited by Professor Collingwood. It is reprinted photographically from corrected sheets of the first edition. The corrections are not numerous. Some of the corrected pages are not quite pleasant to the eye, and the correction of one sentence —the last of the second paragraph on p. 64—seems to have had a mischievous effect upon the preceding sentence. These, however, are trivialities. In substance this second edition is a true picture of the best work of one of the finest minds of our time.

John Laird.

Four Ways of Philosophy. By Irwin Edman. (London: Constable & Company, Ltd. 1939. Pp. viii + 331. Price 12s. net.)

Readers of *Philosophy* will know, if only from Professor Laird's recent view of this author's *Philosopher's Holiday*, that in Professor Edman they may look for an urbane and effective critic of life and thought, and for no mean stylist. In the present volume (an expansion of four lectures given at Amherst College, Massachusetts, and now dedicated to that great American

liberal, Benjamin Cardozo) they will find him returning from holiday themes to his work as a philosopher. Philosophy as he interprets it takes, in the main, four ways, namely: the way of logical faith (i.e. rationalism or idealism), of social criticism, of mystical insight (to which we might give the name 'supra-logical faith'), and of nature understood (i.e. naturalism). "It is not insisted upon," the author remarks, "that these are exhaustive . . . but it is submitted that these four, easily recognizable . . . are not only chronologically recurrent but psychologically typical" (p. 19). He does not in set terms discuss either scepticism, certainly perennial and typical, or phenomenalism, a philosophy now followed by many, and always by some since the days of the Megarians.

The first way is the anthropomorphic. It turns on the universalizing, in one way or another, of human intellect and human morality. Of this Professor Edman with William James judges firmly, howsoever gracefully, that it is the path of the tender minded. Its undoubted 'nobility' is merely that of the 'romantic imagination' (p. 88). His second is that which runs—a long but still the same road—from the fifth-century sophists to his own Dewey (of whose crabbed prose he quotes, with apparent approval, some grim examples). All these, in their several ways, make success the ultimate standard. While some philosophies belong openly to this type, all are in some measure social criticisms. They inevitably, if undesignedly, reflect the *ethos* of a time and place. The third, or mystical, way Professor Edman traces kindly but without conviction. He rightly points out that "The most empirical of thinkers is compelled to begin with data and with assumptions which he can neither prove nor refuse to accept. In the beginnings of thought, and in its culmination, philosophers touch the non-rational immediate . . ." (p. 222), Thus at points they willy-nilly join hands with the mystic, who, however. welcomes what they rather resent. The naturalist way, which is the author's, he modestly leaves until the last. His exposition of this variant of the philosophic theme brings him pretty close to Santayana. His naturalism renounces mechanism of the *L'Homme Machine* sort, asserting in its place that "Naturalism is simply a faith in the unity of nature or substance, of which all life is a derivation, upon which all action is posited, and within which the structure of mechanism is seen to be simply a systematized technique of practice and of economical understanding" (p. 268). Such a position is "an animal faith, not a theory." That it "makes no metaphysical generalizations," however, is a little difficult to swallow when, for example, we are told, "All the naturalist means by nature is that which in experience he finds" (so far so good): "a *dynamic substance* manifesting itself in action. in a thousand forms which he constantly recognizes" (p. 270, *my italics*). Upon the comforting and decisive phrase *dynamic substance*, apparently, the tougher fellows take their repose, leaving such stuff as *spirit* or *mind* for the Hegelian, or tenderer, sort.

That none of us need take our differences, or our lack of progress, too deeply to heart we are assured by the author. Philosophy is a lyric "whose theme happens to be nature and destiny" (p. 324). "That the talk of philosophers should differ is for exactly the same reason that the speech of poets differs." In this Professor Edman is at one with the logical positivists and their kin who hold that philosophy ought to be published, "not in *Mind* but in the *London Mercury*." If philosophy is not something more astringent, precise, and critical—if less charming—than it appears to be in this version, then he and they may very well be right. But my own worthless opinion is that they are alike wrong. Agreeing that there are perennial types of philosophy, must we not trace these not to diverse aesthetic and/or temperamental

attitudes primarily, but in principle to alternative intellectual attitudes and approaches, coupled with various basic valuations. Professor Edman recognizes the several ways of philosophy because at bottom none of them are really philosophical, that is to say logical. He has, when all is said, no trust whatsoever in reason. For a different animal than ourselves the laws of logic might (or probably would, *vide* pp. 249 ff.) be different. But such biologic, seemingly intelligible to those of the Dewey tradition, seems meaningless to many others, for whom it needs no argument to show that the principles of reason, whatsoever these may be, must hold for "all rationals." Genetic accounts of the growth and organic connections of reason bear in no wise upon its nature where it is admitted to be present. Such sentences as "thinking is not a static contemplation but a process of experimental control . . . a process among the processes of nature" (p. 249) give no loophole by which thought can elude its own laws. We may think about *different things*, and with differing hypotheses or postulates; we may 'think more of' (i.e. value differently) this or that; but if we think at all we can only think in the *same way*. It is not modest (in Professor Edman or anyone else) to depreciate human reason; it is unmeaning. The author of course may reply that such opinions merely dub his reviewer an adherent of logical faith, a rationalist: to which the rejoinder would seem to be that all philosophy without exception is an activity of logical faith. This the author very likely would not deny; but his faith does waver in a fashion no more compatible with philosophic naturalism than with idealism.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Philosophy in America from the Puritans to James. By P. R. ANDERSON and M. H. FISCH. (New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co. 1939. Pp. xiii + 570. Price 18s. net.)

An unusually wide significance must be assigned to the title of this volume, because it actually outlines, within the period indicated, "the main currents of American thought in its philosophical expressions." It includes, therefore, several thinkers who, as the authors themselves point out, "would hardly be designated 'philosophers' to-day." There must, in fact, be few readers familiar with the names of Urian Oakes and Cadwallader Colden, despite their exquisite Dickensian quality. This, however, clearly exhibits the powerful formative influence exercised here, as throughout the entire history of philosophy in its stricter sense, by political and social conditions, exaggerated though this principle has been by the current Marxist over-emphasis on purely economic factors.

American History, too, then, amply justifies our parodying a well-known proverb—that "controversy is the mother of metaphysics"; while some paradoxical Genetics involves that the more strenuous the parent, the subtler is her offspring. This becomes increasingly evident in following the advance from the first of the four eras dealt with—that of Colonial Thought—through the Age of Reason, succeeded by Transcendentalism and Evolution, to its final stage described by the more non-committal title, The Emergence of Contemporary Issues. Probably the difficulties of selection explain the mere quartette of the later period—Peirce, Harris, Royce, and James; but it is undeniable, in my opinion, that the second of these fully deserves this somewhat belated recognition. A further consideration has been the inclusion of material hitherto inaccessible, as in the cases of Benjamin Rush and Thomas Cooper.

The method adopted throughout is that of comparatively brief, but always competent, exposition alternating with characteristic extracts from the works of each individual writer. As might be anticipated, the earlier of these appear somewhat archaic. Cotton Mather, for instance, regarded the growing prominence of "Ethicks in our Colledges" as "a vile Peece of Paganism." But no adequately representative history of thought can escape this feature, tedious though it threatens to become; and it in no degree detracts from the value of this volume as a contribution to the clearer understanding of the evolution of one of the most important of all national systems of philosophic speculation.

J. E. Turner.

The Problem of the Future Life. By C. J. Shebbeare. (Oxford: Shakespeare Head Press. 1939. Pp. xiv + 96. Price 2s. 6d.)

Few writers upon the philosophy of religion know their way about the subject more adequately than Dr. Shebbeare, who has a singular power of finding the material he wants in all manner of places and of building it into a compact and lucid argument. He is equally at home with the technicalities of the philosophers and with the difficulties of the plain man, to whom, in the end, the philosophers are responsible. A writer who can outline his answer to the Hegelian Logic with real relevance in a four-page preface, and who can make some very incisive comments on Berkeley in a final Note, two pages long, has clearly the gift of conciseness. His whole book is only 96 pages in length, but it is packed full of matter. He seems to have asked all the important questions, and many secondary ones as well, and he answers them with striking decision and insight. His conclusions confirm, and in some cases almost go beyond, the ordinary faith of the Christian believer. He allows the dog-lover to be reunited to his dog, and the Homeric warriors the renewal of their zest for battle. But these things, and the doctrine of a bodily hereafter upon which they rest are defended in a manner which is truly philosophical The problems of Time and of Infinity are fully faced and discussed effectively. His theory rests firmly upon a belief in a personal and loving God, upon a determinism which is carefully reconciled with moral responsibility, and upon a conception of scientific prediction which implies a standard of value, or of approval. "The Idealism which denies the reality of Space, Matter, and Time" is firmly met and rejected, or, rather, replaced by an ingenious restatement too long to deal with here, except by noting that it closes by challenging the customary conception of substance as the correlatum of change, and suggests that it is more probably the correlatum of attribute.

L. W. Grensted.

Psychotherapy—Scientific and Religious. By Marcus Gregory. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1939. Pp. xvii+495. Price 21s.).

This is a learned and interesting book on the relationship between religion and mental and bodily healing. The author gives an account of the origin of mental healing in magical rites in Egypt and elsewhere, of the miracles of healing in the New Testament, and of psychotherapy and faith-healing in the present day. He maintains that religious healing was part of religion as taught by Jesus Christ, although he considers that the disciples departed in some respects from the methods taught by Jesus.

It is an interesting fact that most religious movements have initially been concerned with health of body and mind as well as with spiritual well-being.

Wesley gave medicines to his followers as well as religious teaching, and some of the early Buddhist scriptures are concerned with matters of medicine. There is no doubt that there has been a change of emphasis in the history of Christianity, shown, for example, by the changed use of unction for the sick in the Western Churches, in which it became a preparation for death instead of a healing rite. It is arguable that this change is simply a change in the direction of increased specialization; the priest retaining one side of religious influence, while the doctor fulfilled Christ's command to heal the sick. Until recent times, however, the development of lay medicine was in a direction which led solely to physical methods of treatment, and psychotherapy was a no-man's land, recognized by neither priest nor doctor as his own field, and open to invasion by quacks. The "faith-healing" movement was an attempt at its occupation by the priest at a time when it was already being increasingly occupied by doctors as a result of an impetus the origin of which is to be found very largely in the work of Freud. Dr. Gregory believes that it is a field in which the priest and the doctor may co-operate. Certainly the minister of religion who feels called on to work in the field of neurosis should know all he can of modern medical psycho-therapeutical methods. There is plenty that he can do without usurping the function of the doctor. Dr. Gregory's book can be recommended as an excellent introduction to the whole subject. It is written with a far wider knowledge than the ordinary introduction to psychotherapy intended for the non-medical reader.

R. H. Thouless.

Books received also:—

H. T. Pledge. *Science since* 1500. *A Short History of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology.* London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1939. Pp. 357. 7s. 6d.

H. N. Spalding. *Civilization in East and West: An Introduction to the Study of Human Progress.* London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. xv + 334. 15s.

F. McEachran. *The Life and Philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder.* Oxford: Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1939. Pp. 98. 7s. 6d.

B. K. Mallik. *The Real and the Negative.* London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1940. Pp. 539. 21s.

C. Bacon *Infinite Traveller: What of the Road?* London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1939. Pp. 300. 7s. 6d.

L. F. Anderson. *Logic and the Cosmic Order.* New York: The Theistic Society. 1939. Pp. 92.

L. F. Anderson. *God and the Cosmic Order.* New York: The Theistic Society. 1939. Pp. 155.

J. H. Woodger. *The Technique of Theory Construction.* (International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science: Vol. II, No. 5.) U.S.A.: University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1940. Pp. 81. 6s.

H. Miller. *History and Science. A Study of the Relation of Historical and Theoretical Knowledge.* Berkeley: University of California Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1939. Pp. x + 201. 12s.

A. C. Bradley. *Ideals of Religion.* (Gifford Lectures, 1907.) London: Macmillan & Co. 1940. Pp. viii + 286. 12s. 6d.

S. Alexander. *Philosophical and Literary Pieces* (With a Memoir). London: Macmillan & Co. 1940. Pp. viii + 390. 15s.

S. K. Ghoshal. *Sarkarism. The Ideas and Ideals of Benoy Sarkar On Man and His Conquests.* Calcutta: C. Chatterjee & Co. 1939. Pp. 57. 8 annas.

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CORRESPONDENCE

HEGEL AND PRUSSIANISM

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,—The question about Hegel is not whether he approved of the specific thing called Prussianism but whether he gave his authority to the doctrine that the State is not bound by the moral law as understood by individuals.

Professor Knox makes only one passing reference to Hegel's *Philosophy of History*—a work founded on lectures delivered in or about the year 1823, i.e. somewhat later than the *Philosophie des Rechts*, and usually regarded as the *locus classicus* for this subject. In this Hegel says explicitly and without qualification much of what the Professor appears to think he did not say, or at least did not mean.

"It is possible," he says in the *Philosophy of History*, "that world-historical men may treat other great, even sacred, interests inconsiderately; conduct which is indeed obnoxious to moral reprehension. But so mighty a form must trample down many an innocent flower—crush to pieces many an object in its path. . . . What the absolute aim of the spirit required and accomplished—what Providence does—transcends the obligations and the liability to imputation and the ascription of good and bad motives which attach to individuality in virtue of its social relations. . . . Moral claims that are irrelevant must not be brought into collision with world-historical deeds and their accomplishment. The litany of private virtues—modesty, humility, philanthropy, and forbearance—must not be raised against them."

Could the decree of divorce between public and private virtue have been pronounced in clearer language? But as if to make quite sure that there should be no mistake about it, Hegel proclaims that *The Prince* of Machiavelli is "the great and true conception of a real political genius with the highest and noblest intentions."

It is, no doubt, true that by linking it up with his "logical doctrine of the universal and the particular, and his metaphysical doctrine of the infinite and the finite" (Professor Knox's words), Hegel gave a philosophical (or pseudo philosophical) veneer to Machiavelli's justification of the unscrupulous use of fraud and force in the service of the State. In the same way he contrives to present the submission of the individual to and his absorption in the State—which to an Englishman is the denial of individual liberty—as the attainment of a higher liberty through his fusion with an "universal and subjective will" supposed to be embodied in the State. (The Hegelian always tries to get it both ways when he talks of freedom.) But this mystification has only added to the mischief by giving an appearance of philosophic respectability to what in effect is a crude denial that morality, as understood by individuals, has any relevance to the conduct of States.

We have here the origin of the grandiose nonsense with which the successors of Hegel, the Treitschkes, the Bernhardis, and finally Hitler and the Nazis, have embroidered the same doctrine. It is quite possible that Hegel would have disliked these developments—very few philosophers like the application of their theories to practical affairs—but the Hegelian doctrine, descending from the classroom to the camp, was entirely acceptable to the soldiers who interpreted submission to the State as obedience to them and their kind and who had always been convinced that might was the measure of right.

Yours faithfully,

J. A. Spender.

Farnborough, Kent.
January 1940.

HEGEL AND PRUSSIANISM

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Sir,—The question is not whether "the Treitschkes, etc." have found in Hegel isolated sentences in support of their own views (the devil can quote even Scripture to suit his own ends), but whether Hegel's political theory as a whole gives, or was intended to give, any support to the view that "might is right" or that "the

State is not bound by the moral law." This question, as I have argued in the article to which Mr. Spender's letter refers, is not to be answered by the citation of isolated passages from the *Philosophy of History* or elsewhere, but only by the study of Hegel's political theory *in extenso*.

Mr. Spender's quotations, when set in their context, do not seem to me to support his belief that Hegel gave "authority to the doctrine that the State is not bound by the moral law." In them Hegel is talking of great men and their deeds. Great men, he believes, are the unconscious tools of God's Providence, and what they really achieve (not what they *seem* to achieve) is a step forward in God's plan for the world, or, in other words, in mind's knowledge of itself, in self-conscious freedom. If you like, Hegel holds, you may judge that the great man is proud, immoral, heartless, and cruel, but these moral judgments are irrelevant because they apply only to the overt character of the great man's deed and not at all to the substance of what he effects. For instance, Caesar's opponents had the law and the constitution on their side, and his advance to autocracy was therefore technically unjust and wrong; but, Hegel argues, the foundation of the Roman Empire was an advance in civilization, an enrichment of human life, and this subsists as the substance of Caesar's achievement, be his personal immorality what it may.

Hegel holds further that at times before constitutional law is established, the great man has no option but to resort to force and violence in order to establish law and order ("mere goodness avails little against the force of nature"), and here again a moral judgment on the means used is irrelevant. Once a rational, i.e. a free, constitution is established, the right to use force has gone and changes must be brought about by constitutional means (*Philosophie des Rechts*, § 273, and *Zusatz* to § 93). Herein lies Hegel's agreement with Machiavelli, and Mr. Spender might in fairness have quoted from his own text, the *Philosophy of History*, what Hegel actually says about *The Prince* (Sibree's translation, New York, 1900, p. 403): "This book has often been thrown aside in disgust as replete with the maxims of the most revolting tyranny; but nothing worse can be urged against it than that the writer, having the profound consciousness of the necessity for the formation of a State, has here exhibited the principles on which alone States could be founded in the circumstances of the times. The chiefs who asserted an isolated independence, and the power they arrogated, must be entirely subdued; and though we cannot reconcile with our idea of freedom the means which he proposes as the only efficient ones, and regards as perfectly justifiable—inasmuch as they involve the most reckless violence, all kinds of deception, assassination, and so forth—we must nevertheless confess that the feudal nobility, whose power was to be subdued, were assailable in no other way, since an indomitable contempt for principle and an utter depravity of morals were thoroughly engrained in them."

Many writers, whom Mr. Spender might regard as less suspect than Hegel, have held that moral judgments are out of place in historical writing and that a moral judgment on a man's character is a quite different thing from, and one irrelevant to, the historical judgment on what he has achieved in public life. But still, even if this is wholly false, Mr. Spender has proved in his quotations nothing about Hegel's view of the State's relation to morality. It is precisely because Hegel holds that the *State* is the highest of ethical institutions that he is constrained to provide a special justification for the high-handed acts of great *men* and in fact regards these acts as strictly non-political. However, although as it seems to me Hegel clearly rejects the view held by "the Treitschkes, etc." of the relation between political and moral action, the question of what Hegel's own positive view on this question was is no easy one to answer, though I may say that, if I wanted to argue for Mr. Spender's answer, I would be inclined to base my reasons on Hegel's assertion (*Philosophie des Rechts*, §§ 333, 337) that though international law *ought* to be kept, the ultimate principle of the action of any State is regard for its own special welfare. Even there, however, I would have to take account of Hegel's denial (§ 337) that there is an opposition between morals and politics.

St. Andrew's University, T. M. Knox.
Scotland.

January 28, 1940.

INSTITUTE NOTES

As a special contribution to the problems of the present European crisis, a series of public addresses have been delivered in London during the past winter, entitled "The Deeper Causes of the War and its Issues." These addresses are to be published in a book by Messrs. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. An inset giving particulars of the contents of the book is inserted in this number of the Journal.

The following courses of lectures have been given during the winter Session: "Problems of Philosophy and Civilization," Miss Hilda D. Oakeley, M.A., D.Lit.; "Interpretation of Modes of Experience," Professor G. H. Langley; "The Contribution made by Greek Philosophy to Human Thought," The Director of Studies.

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Applications from candidates should be sent to Professor C. D. Broad, Trinity College, Cambridge, before May 6, 1940. In making his application a candidate should state his qualifications and claims, and his proposed course of research; he may also submit any work which he has written, published or unpublished. No testimonials are required from candidates who are graduates of Cambridge University or women students on whom a title of a degree has been conferred by that University. Other candidates must submit the names of three referees, and the Electors will not award the Studentship to any such candidate until they have had a personal interview with him.

The election to the Studentship will take place in the Easter Term of this year, and, if a candidate be elected, his tenure will begin at Michaelmas following the election.

January 31, 1940.

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

The Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the Journal, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

IN MEMORIAM: John Henry Muirhead, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A.

John Henry Muirhead died on the 24th of May last at the age of 85. I remember at the Oxford Congress of Philosophy after the war an occasion when Muirhead intervened in a discussion with the words: "I think I am the last of the idealist old gang and I have always been a peacemaker." A good description of himself. He began his philosophy under Edward Caird in Glasgow in the early seventies, and came as Snell Exhibitioner to Balliol in 1875. There he became a devoted pupil of Nettleship. Balliol legend said he was the famous Scot who to one of Nettleship's characteristic answers "Oh, I don't know," replied, "But you're paid to know," though Muirhead always denied the story. Like his distinguished tutor he got a first in classical Mods. and a second in Greats. His first teaching posts were classical. Then he taught both Classics and Philosophy at the Royal Holloway College; then Philosophy at Bedford College and then found his life-work when he became Professor of Philosophy in Birmingham in 1897. He became Emeritus Professor in 1920, but his philosophical activity and interests kept astonishingly alive up to the last. He did belong to "the idealist old gang." He had the broad interests typical of them. That can be seen by his writings on politics, on morals, and on poetry. He had their active interest in social reform and practical affairs. He was a great citizen of Birmingham. He had also their catholicity of mind. This is where his "peace making" came in. He had a very great power of understanding what philosophers were after even when he didn't agree with them. Witness his early work on Aristotle's *Ethics* and his last work appreciating Pritchard and Ross and Joseph. That catholicity and sympathy of mind served him well in his remarkable work as Editor of the Library of Philosophy. Only Muirhead could have seen the worth and importance of such diverse authors as he then collected.

He had also in a prominent degree, and as though they were part and parcel of his philosophy, wisdom and sweetness, and these combined gave him all his long life the gift of perpetual youth.

A. D. L.

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